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Introduction
This dissertation includes four self contained chapters that empirically investigate dierent
trade dampening phenomena. The first two chapters are closely related and constitute the
core of the dissertation. Both examine the eects of anti-dumping (AD) duties on trade.
Chapter 1 investigates the universe of EU imports to analyse the trade eects of AD duties
over exporting countries treated dierently in EU AD investigations. Chapter 2 uses Chinese
customs data to examine varying eects of AD duties on Chinese exporting firms across
dierent importing countries. Both chapters put a strong focus on addressing endogeneity
concerns linked to trade policy in general and AD duties in particular.
Chapter 3 also relates to trade policy, examining the trade dampening eects of non-tari
barriers. Particular emphasis is placed on the estimation of the eects of so called behind-the-
border measures, which are diicult to identify since they aect all exporters equally. Finally,
Chapter 4 shis the focus away from trade policy, using Chinese customs data to examine the
impact of maritime piracy on Chinese export flows as well as firms’ choice of transport mode.
Methodologically, a common theme across all chapters is the use of gravity equations as the
foundation for the empirical strategy. Not only does the gravity model have a proven track
record of predicting trade flows between countries (Baier and Bergstrand, 2009; Anderson,
2011; Head and Mayer, 2014; Yotov et al., 2016). As discussed in Chapter 2, its theoretical
foundations as provided amongst others by Anderson (1979); Eaton and Kortum (2002); Ander-
son and van Wincoop (2003) and Melitz (2003) constitute a structural framework which helps
uncovering potential sources of endogeneity and thus provides guidance for the estimation
specification.
With over 1,600 measures in force in 2017, AD duties constitute the most frequently used
trade defence instrument that is associated with large welfare costs (Gallaway et al., 1999;
Blonigen and Prusa, 2003b).1 It is therefore of crucial importance to understand and correctly
measure their eects. Politically, the subject is highly relevant, as the European Union has
1 Dumping is defined as exporting a product at a price below its “normal value” (WTO, 1994), where normal value
is typically the domestic price of the product in the exporting country (for a detailed discussion see for example
Felbermayr et al. (2016)). WTO rules allowmember states to counteract dumping practices with anti-dumping
duties.
1
Introduction
recently adjusted its AD regulation in December 2017. In response to demands from China
- the world’s largest target of AD duties - the EU has abandoned the concept of Non-Market
Economy Status (NMES) for WTOmembers, which aects the way AD duties are calculated
(European Parliament, 2017).2
The trade eects of AD duties have already received significant research attention (for an
overview over the literature see for example Nelson (2006) and Blonigen and Prusa (2003a,
2016)). Nevertheless, endogeneity concerns threatening the correct identification of the
treatment eect of AD duties on trade remain. For example, while AD duties reduce imports,
positive import shocks increase the likelihood of an AD investigation being initiated, leading to
an underestimation of the treatment eect (Bown and Crowley, 2013). The first two chapters
of this dissertation hence propose dierent strategies to reduce endogeneity - in particular
omitted variable bias and simultaneity - in order to correctly measure the eect of AD duties
on trade. At the same time, they shed light on aspects of AD duties that so far remain under-
researched but are of great relevance for policy makers.
Chapter 1 combines information on AD duties taken from the World Bank’s Global Anti-
dumping Database (Bown, 2015) with EU import data at the CN8 digit product-level (Eurostat,
2017) to examine the eect of AD duties on exporter producer prices and quantities. In con-
trast to the eects on export quantities (for recent studies see for example Vandenbussche
and Zanardi (2010) or Egger and Nelson (2011)), price eects of AD duties have so far only
received limited research attention. Theory predicts that, unlike normal taris, AD duties raise
producer prices (Blonigen and Haynes, 1999; Blonigen and Park, 2004; Feenstra, 2008). This
implies a worsening of the terms of trade of the importing country, accompanied by a shi
in rents from the customs authority of the importer towards exporters. However, empirical
evidence remains scarce and inconclusive. While Blonigen and Haynes (2002) find that AD
duties do indeed raise exporter prices, Lu et al. (2013) fail to find such evidence.
The chapter exploits the EU enlargement of 2004 as a natural experiment to address simultane-
ity and omitted variable bias inherent in AD policy. Following their accession to the EU, the
newmember states inherited the Union’s AD duties. Under the plausible assumptions that the
decision to join the EU is independent of existing ADduties and that the EUdid not adjust its AD
regulation in anticipation, these duties are exogenous to newmembers’ trade shocks. Hence,
2 Regulation (EU) 2017/2321. For reasons explained in Chapters 1 and 2, average AD duties imposed using the
NMESmethodology are larger than those imposed using the Market Economy Status (MES) methodology.
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the eect of AD duties can be estimated with the help of a simple dierence-in-dierences
regression with fixed eects.
In line with theoretical considerations, Chapter 1 shows that AD duties raise producer prices
on average by 25%, but only for imports originating from countries with Market Economy
Status (MES). Import prices from non-MES countries remain unchanged, while quantities fall
by more (on average 85% for NMES exporters and 68% for MES exporters). In light of the
recent change in EU AD legislation, these results have obvious implications for the design of
AD policy. They also align what seem to be inconsistent findings in the literature, by showing
that results may be driven by the MES of the exporting country considered in the respective
sample. Furthermore, this chapter presents evidence that the trade dampening eects of AD
persist over time. Finally, it is shown that duties also indirectly aect non-targeted exporters,
a finding that relates to the literature on trade deflection (Bown and Crowley, 2007, 2010;
Baylis and Perlo, 2010).
A drawbackof usingproduct-level data is that one cannot dierentiate between firm responses
and composition eects. On the one hand, it is possible that AD duties induce firms to raise
prices and reduce export quantities. On the other hand, in line withMelitz (2003), the same ob-
servation of falling quantities and increased prices can be driven by exit of low-price exporters,
with remaining exporters being unaected. Chapter 2 therefore moves to the firm-level, using
Chinese customs data to investigate the eects of AD duties on Chinese exporters. Estimations
are based on a firm-level gravity model that provides information on potential sources of
omitted variable bias. In a first step, it is shown that existing firm-level estimations that fail to
control for the appropriate fixed eects suggested by themodel indeed suer from omitted
variable bias. Following theoretical considerations, endogeneity problems are thenminimized
by employing a saturated dierence-in-dierences estimation. By merging firm-level exports
to firm-specific AD duties, this chapter exploits dierences in AD duties across firms exporting
the same product to the same country to identify a treatment eect.
In line with the literature, it is found that AD duties reduce exports, induce firm exit but do
not aect producer prices, suggesting complete pass-through of AD duties to consumers.
Beyond these basic findings, analyzing the universe of Chinese export destinations enables a
comparison of the eectiveness of AD duties imposed by the EU and the US (among others).
Imports to the EU react dierently compared to those to the US; a finding with obvious
implications for the design of AD policies. In particular, the number of exporters reacts more
3
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sensitively to EU duties, implying that higher duties are required in the US to yield the same
eect. Considering both elasticities as well as average levels of AD duties, US duties have,
however, a greater trade dampening eect.
Furthermore, smaller exporters are more heavily aected than larger ones, suggesting im-
portant within-industry reallocation eects. Following Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2010),
Chapter 2 also tests whether the trade eects of AD duties vary across sectors. It finds sig-
nificant heterogeneity in estimated eects, suggesting that a one size fits all AD policy may
aect dierent sectors very dierently. Finally, there is evidence for trade deflection at the
firm-level, as Chinese exports are diverted to third countries through increased market entry.
The second part of the thesis moves away from AD duties and turns towards two dierent
trade dampening phenomena. Chapter 3 remains in the realm of trade policy, shiing atten-
tion towards non-tari barriers (NTBs), which increasingly shapemodern trade policy (Datt
et al., 2011; Kee et al., 2013; Evenett, 2014). NTBs represent trade policy instruments other
than customs duties that can potentially have an economic eect on international trade by
aecting import prices or quantities. According to the recently updated Global Trade Alert
(GTA) database, around 300 NTBs were implemented worldwide in 2014, with the US being by
far the largest user and Canada, Germany and China being targeted most oen. Accordingly,
NTBs also play an increasing role in negotiations on trade agreements (Felbermayr, 2016;
Felbermayr et al., 2017).
Based on a structural gravity equation and using data provided by the GTA database as well
as CEPII’s BACI trade dataset, Chapter 3 empirically investigates the eect of NTBs on im-
port values. Dierentiating between import controls, state aid and subsidy measures, public
procurement and localisation policies, and other NTBs such as sanitary and phytosanitary
standards, technical barriers to trade and capital controls, the analysis reveals a significant
protectionist impact of non-standard trade policy measures. It is shown that the implementa-
tion of NTBs reduces imports of aected products by up to 12%. Besides NTBs, the estimations
additionally account for traditional trade defence instruments (including AD duties), allowing
for a quantitative comparison of dierent trade policy instruments. It is shown that non-tari
barriers are very diverse, meaning that dierent types of NTBs aect trade to a dierent extent.
Finally, following Head and Ries (2008); Head and Mayer (2014); Egger and Nigai (2015) and
Yotov et al. (2016), Chapter 3 applies a two-step estimation procedure to identify the eect of
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behind-the-border measures on trade, showing that they significantly reduce the importer’s
market access.
Chapter 4 investigates the relationship between trade andmaritime security, more precisely
the eect of piracy on firms’ choice of transport mode. With 180 actual and attempted at-
tacks in 2017 leading to several killings (ICC IMB, 2018), there is no doubt that piracy poses
a significant threat to maritime shipping. Surprisingly, detailed evidence regarding its eco-
nomic consequences remains scarce, with most studies being descriptive (Endler et al., 2012).
The most notable exceptions are Bensassi and Martínez-Zarzoso (2013) and Bensassi and
Martínez-Zarzoso (2012), who estimate the eects of maritime piracy on transport cost and
overall trade respectively. However, both papers focus on trade between Europe and Asia.
This Chapter adds to the literature by combining the same firm-level Chinese customs data
used inChapter 2with informationonpirateattacks to investigatehowexporting firms respond
tomaritime piracy. It shows that an increase in pirate activity along a particular shipping route
induces firms to switch from ocean to air shipping, while the remaining ocean shipments
become larger. This is accompanied by a fall in producer prices, indicating that the piracy
induced increase in transport costs is not fully passed on to consumers. These results can be
linked to the literature on trade and uncertainty (Békés et al., 2017), but also to the discussion
on the relationship between fixed costs per shipment and the number of transactions as well
as their size (Kropf and Sauré, 2014). Moving beyond individual shipments, the chapter also
shows that piracy reduces overall exports. More specifically, the average number of pirate
incidents per month on routes connecting China and Europe (26) reduces exports by 2.3%.
To sum up, this dissertation adds four chapters to the empirical literature on the trade eects
of anti-dumping duties and non-tari barriers, as well as maritime piracy. The first two
chapters in particular aim to make a methodological contribution by proposing two dierent
strategies to address sources of endogeneity that have long plagued the literature on trade
policy in general and anti-dumping in particular. Beyond that, all papers aim to advance our
understanding of dierent trade dampening phenomena in order to enable better informed,
welfare enhancing policy responses.
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1 The Trade Effects of Anti-Dumping Duties:
Evidence from the 2004 EU Enlargement∗
1.1 Introduction
Since 2007, the number of anti-dumping (AD) cases initiated has increased from 165 to 300
in 2016, culminating in more than 1,600 measures being in force worldwide in 2017.1 In
December of the same year, the EU has adjusted its AD regulation,2 abandoning the much
disputed Non-Market Economy Status (NMES). This may have important implications because
Market Economy Status (MES, assigned to the exporter by the imposing country) determines
the way AD duties are calculated.3
Theory predicts that AD duties incentivise producers to raise prices in an eort to reduce the
applied duty following reviews in consecutive periods. Over time, this results in a worsening
of the importer’s terms of trade as rents shi from the customs authority of the imposing
country towards exporters. Hence, measuring price responses of exporters constitutes an
important component when evaluating the eects of AD duties on welfare. However, with the
exception of a prominent paper by Blonigen and Haynes (2002), the empirical literature has
∗ This chapter is based on the paper “The Trade Eects of Antidumping Duties: Evidence from the 2004 EU
Enlargement”, ifo Working Paper No. 261, 2018. I would like to thankmy supervisor Gabriel Felbermayr for his
support throughout this project. I am also grateful to Andrea Ariu, Daniel Baumgarten, Carsten Eckel, Lisandra
Flach, Jasmin Gröschl, Anna Gumbert and Monika Schnitzer for valuable comments and suggestions as well
as to participants of the Industrial Organization and Spatial Economics Conference 2018, the ifo Center for
International Economics Internal Seminar and the LMU IO and Trade Seminar for their helpful remarks.
1 Data on global ADmeasures in force is taken from the WTO’s I-TIP database (WTO, 2018). Dumping is defined
as exporting a product at a price below its “normal value” (WTO, 1994), where normal value is typically the
domestic price of the product in the exporting country (for a detailed discussion see for example Felbermayr
et al. (2016) or Sandkamp and Yalcin (2016)). It is a common phenomenon in international trade, that can have
many causes, such as international price discrimination (Viner, 1923), production under demand uncertainty
(Ethier, 1982), reciprocal dumping with oligopolistic firms (Brander and Krugman, 1983), dynamic competition
(Gruenspecht, 1988; Clarida, 1993), subsidies (Dixit, 1988; Blonigen and Wilson, 2010) or cyclical aspects (Staiger
and Wolak, 1992). WTO rules allowmember states to counteract dumping practices with anti-dumping duties.
2 Regulation (EU) 2017/2321 (European Parliament, 2017).
3 NMES has been abandoned by the EU only for WTO exporters. Other countries such as the US are still applying
the NMESmethodology to WTO exporters.
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not found any evidence in support of the theory.4 Furthermore, the question of whether the
price eects of AD duties depend on whether or not the exporter enjoys MES has so far been
completely ignored by existing studies.
This paper aims to fill the gapby exploiting the EUenlargement of 2004 as anatural experiment
to investigate the trade eects of AD duties. The accession countries were required to adopt
the existing EU AD policy at the time of joining the EU. Under the identifying assumptions
that the decision to join the EU is independent of existing AD duties and that the EU did not
adjust its AD regulation in anticipation, the enlargement constitutes an exogenous treatment
of newmember states. The eect of AD duties can hence be estimated without simultaneity
and omitted variable bias by applying a simple dierence-in-dierences regression with fixed
eects, exploiting the change over time in import prices and quantities of treated country-
product combinations relative to non-treated ones.
Beyond this methodological contribution, the paper demonstrates that the missing evidence
for positive price eects in the literature is driven by theMES of the exporter investigated in the
respective studies. By looking at the universe of European imports, it is shown that AD duties
do raise producer prices on average by 25%, but only for imports originating from countries
with MES. Producer prices of imports from non-market economies remain unchanged, while
quantities fall by more (on average 85% compared to 68% for MES exporters). Estimated
coeicients are not sensitive to several fixed eects specifications, suggesting that the experi-
ment itself also addresses omitted variable bias. The third key contribution of this paper is to
show that price as well as quantity eects of AD duties persist over time, even beyond their
revocation. Finally, evidence for spillover eects is provided. Producer prices of imports from
countries not targeted by AD duties also increase, indicating that AD duties imposed against
one country induce exporters in non-targeted countries to update their beliefs regarding the
likelihood of becoming subject to AD investigations and raising prices in anticipation.
This paper relates to three strands of literature, namely the impact of AD duties on producer
prices, on quantities as well as eects on third countries. Regarding the first, AD duties
can aect import prices through two channels. Like taris, they directly increase consumer
prices (assuming positive pass-through). In addition, and in contrast to ordinary taris, they
incentivise exporters to raise their prices. Having the oicial objective to protect the importer’s
4 In contrast to price eects, the eect of AD duties on import volumes has already drawn significant research
attention. For an overview see for example Blonigen and Prusa (2003a, 2016) and Nelson (2006).
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domestic market from “unfair” foreign competition,5 AD duties are adjusted if the exporter
increases ex-factory prices (Feenstra, 2008).6 Consequently, theory predicts pass through
rates larger than 100 % as exporters increase prices to achieve a reduction of AD duties in
subsequent periods (Blonigen and Haynes, 1999; Blonigen and Park, 2004).
This has importantwelfare implications. While traditional tari revenueaccrues to thecustoms
authority of the importer, the adjustment of AD duties means that if exporters raise prices and
the duty is lowered as a result, rents that first went to the customs authority of the importer
are transferred to the foreign exporter by means of increased producer prices. If consumer
prices (including duties) in the importing country stay constant following a reduction of the
duty, the dynamics of AD duties imply a welfare reduction beyond trade destruction over time
in the importing country relative to a classic tari.7
Empirically, Blonigen and Haynes (2002) find that AD duties indeed lead to higher import
prices (excluding duties) from the point of view of the AD imposer. However, their study looks
at a very specific example, namely US iron and steel imports from Canada. Lu et al. (2013)
use Chinese customs data to investigate the eect of US AD duties on Chinese exports to the
US. The authors do not find positive price eects. Beyond these studies with their focus on
a single country pair, investigations of price eects of AD duties remain scarce.8 This paper
adds to the literature by investigating the universe of EU imports, thus extending the scope
tomany exporting countries. It also examines the eects of AD duties over time and across
targeted and non-targeted exporters.
By investigating several exporters, this paper aligns the seemingly conflicting results of Bloni-
gen and Haynes (2002) (increasing producer prices following AD duties) with those of Lu
et al. (2013) (no producer price eects) by showing that this dierence is driven by China’s
Non-Market Economy Status (NMES). The way EU and US AD duties against NMES countries
are constructed does not incenitivise exporters to raise prices. Specifically, exporters in coun-
tries with MES (such as Canada) receive firm specific AD duties that are adjusted when the
exporter raises prices. In contrast to that, exporters situated in countries with NMES oen
only receive a duty constructed using average dumping margins across all firms exporting the
5 See for example the EU’s position on AD in European Parliament (2017) and European Commission (2016).
6 As explained further down, the eectiveness of this channel however depends on the MES of the exporter.
7 Duties typically remain in place for at least five years (European Commission, 2013). It will be shown further
down that the estimation strategy draws on this persistence.
8 Gourlay and Reynolds (2012) and Nita and Zanardi (2013) provide indirect evidence for price eects by looking
at the change in AD duties following reviews.
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same product. Hence, adjusting own export prices does not change the duty the exporting
firm faces, providing no incentive to raise prices.9
Thehypothesis that price eects dependon the ADmethodology applied to calculate dumping
margins (i.e. MES or NMES) can be tested, and this paper provides evidence in its support,
comparing price eects of AD duties for exporters from countries with MES with those from
NMES countries. It finds that price increases are driven by exporters from MES countries,
indicating that the NMESmethodology does not incentivise exporters to raise their prices.10
By doing so, it is the first study to identify dierential trade eects of AD duties by applied AD
methodology.11 This is relevant for policy makers as it allows making predictions on the likely
eects of applying either MES or NMES on import prices and quantities.
The second strand of literature to which this paper contributes relates to the eects of AD
duties on import values and quantities. Prusa (1997, 2001) investigates the implementation of
US AD duties, showing that they reduce US imports from targeted countries by up to 50%. In
contrast to that, Egger and Nelson (2011) findmuch smaller eects.12 For the European Union,
Messerlin (1989); Lasagni (2000) and Konings et al. (2001) estimate treatment eects similar in
magnitude to those of Prusa (1997, 2001).13 Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2010) look at several
AD imposing countries, finding that AD duties imposed by the so called “new adopters” have
9 In addition, the theory of heterogeneous firms (Melitz, 2003) suggests exit of firms with high marginal costs,
which would even push average prices down.
10 An alternative explanation however could be that MES exporters with low prices receive higher AD duties
which force them to exit the market. Even if the remaining high price firms do not adjust prices, this selection
would raise average prices. In contrast, exporters in NMES countries all receive the same duty. Consequently,
low price exporters are not necessarily more likely to be forced to exit the market than high price exporters,
leaving average prices unchanged. Testing whether the within firm or between firm eect dominates the results
however requires the use of firm level data. As both channels work in the same direction, the exact channels at
work are not the primary concern of this paper.
11 Existing studies are either descriptive, comparing levels of AD duties for MES and NMES exporters (Detlof and
Fridh, 2006; Felbermayr et al., 2016) or look at the eect of MES on the number of AD investigations (Urdinez and
Masiero, 2015).
12 Other studies include the investigation of individual stages of the AD process (Staiger and Wolak, 1994) as well
as particular sectors (Carter and Gunning-Trant, 2010).
13 The AD process itself also plays a role for the EU, with Baran (2015) finding that withdrawn or rejected cases
only have temporary eects, while trade eects of final duties are strong and lasting.
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trade chilling eects on bilateral trade flows. Following the availability of firm level export
data, a growing literature is also starting to look at impacts of AD duties on exporting firms.14
The above studies potentially suer from endogeneity bias due to simultaneity of AD duties
and imports. AD duties typically increase consumer prices and thus reduce import quantities
of targeted products. However, they are by nomeans exogenous. Being designed to protect
domestic industry, they are more likely to be imposed on products with low prices and high
import quantities. This simultaneity of imports and AD duties violates the exogeneity assump-
tion as the independent variable is no longer uncorrelated with the error term. OLS results
in biased estimates of the treatment eect (Bown and Crowley, 2013), more specifically, an
underestimation of the eect of AD duties on import quantities and prices (the latter being
the case under the assumption that AD duties do indeed raise prices).15 This paper adds to
the literature by exploiting the EU enlargement of 2004 as a natural experiment to tackle
simultaneity and obtain unbiased estimates of the eect of AD on imports. Estimated eects
are larger than those found by previous studies, indicating that these may indeed suer from
simultaneity bias, which results in an underestimation of the treatment eect.
Third, the paper contributes to the literature on trade deflection and other eects of trade
policies on third countries.16 Bown andCrowley (2007) find that the imposition of US ADduties
on Japanese exports increases Japanese exports to third countries by 5 - 7%. Similarly, Nguyen
et al. (2016) show that EU duties imposed on Vietnamese footwear increase Vietnamese
exports to the US. The same is true for Mexican exports of tomatoes, which were diverted to
Canada following the imposition of US AD duties (Baylis and Perlo, 2010). Chandra (2016)
14 At the firm level, Besedeš and Prusa (2013) find US AD to induce firm exit. Lu et al. (2013) use firm level data
to estimate semi-elasticities for the eects of US AD duties on Chinese exports to the US, showing that a one
percentage point increase in preliminary (final) US AD duties reduces Chinese exports to the United States by
0.27% (0.6%). The eects are driven both by reduced firm exports as well as firm exit. Jabbour et al. (2016) show
that Chinese exporters reduce exports to the EU following the imposition of EU AD duties, but also become
larger andmore productive. Felbermayr and Sandkamp (2018) look at the universe of Chinese firm level exports,
showing that both EU and US AD duties decrease firm exports and induce exit, with small firms being aected
most severely.
15 Felbermayr and Sandkamp (2018) tackle this problem by combining firm level data with an extensive fixed
eects estimation strategy, as time varying product characteristics can be controlled for, so that the treatment
eect is identified using variation in duties within products across firms. However, this methodology requires
firm level data which is not available for all countries exporting to the EU.
16 Following Bown and Crowley (2007), trade deflection is defined as an increase in exports from country B to
country C, following the imposition of AD duties of country A on imports from country B. Country B’s exports are
thus deflected from country A to country C. This is in contrast to import diversion, which is defined as an increase
in exports from country C to country A following the imposition of AD duties of country A against country B.
Country A’s imports are thus diverted from country B to country C.
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finds evidence for trade deflection following the imposition of US temporary trade barriers
against China.17 In contrast, other studies do not find systematic evidence for larger export
volumes to third countries following the imposition of US AD duties (Lu et al., 2013) and more
general EU and US import restrictions (Bown and Crowley, 2010) against China.
In light of the above literature, it is possible that the estimated treatment eect of EU AD
duties on imports using the natural experiment of the EU enlargement captures not only trade
destruction but also a reversal of trade deflection. This would threaten the identification
of the treatment eect. If imports targeted by the EU were deflected from EU15 countries
to accession countries before 2004, then imports of new member states would be larger
in the pre-treatment period than what they would have been without the EU AD duty. An
investigation of the pre-treatment period however provides no evidence for trade deflection
by means of lower prices or higher import quantities. It also rules out anticipation eects.18
Finally, this paper also looksat spillover eectsof ADdutieson importprices fromnon-targeted
countries. It thus relates to the work of Blonigen and Park (2004), who discuss the role of
firms’ expectations of AD investigation outcomes in explaining AD recalculations. Dumping
allegations for the same product are oen investigated separately for dierent exporting
countries. Given the uncertainty surrounding the AD investigation process as explained by
Blonigen and Park (2004),19 the imposition of AD duties against one exporting country may
induce producers of the same product in other exporting countries to update their beliefs
about the likelihood of being investigated and becoming subject to duties. This paper finds
evidence for such behaviour, as producer prices of imports from non-targeted countries
increase following the imposition of AD duties against another country.20
17 Felbermayr andSandkamp (2018) show that tradedeflection of ADduties is drivenbymarket entry of exporters
into third countries as well as by increased exports to these countries by established exporters.
18 Anticipation eects could go in both directions. On the one hand prices could fall shortly before the accession
to sell as much as possible before AD duties are implemented. On the other hand, prices could be increased to
avoid the imposition of AD duties following the accession. Neither eect is observed in the data.
19 According to Blonigen and Park (2004), uncertainty surrounding the AD investigation process is also the reason
why dumping takes place at all. If exporters had perfect foresight and knew they would become subject to AD
duties, they would have increased their prices preemptively. Consequently, depending on expectations, some
exporters already set higher prices compared to a scenario without the presence of AD, thus aecting welfare in
the importing country.
20 This finding also relates to the work on AD echoing by Tabakis and Zanardi (2016). The authors find that
dierent importing countries tend to echo each others AD policies in the sense that they impose AD duties on
products from the same exporter, either simultaneously or consecutively. In contrast, this paper finds evidence
for non-targeted exporters echoing price responses of targeted exporters. The possibility of AD echoing would
provide further incentives for exporting firms to raise prices.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 presents the estimation strat-
egy, including potential threats to identification and ways to address them. This is followed
by an overview of the data used (Section 1.3). Section 1.4 presents descriptive evidence, while
Section 1.5 provides the core results of the paper. Section 1.6 oers several extensions and
robustness checks and Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Estimation Strategy
Identification of the treatment eect relies on a dierence-in-dierences estimation exploiting
the change over time in import prices and quantities of treated exporting country-product
combinations relative to the same product imported from untreated exporting countries
(within product across country variation) and relative to untreated products imported from
the same exporting country (within country across product variation).21 For the baseline
analysis, EU15 importers are dropped and the ten accession states aggregated to one entity.22
The years 2003 and 2005 are chosen as pre- and post-treatment period respectively, as they
constitute a symmetric time period around the accession of the ten newmember states in
May 2004. The panel is balanced by dropping exporting country-product combinations that
were only observed in one year.23
Since the time dimension of the panel only consists of two years (a pre- and a post-treatment
period), the dierence-in-dierences specification can be estimated with a first dierences
regression. The baseline estimation equation is given by
∆ ln yih = δ∆ADih + νi + νh + εih. (1.1)
The dependent variable∆ ln yih is the change in the natural logarithm of import price (quan-
tity) of product h imported from exporting country i between 2003 and 2005.∆ADih is the
21 Unit values are constructed by dividing import values by quantities. Import quantities rather than values are
investigated since they provide a clearer picture of changing trade flows. Import values incorporate price eects,
so that changing prices would disguise the impact on real trade flows. Value eects are however estimated as a
robustness check.
22 These are Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, who joined the EU in 2007 and 2013, are dropped. Treating individual countries as
separate entities does not oer any additional information as treatment takes place at the EU level. A robustness
check performs the same estimation with individual importing countries. Estimated coeicients remain similar.
23 Dropping singletons may bias the results if zero trade flows contain information. This is addressed in a
robustness check.
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treatment dummy that equals one if an exporting country-product combination becomes
subject to ADduties in 2005.24 It tells how import prices (quantities) of treated country-product
combinations (for which∆ADih = 1) change relative to untreated country-product combina-
tions (for which∆ADih = 0) once the AD duty is implemented through accession to the EU.
νi and νh are exporter and product fixed eects respectively.25 εih is an error term.
In order to test for dierential eects of duties on imports by applied ADmethodology, the
treatment dummy is nested by AD regime. This is done by interacting the treatment dummy
∆ADih oncewith a dummy that is equal to one if the exporter hasMES andoncewith a dummy
identifying if the exporter has NMES.26
Once implemented, AD duties typically remain in force for at least five years (European Com-
mission, 2013), which allows their eect on trade to be estimated. For the experiment, the
paper only considers AD cases for which final duties were implemented by the end of 2003
(i.e. before the accession) and that were in force throughout 2005 (i.e. not revoked in 2005
or before). This yields a clear pre- and post-treatment period. All duties considered were in
force in EU15 countries but not in accession states in 2003 (pre-treatment period), entered
into force at the same time in 2004 from the perspective of newmember states and still were
in force in 2005 (post-treatment period).27
The advantage of the natural experiment is that the implementation of AD duties already in
force in the EU is exogenous from the perspective of newmember states. Member states were
required to adopt the existing AD policy (treatment) because they joined the EU. Under the
plausible identifying assumption that accession states did not join the EU because of its AD
24 The dummyAD is zero for all ih in 2003 and changes to one in 2005 only for those ih that are subject to EU
AD duties.
25 The first dierences approach eliminates all unobserved time invariant country-product variation. Adding
exporter (product) fixed eects aer taking first dierences additionally controls for the change in unobserved
exporter (product) characteristics over time.
26 The resulting estimation equation becomes
∆ ln yih = δ
MESMES∆ADih + δ
NMESNMES∆ADih + νi + νh + εih.
27 This is also the reason why the 2007 accession round is not considered. If 2008 was chosen as the post-
treatment period so as to include Romania and Bulgaria, all duties implemented or revoked between 2005 and
2008 would have to be removed from the sample. As several duties were revoked during this time period, this
would have reduced the size of the treatment group significantly.
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policy (independence of decision to join EU and existing EU AD regulation), the dierence-in-
dierences strategy yields unbiased estimates of the treatment eect.28
Even though the experimental setup reduces endogeneity bias by addressing simultaneity
(newmember states’ imports do not determine whether AD duties are introduced by EU15
countries before 2004), a threat to clear identification may remain if imports of EU accession
states correlate with those of EU15 countries, for which endogeneity is suspected. In order to
address this potential problem, this paper additionally uses product fixed eects to control
for unobserved demand side variables such as changes in tastes and preferences.29 They also
capture average changes in MFN taris over time.30
All time invariant unobserved country-product characteristics are eliminated by the first
dierences approach. Potentially omitted time varying supply side factors are additionally
controlled for through exporter country fixed eects. In the context of a first dierences estima-
tion, country fixed eects capture time varying exporter characteristics such as non-product
specific market distortions and changes in the price index of intermediates in individual ex-
porting countries as well as time-varying multilateral resistance terms (Feenstra, 2008). To
sumup, the combination of first dierences with country and product fixed eects controls for
all unobserved variables that vary across the exporter-product, exporter-time or product-time
dimension.
Omitted supply side factors which vary across the exporter-product-time dimension andmay
cause omitted variable bias cannot be controlled for with fixed eects because this variation is
required to estimate the eect of AD duties. However, they should not play a role in the context
of the natural experiment. For example, an exporter-product specific subsidy which increases
EU imports and consequently induces the EU to impose AD duties would constitute a source
of endogeneity. However, only AD cases imposed by (and hence initiated before) 2003 are
28 This exogeneity is not trivial as Bown and Crowley (2013) show. In the presence of simultaneity (AD duties
reduce imports but higher imports increase the likelihood of AD implementation), estimated coeicients may
suer from endogeneity bias. For quantity eects, the bias is likely to be positive, leading to an underestimation
of the (negative) treatment eect. For prices, the bias is likely to be negative, as AD duties are more likely to be
implemented in sectors where dumping exists, i.e. import prices are low. Felbermayr and Sandkamp (2018)
show explicitly that not accounting for demand side eects that are correlated with the decision to implement
AD duties results in an underestimation of the true treatment eect.
29 Since the initial panel only consists of two time periods, the time dimension disappears aer taking first
dierences. Product fixed eects in the first dierences model hence capture the change in product specific
demand and supply side variables between the two time periods.
30 Moore and Zanardi (2009, 2011) show a correlation between anti-dumping and trade liberalisation, i.e. an
increase in the use of AD following a reduction in MFN taris.
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included in the sample. Their implementation in the past (including possible reactions by the
exporter) should not be correlated with time varying country-product characteristics in 2003
and 2005. The fact that they are inherited by the newmember states from 2004 onward does
not imply a change in unobserved exporting country-product characteristics between 2003
and 2005. Nevertheless, the potential for unobserved time varying exporting country-product
specific variables that correlate with imports and AD duties andmay cause omitted variable
bias is addressed in a robustness check.
The dierence-in-dierences setup also ensures that results are not driven by trade diversion
eects due to the EU enlargement.31 As AD duties vary by exporter and product, eects are
estimated by exploiting variation across these two dimensions. On the one hand, the change
in imports of targeted products fromaparticular country is compared to the change in imports
of a non-targeted product by that same country, exploiting within exporter across product
variation. This channel is not aected by trade diversion as long as trade diversion is not
systematically larger for products subject to AD duties. On the other hand, the change in
imports of a specific product from a country targeted by AD is compared with the change
in imports of the same product exported from another un-targeted (EU or non-EU) country.
This channel could indeed be aected by trade diversion, which is why all EU exporters are
excluded in a robustness check. As a consequence, imports from targeted countries are only
compared to imports from non-targeted non-EU countries.
The possibility of the reversal of trade deflection resulting in an overestimation of the treat-
ment eect was already discussed in Section 1.1. Similarly, the existence of anticipationmight
also constitute a threat to identification. The accession of the ten member states and its
consequences for their AD policy was known by importers and exporters years before 2004. If
the change in AD regulationwas anticipated it is hence possible that firms exporting to the new
member states may have adjusted their prices before 2004 in order to avoid the imposition of
AD duties once the EU AD rules are in force. Only looking at post-treatment price eects would
hence underestimate the treatment eect. Similarly it is also possible that exporters engaged
in excessive dumping before 2004 to sell as many dumped products as possible before the
regulation enters into force. By looking at treatment eects over time, this paper shows that
trade deflection and anticipation eects were absent for duties implemented before 2003.
31 Tradediversionexists if imports of EUaccession countries fromnonEUcountries arediverted toEU15 countries,
i.e. accession states substituting non EU imports for EU imports following accession.
16
1 The Trade Eects of Anti-Dumping Duties: Evidence from the 2004 EU Enlargement
A final threat to identification worth discussing is anticipation of the EU enlargement by EU
trade authorities in charge of AD investigations. Knowing that the newmember states were
about to join the EU in 2004, it is possible that EU AD decisions were adjusted even before
2004 in order to accommodate the need for protection of future member states. AD duties
imposed before 2004 would thus not be exogenous from the perspective of the accession
countries. This claim can however be rejected for three reasons. According to the EU AD
legislation, duties can only be imposed if there is proof for material injury of the domestic (i.e.
EU15) industry. From a legal perspective, AD duties can therefore not be imposed if only the
domestic industry of EU accession states is aected by dumping practices. Second, only four
out of the ten newmember states imposed AD duties before joining the EU, indicating limited
interest in the instrument.32 Finally, for almost all AD cases that were successfully imposed
by the accession states, the EU imposed no case covering similar products and exporting
countries, indicating that the EU did not adjust its AD policy before 2004.33
1.3 Data
Data on EU trade is obtained from the Eurostat Comext Database (Eurostat, 2017). It supplies
data on annual bilateral import values and quantities for all EUmember states at the CN8 digit
product level. This paper uses data for the years 1999 to 2009, with a focus on 2003 and 2005.34
For 2003 and 2005 the dataset covers imports of 10,636 CN8 products from 223 countries.
Information on EU AD duties is taken from the World Bank’s Global Anti-dumping Database
(Bown, 2015). The European AD process involves three stages: Initiation of a case, preliminary
(temporary) duties and final duties. Only cases in which final duties were implemented are
considered. The estimation strategy requires a degree of persistence of AD duties, meaning
they have to remain in force for several years. More specifically, only cases for which final
32 These are the Czech Republic (one case), Latvia (one), Lithuania (seven) and Poland (nine). Slovenia started
one investigation which however was withdrawn. All data from Bown (2015).
33 One exception is the case of graphite electrodes from India that were investigated by Poland and the EU
simultaneously in 2003 and became subject to AD duties by both economies. On the other hand, pocket lighters
exported by China, Taiwan, Indonesia and Vietnam that became subject to Polish AD duties in 2000 were
investigated by the EU in 2002. However, no final duties were imposed by the EU. Similarly, styrene-butadiene
rubber from Russia became subject to Polish AD duties in 2003 and was subsequently investigated by the EU in
2004 and 2005. Even though dumping was determined to take place, no evidence for injury was found so that no
duties were imposed.
34 1999 is the first year for which Eurostat provides trade data for EUmember states that joined in 2004. Using
data until 2009 provides a symmetric five year window around the treatment year 2004.
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duties were implemented by the end of 2003 and that remained in force until at least 2005
(i.e. not revoked in 2005 or earlier) are considered. This leaves 87 AD cases covering 82 CN8
products from 17 exporting countries.35 The persistence of AD duties implemented by 2003 is
illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: AD Duties imposed by 2003 and remaining in force
145
108
87
71
52
43 43
0
50
100
150
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Note: Cases in force both in 2003 and onward (several products per case)
The datasets are merged by exporting country, CN8 product and year. Using import (rather
than export) data has the advantage that the importer’s product nomenclature is used, which
coincides with the nomenclature reported in Bown (2015) who also relies on importers’ decla-
ration of AD duties. As HS codes are only comparable across countries up until the HS6 digit
level (Lu et al., 2013; BownandCrowley, 2016), studies using exporter data have to restrict their
analysis to this higher level of aggregation. Since AD duties are however oen implemented
at a more disaggregated level, using aggregated data means that HS6 products which are
assigned AD treatment incorporate trade flows that are in fact not subject to AD duties, leading
to attenuation bias and hence an underestimation of the treatment eect. Aer themerge,
the balanced baseline sample includes imports of 8,366 CN8 products from 149 countries.36
35 Overall, 145 (115) cases were in force in 2003 (2005). Only those in force in both years are included in the
analysis. Each case can cover several products, while several casesmay cover the same product, but for dierent
exporting countries. Except for one case, all AD cases involve duties imposed at the CN8 digit level.
36 Not every product is exported by every country.
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55 products imported from 13 countries are subject to EU AD duties.37 Information on NMES
of exporters is taken from Detlof and Fridh (2006) and (Felbermayr et al., 2016).38
1.4 Descriptive Evidence
Figures 1.2 and 1.3 present an event analysis, providing descriptive evidence for the eect of
AD duties on import quantities and prices.39 For the years 1999 to 2009, they show average
quantities (prices) in logarithms of imports into the ten EU accession states (grouped together)
of six specific products that are subject to EU AD duties. The treatment group consists of
imports of the respective CN8 product from the country (countries) targeted by EU AD duties,
while the control group is given by the same product, imported from non targeted countries.40
Looking at the top le panel of Figure 1.2, it can be seen that imports of Silicon Metal from
targeted and non targeted countries followed the same trend before the year of accession
(2004). However, once the newmember states joined the EU in 2004 and EU AD policy was
implemented, imports from targeted countries drop, while those from non targeted countries
increase. The other panels of Figure 1.2 illustrate similar developments.
The impact of ADduties onprices is not that clear. Looking at the topmiddle panel of Figure 1.3,
it can be seen that prices of targeted Ethanolamine imports increased rapidly relative to the
control group following the imposition of AD duties in 2004. On the other hand import prices
of television camera systems and parts fell following the imposition of AD duties (bottom right
panel). In addition prices of both treated and untreated imports of iron tubes (bottommiddle
panel) increased following the accession. This could be evidence for spillover eects from
treated to untreated countries.
Prices may also be aected by exchange rate fluctuations. This should however only be the
case if the currency of countries subject to AD duties reacted dierently to the EU enlargement
37 AD duties are product and country specific, so that the same product may be subject to AD duties if imported
from one country, but not the other.
38 Countries that are assigned NMES by the EU in the period of investigation are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, China, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, North Korea, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan and Vietnam. Out of these 15 countries, only five (Armenia, Belarus, China, Kazakhstan and Vietnam)
have ever become subject to EU AD duties and two (Belarus and China) are targeted in the sample period.
39 Value eects are similar to quantity eects. They are illustrated in Figures A.1 (including EU exporters) and A.4
(excluding EU exporters) in the Appendix.
40 The descriptive analysis hence ignores the second identification channel of variation within countries across
products.
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than currencies of countries not subject to AD duties. The dierence-in-dierences speci-
fication relies on variation within countries across products as an additional identification
channel which is not aected by exchange rate fluctuations. In addition, country fixed eects
capture average exchange rate fluctuations by exporting country.41
Figure 1.2: Average Import Quantities by Treatment Status
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Note: EU accession (beginning of treatment) in May 2004. Ln import quantity on vertical axis,
year on horizontal axis. For example, a change in imports of Silicon Metal from almost 10 in
2003 to 4 in 2009 indicates a trade reduction of e10−e4
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∗ 100 = 99.75%Missing observations
represent non-reported quantities and can be interpreted as zero trade flows.
It is, however, not obvious whether the drop in imports of treated products stems from AD
or is simply a consequence of the EU accession. As imports of untreated products include
imports from EU countries, the graphs above could simply show import diversion from non
EU exporters towards EU exporters. Figures A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix hence show import
quantities and prices for the same products, excluding imports from EU exporters. The control
group only consists of non EU exporters not subject to AD and exporting the same product.
41 Since most EU accession states had their own currencies during the period of investigation, exporter fixed
eects only capture average changes in the currency of the exporter relative to all currencies of the importing
countries. When importing countries are assessed individually in a robustness check, additional importer fixed
eects however also control for each importer’s individual currency.
20
1 The Trade Eects of Anti-Dumping Duties: Evidence from the 2004 EU Enlargement
The overall picture remains similar, indicating that results are not driven by trade diversion
following the accession.
Figure 1.3: Average Import Prices by Treatment Status
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as zero trade flows.
Table 1.1 provides results of a descriptive regression of import prices and quantities on an AD
dummy (nested by year) with product fixed eects.42 It thus shows prices and quantities of
products that become subject to AD duties in 2005 relative to the same product exported from
countries not targeted by AD duties (within product across countries), both in the pre- and
post-treatment period. Looking at Column (1), the coeicient of the AD dummy is negative and
statistically significant in 2003, indicating that products subject to AD duties were on average
38% cheaper than the same product exported from a country not subject to AD duties.43 This
dierence shrunk to 23% in 2005 following the imposition of the AD duty, providing some
42 The sample is the same as the one used in the baseline regression, before taking first dierences.
43 100 ∗ (eδ − 1)%
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preliminary evidence that the imposition of AD duties is associatedwith higher exporter prices.
The dierence is statistically significant at the 5% level.44
Table 1.1: Import Prices and Quantities of EU Accession States, 2003 and 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable ln price ln price ln quantity ln quantity
AD (2003) -0.4716*** 2.0112***
(0.0886) (0.2603)
AD (2005) -0.2658*** 0.9756***
(0.0960) (0.2847)
AD (MES, 2003) -0.4251*** 1.8357***
(0.1066) (0.3009)
AD (MES, 2005) -0.1615 0.9526***
(0.1236) (0.3276)
AD (NMES, 2003) -0.5802*** 2.4266***
(0.1452) (0.4768)
AD (NMES, 2005) -0.5123*** 1.0278*
(0.1120) (0.5427)
Note: OLS regression with product fixed eects. Robust standard errors
clustered by Exporter-Product in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Same products subject to AD duties in 2003 and 2005. 144,998 observations
per year. The sample is the same used in the baseline regression (before
first dierencing).
When interacting the time invariant dummy with market economy status of the exporter
(Column 2), it can be seen that the NMES coeicient is larger in terms of magnitude than
the MES coeicient both in 2003 and in 2005. Interestingly, the dierence in the size of the
coeicient between MES and NMES countries is not statistically significant in 2003, while it
increases and turns significant in 2005 (5% level). This provides preliminary evidence that
the imposition of AD duties correlates with an increase in import prices fromMES exporters,
going so far as to eliminate the price dierential relative to products not subject to AD duties
(as indicated by the insignificant coeicient of AD for MES exporters in 2005). This is not the
case for NMES exporters, for whom the coeicient hardly changes between 2003 and 2005.
44 When not controlling for product fixed eects, the coeicient becomes evenmore negative. This indicates
that products subject to AD duties are both cheaper than products of the same CN8 product classification not
subject to AD (within product) and cheaper than untargeted products of dierent CN8 product classifications
(across product), providing some insights regarding the type of product typically targeted by AD.
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Regarding import quantities, Column (3) shows that the AD coeicients are positive and
significant, indicating that country-product combinations targeted by AD duties experience
higher import quantities. The coeicient is significantly smaller in 2005, indicating that the
gap in import quantities between targeted and non-targeted products falls following the
imposition of AD duties.45 The same dierence between pre- and post-treatment is true
when looking at exports from NMES and MES countries separately (Column 4). In contrast to
prices, the dierence between MES and NMES coeicients of the same year is not statistically
significant.
1.5 Econometric Baseline Results
1.5.1 Eects on Prices
Table 1.2 provides the baseline estimation results, with the change in the logarithm of import
price, quantity andvalue asdependent variable. Column (1) of Table 1.2 shows theprice eects
of AD duties following the basic dierence-in-dierences estimation as given in Equation 1.1.
The coeicient of the AD dummy (0.2206) is positive and statistically significant. It indicates
that import prices (before taris and duties) increase by 25% following the imposition of AD
duties.46
The baseline estimation already includes product and exporter fixed eects. Interestingly,
not controlling for these fixed eects does not significantly alter the results.47 The positive
estimated treatment eect is robust to all possible fixed eects specifications. This indicates
that the quasi-experimental setup addresses omitted demand and supply side variables that
typically have to be controlled for using fixed eects.
The results are in line with Blonigen and Haynes (2002), who also find pass-through rates of
more than 100%, but not with Lu et al. (2013), who do not find any price eects for imports
from China. To check whether this dierence stems from the specific AD procedure applied
to non-market economies such as China, the AD dummy is additionally interacted with a
45 Similar to the price eects discussed before, the magnitude of the estimated coeicient increases when not
controlling for product fixed eects, indicating that it is driven both by within product variation (higher import
quantities of products imported from countries subject to AD compared to the same product imported from
countries not subject to AD duties as shown in the table) as well as across product variation (larger ex ante import
quantities of products subject to AD duties).
46 100 ∗ (eδ − 1)%
47 Results for varying fixed eects specifications are provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix.
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dummy indicatingwhether the exporter hasMES, anda (mutually exclusive) dummy indicating
whether the exporter has NMES.
Table 1.2: The Eect of AD Duties on Imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var. ∆ ln price ∆ ln price ∆ ln quantity ∆ ln quantity ∆ ln value ∆ ln value ∆ ln value ∆ ln value
AD 0.2206** -1.3518*** -1.1312*** -1.1384***
(0.0943) (0.2362) (0.2174) (0.2179)
AD*MES 0.2518** -1.1253*** -0.8736*** -0.9057***
(0.1151) (0.2934) (0.2589) (0.2593)
AD*NMES 0.1471 -1.8852*** -1.7381*** -1.7582***
(0.1578) (0.3448) (0.3525) (0.3504)
R2 0.1223 0.1223 0.1359 0.1359 0.1703 0.1704 0.1420 0.1420
Note: OLS regressions (first dierences) with exporter and product fixed eects. Robust standard errors clustered by
Exporter-Product in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (1) - (6): 144,998 observations. (7) - (8): 184,889 obs.
The results are presented in Column (2). When comparing the estimated coeicients for MES
and NMES countries, it is evident that aggregate results presented in Column (1) are driven by
MES countries. The interaction coeicient of the treatment dummy and the MES dummy is
positive and statistically significant, while the interaction coeicient of the treatment dummy
and the NMES dummy is smaller and not statistically significant. This provides evidence that
producer prices of products imported fromMES countries increase following the imposition
of AD duties. On the other hand, one cannot reject the hypothesis that producer prices of
products exported from NMES countries do not change following the imposition of AD duties.
The policy implication of this finding is that the MESmethodology increases the likelihood
that AD duties achieve an increase in import prices, which is the oicial objective of the
instrument.48
48 As mentioned before, product level data does not allow the determination of whether the price increase for
MES exporters stems fromexporting firms increasing their prices or from lowprice exporters receiving high duties
and thus exiting the market, leaving only high price exporters behind. From the perspective of the importer, the
result is the same. It may nevertheless have long term implications if the exporter composition is aected (e.g.
ineicient exporters driven out of themarket, leaving only eicient ones behind. See for example Lu et al. (2013),
Jabbour et al. (2016) and Felbermayr and Sandkamp (2018) for a more detailed discussion).
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1.5.2 Eects on Quantities
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.2 summarise the eects of AD duties on import quantities. Col-
umn (3) shows regression results for the basic dierence-in-dierences specification following
Equation 1.1. The coeicient of the AD dummy is negative and statistically significant at the
1% level, indicating that the imposition of AD duties reduces import quantities of EU accession
states. As with price eects, the result is robust to all possible fixed eects specifications.
In terms of magnitude the coeicient of -1.3518 in Column (3) indicates that imports fall by
74% following the imposition of AD duties.49 This estimate is at the high end of the existing
literature.
Column (4) presents the estimated eect of AD duties on import quantities separated by
MES and NMES. It shows that while both coeicients are highly statistically significant, the
estimated treatment eect for NMES countries is larger in terms of magnitude than the one
for MES countries. The dierence is statistically significant at the 10% level. This result is to
be expected given the higher average AD duties imposed on NMES exporters observed in the
literature.
1.5.3 Eects on Values
The baseline regression focuses on quantity eects to estimate the impact of AD duties on
real trade flows. For completeness, value eects (in EUR) are also estimated. By construction,
value = price ∗ quantity so that∆ ln value = ∆ ln price + ∆ ln quantity. This is also true
for the estimated coeicients which are reported in Columns (5) and (6) of Table 1.2. They
are similar to quantity eects but smaller in magnitude. This is due to the positive price
eects of AD duties which are incorporated in the value eects and reduce the magnitude of
the (negative) coeicient. The dierence between estimated coeicients for MES and NMES
countries increases in significance (5%) relative to the quantity regression. An advantage of
using import values is the resulting increase in sample size, as information on import values is
more frequently available than information on import quantity. Running the same regression
with a larger sample (Columns 7 and 8) however yields coeicients of similar magnitude,
indicating that results are robust to a change in sample composition.
49 100 ∗ (eδ − 1)%
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1.5.4 Eects over Time
By comparing import flows in 2003 and 2005 for treated and untreated products, the baseline
regression provides a snapshot of the trade eects of ADduties. In order to investigatewhether
the eect of AD duties persists over time, the sample is extended, covering trade flows for
the years 1999 to 2007. The AD cases included in the sample are the same as in the baseline.
Instead of estimating one treatment eect, separate treatment eects are estimated for each
year from 2001 to 2007.50 This is done by interacting the AD dummy (which varies across
products and exporters) with year dummies. Each of the resulting dummies hence only
switches from zero to one in one year, identifying the eect of AD duties on import prices and
quantities in that specific year.51
The results are illustrated graphically in Figure 1.4.52 The graph already provides transformed
eects, so that the point estimates depicted show percentage changes in import prices and
quantities of treated exporting country-product combinations for each year relative to non
treatedones.53 It canbe seen thatbothpriceandquantity eects arenot statistically significant
before the newmember states joined the EU in 2004. Both coeicients become significant
in 2004 (the new member states oicially joined the Union in May 2004) and increase in
magnitude in 2005. From 2005 onwards, eects remain stable. Since only a part of 2004 is
treated, the smaller coeicient for this year is to be expected. The results imply that AD duties
quickly unfold their full eect on trade. Small delays could be driven by contracts which
fix prices and quantities in the short run. On the other hand the results could be taken as
evidence that exporters adjust their prices in steps. Firm-level data is necessary to decompose
these potential channels.
50 Symmetric around the treatment year 2004, relative to 1999 and 2000.
51 Eects over time are estimated using fixed eects rather than first dierences. With t=2, first dierences and
fixed eects estimations are identical (Wooldridge, 2010). The fixed eects specification is given by ln yiht =
δ(ADihpostt) + νih + νit + νht + εiht. The dependent variable ln yiht is the natural logarithm of import price
(quantity) of product h imported from country i at time t. ADih identifies the treatment group and is a time
invariant dummy that is equal to one if imports from country i of product h are subject to EU AD duties and zero
otherwise. postt is a timedummythat equals zero in2003andone in2005andADihpostt is the treatmentdummy
that is an interactionof theADdummyand the timedummyso that δ identifies the treatment eect. εiht is anerror
term. νih, νit and νht are exporter-product, exporter-time andproduct-time fixed eects respectively. Eects over
time are estimated using the specification ln yiht =
∑2007
T=2001 δ
yearT (ADihyearT ) + νih + νit + νht + εiht with
yearT = 1 if t = T and zero otherwise. The three two dimensional fixed eects are implemented simultaneously
using the “reghdfe” stata command by Correia (2016) for OLS and the “poi2hdfe” stata command by Guimarães
and Portugal (2010) and Figueiredo et al. (2015) for PPML.
52 Detailed coeicients for each year are provided in Columns (1) and (2) of Table A.2 in the Appendix.
53 100 ∗ (eδ − 1)%
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Figure 1.4: Eect of AD Duties on Import Prices and Quantities, by Year
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Note: EU accession (beginning of treatment) in May 2004. Percentage change in import prices
and quantities of treated products on vertical axis, year on horizontal axis. The plot shows
point estimates with 95% confidence intervals, indicating large and significant price and
quantity eects of AD duties since their introduction in 2004.
1.6 Extensions & Robustness Checks
1.6.1 The Persistence of AD Duties
Figure 1.4 has illustrated that the trade dampening eects of AD duties persist over several
years. The estimated coeicients show the average eect over time of AD duties that were
in force 2005. However, they may underestimate the treatment eect for the years 2006 and
2007 because the baseline sample only includes AD cases that were in force until at least 2005.
Cases revoked in 2006 or 2007 are still treated as being subject to AD duties in the baseline
sample, even though they are not in force anymore. A robustness test hence performs the
same regression, estimating treatment eects by year, but only including cases in force until
at least 2007. The results (provided in Columns (3) and (4) of Table A.2 in the Appendix) show
that estimated treatment eects on quantity and price increase for all post-treatment years.
Estimated coeicients for 2004 become insignificant, which is not surprising given the smaller
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number of cases used to identify the treatment eect and since some products that were
treated in 2004 and 2005 are not assigned treatment anymore.
In order to investigate an even longer timehorizon, treatment eects are also estimated for the
years 2000 - 2008 (using the baseline sample) as well as for 2000 - 2009. Results are reported
in Columns (5) to (8) of Table A.2 and graphically in Figure A.5 in the Appendix. Both price and
quantity eects remain significant until the end of the sample period, despite half of the cases
being revoked before (Figure 1.1). The magnitude of the price coeicient remains almost
constant between 2005 and 2008, indicating that the eect of AD duties on prices persists
beyond their revokement. Even though the estimated quantity coeicient falls over time, it
does by no means halve, as would be expected if AD duties only aected trade as long as they
are in force.
In fact, the removal of AD duties constitutes a source of variation that has so far not been
used to identify the treatment eect. An extension hence departs from the baseline setting
and only looks at cases that were revoked between 2006 and 2009. The treatment dummy
switches from one to zero in the revoke year and remains zero aerwards. Columns (1) and
(2) of Table A.3 in the Appendix report the results. Estimated coeicients of the time varying
AD dummy are insignificant, implying no change in import prices and quantities following
revokement of AD duties. One possible explanation for this observation is that large AD duties
completely eliminate imports, as indicated by the large coeicients reported in Table 1.2.
Once an exporter is eliminated, it is impossible for her to re-enter themarket quickly following
the elimination of the duty. The trade destructing eect of AD duties thus persists beyond
their duration. This could be due to market entry costs or a strengthening of the domestic
industry during the protection period. Looking at lagged eects provides some evidence that
import values recover slightly one year aer a case is being revoked, while producer prices
fall only three years aer the AD duty has been removed (Columns 3 - 5 of Table A.3 in the
Appendix).
1.6.2 Elasticities & Semi-Elasticities
Byusingdummies to identify the treatment, thebaseline regressionsestimateaveragechanges
in import prices and quantities following the impositions of AD duties. These eects depend
on the average size of the duty as well as the implied elasticity. To investigate how import
prices and quantities react to a change in the size of AD duties, an extension uses information
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on average product specific duty rates to estimate elasticities.54 Columns (1) to (4) of Table
1.3 provide estimates for semi-elasticities. The estimated coeicient in Column (1) shows that
a one percentage point increase in AD duties leads to an increase in (producer) import prices
of 0.34%. As was the case in the baseline regression, the results are driven by MES countries
(Column 2). There is no evidence that import prices from NMES countries react to AD duties.
Table 1.3: The Eect of AD Duties on Import Prices and Quantities, Elasticities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var. ∆ ln price ∆ ln price ∆ ln quantity ∆ ln quantity ∆ ln price ∆ ln price ∆ ln quantity ∆ ln quantity
Treat. var. Duty Duty Duty Duty ln(1 + Duty
100
) ln(1 + Duty
100
) ln(1 + Duty
100
) ln(1 + Duty
100
)
Duty 0.0034** -0.0209*** 0.4854** -2.8718***
(0.0015) (0.0043) (0.2162) (0.5815)
Duty*MES 0.0038** -0.0199*** 0.5500** -2.6858***
(0.0017) (0.0051) (0.2446) (0.7027)
Duty*NMES 0.0023 -0.0243*** 0.3028 -3.3973***
(0.0033) (0.0079) (0.4457) (0.9916)
R2 0.9099 0.9099 0.9016 0.9016 0.9099 0.9099 0.9016 0.9016
Note: OLS regressions with first dierences, including exporter and product fixed eects. Robust standard errors clustered by
Exporter-Product in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 144,998 observations.
Looking at the impact of AD duties on import quantities (Columns 3), the coeicient of -0.02
means that import quantities fall on average by 2% for each percentage point increase in
AD duties. Coeicients for MES and NMES countries are not significantly dierent from each
other (Column 4), indicating that the dierence observed in the baseline regression is indeed
driven by dierences in average AD duty rates. Given the same estimated elasticity, imports
from NMES countries on average fall by more following the imposition of AD due to the higher
average duty rates they face. Elasticity estimates provided in Columns (5) to (8) yield similar
results.
1.6.3 Trade Diversion and Spillover Eects
The baseline sample includes imports from EUmember countries (both EU15 as well as the
ten accession states). If AD duties strengthen intra EU trade relatively more than imports from
non-targeted non EU countries, this could aect the results. Similarly, increased imports from
54 As duties are oen firm specific, the duties used in the regression are themaximumduties imposed as provided
by Bown (2015).
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EU15 countries as a consequence of the accession (trade diversion) may aect one of the two
identification channels, resulting in an overestimation of the treatment eect (see discussion
in Section 1.2).
To exclude this possible channel, the baseline regression is performed on a sample that
excludes imports from EUmember states. The results are presented in Columns (1) and (2)
of Table 1.4. The estimated coeicient for the eect of AD on import quantities (Column 2)
remains stable and even increases in magnitude, indicating that trade diversion does not
drive the results.
Table 1.4: The Eect of AD Duties on Imports, Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sample no EU no EU non-targeted non-targeted PPML: zero excluding excluding
exporters exporters countries countries trade flows China China
Dep. var. ∆ ln price ∆ ln quantity ∆ ln price ∆ ln quantity quantity ∆ ln price ∆ ln quantity
AD 0.1374 -1.5504*** 0.1240* 0.1546 -1.4421***
(0.1171) (0.2873) (0.0651) (0.1388) (0.3223)
AD*MES 0.2511** -1.1164***
(0.1151) (0.2939)
AD*NMES 0.1208 -2.0290**
(0.1615) (1.0177)
Obs. 51,962 51,962 144,900 144,900 440,606 140,381 140,3812
R2 0.9149 0.9014 0.9098 0.9016 0.9103 0.9018
Note: OLS regression with first dierences unless indicated otherwise. All regressions include exporter and product
fixed eects. PPML regression includes exporter-product, exporter-time and product-time fixed eects. Robust
standard errors clustered by Exporter-Product in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The estimate for the treatment eect of AD duties on prices (Column 1) remains positive but
turns insignificant, indicating that prices of targeted products increase relative to imports
from EU countries (baseline), but not relative to imports from non-targeted non EU countries.
This observation can be explained by spillover eects. Allegations of dumping concerning
the same product are oen split by exporting country and investigated in separate cases
either simultaneously or sequentially. If one country is found guilty of dumping a particular
product, then other exporters of the same product may expect to become the subject of
investigations in the future and raise prices in anticipation. Such spillover eects would mean
that non-targeted countries raise prices following the imposition of anti-dumping duties
against one particular country. This would violate the stable unit treatment assumption and
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cause underestimation of the treatment eect. As EU exporters are never subject to EU AD
duties, no anticipation spillovers are to be expected for them.
The hypothesis of price spillovers can be tested by investigating the eect of AD duties on
imports of targeted products from non-targeted countries. To do this, all product-country
combinations subject to AD duties are removed from the sample. AD treatment is then as-
signed to imports of targeted products from the remaining non-targeted non-EU countries.55
Imports of targeted products from EU countries receive a zero treatment. The treatment eect
is hence identified by using variation in imports from non-targeted non-EU countries (where
spillovers due to anticipation of further AD cases may be expected) relative to imports from
non-targeted EU countries (which will never be subject to EU AD duties).
The results are reported in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.4. The estimated coeicient for the
eect of AD duties on import prices from non-targeted countries is indeed positive and statis-
tically significant, indicating that prices of imports from non-targeted countries do increase
following the imposition of AD duties against other countries. The magnitude of the price
change is roughly half the eect for treated countries (Column (1) of Table 1.2), indicating sig-
nificant spillover eects. Quantity eects (Column 4) are insignificant. These results provide
evidence that exporting countries react to AD duties imposed against dierent exporters. AD
duties thus seem to have a signalling eect, as they induce non-targeted exporters to raise
prices. At the same time, the insignificant quantity coeicient in Column (4) indicates that the
baseline results are not driven by import diversion away from non-EU countries towards EU
countries following the enlargement as this should result in a significantly positive coeicient
in Column (4).
1.6.4 Further Robustness Checks
In the baseline analysis, zero trade flows are omitted as they are not reported in the trade
statistic. If a country-product combination is only observed inone year, it is dropped inorder to
balance the panel as pre- and post-treatment observations are needed to estimate a treatment
eect. However, these nonobserved zero trade flows potentially contain information, because
AD duties are expected to reduce imports. If duties are prohibitively high, eliminating trade
flows entirely, the observation drops out of the sample, leading to an underestimation of the
55 The removal of targeted product-country combinations is necessary due to collinearity within products across
countries which would mean that coeicients would be the same as in the baseline, only with opposite sign.
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treatment eect. Rather than balancing the panel by dropping country-product combinations
that are only observed once, the sample is expanded by filling up the missing years with zero
trade flows. Since the natural logarithmof zero is not defined andOLS yields unreliable results
when zero trade flows are included (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006), quantity eects are
estimated using poisson-pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML).56 The results are reported in
Column (5) of Table 1.4. The estimated coeicient of -1.44 is almost identical to the baseline
ppml regression excluding zero trade flows (Column 7 of Table 1.6 further down) and very
similar to the baselineOLS result (Column 3 of Table 1.2). Within the fixed eects setup, adding
zero trade flows hence does not significantly alter the results.
Since China is not only the largest non-market economy, but also the major target of EU
AD duties, it is possible that estimated coeicients of the eect of AD duties against NMES
countries are driven by China. Another robustness test hence excludes imports from China
and re-estimates AD eects for MES and NMES countries. The results, presented in Columns
(6) and (7) of Table 1.4 are very similar to the baseline results in Table 1.2. Coeicients are
thus not driven by China, which provides further evidence that non-market economy status
drives the results, not any unobserved China characteristics.57
In Section 1.2 it has been argued that existing studies may suer from endogeneity bias,
resulting in underestimation of the treatment eect. Indeed, baseline estimates provided
in Table 1.2 are at the high end of estimates in the literature. However, it is also possible
that this paper overestimates the treatment eect. One channel that constitutes a threat to
identification of the treatment eect and may cause overestimation is the potential of AD
duties to cause a reversal of trade deflection. This would be the case if the imposition of
AD duties by EU15 countries before 2004 has lead to increased imports of targeted products
into the newmember states. The imposition of AD duties in newmember states following
accession to the EU in 2004 could thus have two eects, firstly the standard trade destruction
eect and secondly the reversal of previous trade deflection.
The potential for the reversal of trade deflection can be estimated by testing whether trade
deflection has taken place before 2004. Figure 1.4 has already shown that treated products
56 Since PPML does not permit negative dependent variables, a fixed eects estimation is employed instead of a
first dierences estimation.
57 As discussed in Section 1.3, only Belarus and China are subject to EU AD duties in the investigation period.
Hence excluding China leaves Belarus as the only other NMES country subject to AD duties in the sample period.
Excluding Belarus instead of China from the sample yields estimated coeicients that are also very close to the
baseline (not reported). This constitutes further evidence that results are driven by the two countries’ NMES.
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did not react dierently to untreated products before 2004. As an additional robustness check,
import quantities and prices of EU accession states are regressed on AD duties imposed by
the EU in the pre-accession period 2000 to 2003.58 The treatment dummyADt switches from
zero to one in the year in which final AD duties are imposed and remains equal to one until
the end of the sample period. AD cases revoked between 2000 and 2003 are excluded from
the sample.
Table 1.5: Trade Deflection and post Accession Eects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Importer EU Accession EU Accession EU 25 EU 25
Sample pre 2004 pre 2004 post 2004 post 2004
Dep. var. ln price ln quantity ln price ln quantity
ADt 0.0489 -0.2213*
(0.0448) (0.1327)
ADEU15t 0.0659** -0.8647***
(0.0257) (0.0910)
ADAccessiont 0.0611* -0.5956***
(0.0354) (0.1041)
Obs. 931,883 931,883 2,467,857 2,467,857
R2 0.8976 0.8897 0.8890 0.9072
Clusters 239248 239248 436888 436888
Note: OLS regression (fixed eects). Regressor: AD Dummy (time vari-
ant). Regressions (1) and (2) include exporter-product, exporter-year
and product-year fixed eects. Regressions (3) and (4) include exporter-
importer-product, exporter-importer-year and importer-product-year
fixed eects. Robust standard errors clustered by Exporter-Product in
parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample period pre 2004:
Import data 1999 - 2003, AD Duties imposed 2000 - 2003, Sample period
post 2004: Import data 2005 - 2009, AD Duties imposed 2006 - 2009
The results of the fixed eects estimation are reported in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.5. The
coeicient of the time varying AD dummy in Column (1) is insignificant, indicating no eect of
EU15 duties on import prices of newmember states in the period before the accession. The
estimated coeicient for quantity eects is negative and statistically significant at the 10%
level (Column 2). Both coeicients provide evidence for the absence of trade deflection of EU
imports towards the newmember states. They also indicate that there were no anticipation
58 With trade data from 1999 to 2003, only AD duties imposed from 2000 onwards are considered to ensure the
existence of a pre-treatment period for each targeted product.
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eects for AD duties imposed in the years before the accession. If exporters had increased
prices before the accession to avoid the implementation of AD duties by EU accession states
aer 2004, one would observe positive price eects. Similarly, if exporters increased exports
to newmember states before 2004 to sell as many products as possible before the imposition
of duties, this would have resulted in a positive coeicient in Column (2). Even though the data
does not allow tomake a statement on duties implemented before 2000, it does permit the
conclusion that EU AD duties imposed between 2000 and 2003 did not cause trade deflection
to newmember states.
The significantly negative coeicient in Column (2) constitutes an interesting result. It is
negative but much smaller in magnitude than the coeicient of -1.3518 in the baseline regres-
sion (Column (3) of Table 1.2). It hence should not be interpreted as evidence that the new
member states already adopted the EU AD policy before their accession in 2004. If this was
the case, the coeicient would be larger in magnitude. In addition, this would have resulted
in significant coeicients for the pre-treatment years in Figure 1.4. In fact, the finding is in
line with Bown and Crowley (2010), who also find weak evidence for trade chilling eects of
exports of targeted countries to third countries. The authors interpret this finding as a political
chilling eect. Regarding the EuropeanMarket, an alternative explanation would be that EU15
countries constitute the primary market for some exporters. When EU15 AD duties drive them
out of thismarket, they cease production and also stop exporting to other countries, including
the newmember states. The small negative eect could constitute such a spillover eect.
Felbermayr and Sandkamp (2018) show that the eect of AD duties may vary by imposing
country. This raises the question of external validity, more precisely whether the results can
be transferred to EU15 countries or whether they are specific to EU accession states. To test if
the newmember countries react dierently to the imposition of AD duties than EU15 states,
both EU15 and EU accession states’ import quantities and prices are regressed on AD duties
(nested by EU15 and EU accession states) imposed aer the EU enlargement in 2004. The
sample period consists of the years 2005 - 2009.59
The results are reported in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.5. Comparing price eects (Column 3)
andquantity eects (Columns 4) for EU15andEUaccession state importers reveals coeicients
of very similar size, indicating no systematic dierence between the two entities. The price
coeicients (column 3) are not statistically significantly dierent from each other. Both are
59 Only AD duties imposed from 2006 - 2009 are considered to have a pre-treatment period.
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positive and significantly dierent from zero, while quantity eects in Column (4) are negative
and significant. The results are thus in line with the baseline regression, although smaller in
magnitude. This provides further evidence for endogeneity leading to underestimation of the
treatment eect when not relying on the natural experiment.60
Column (1) of Table 1.5 has shown that AD duties imposed by EU15 countries did not aect
import prices in EU accession countries before 2004, although import quantities fell slightly
(Column 2). These regressions however rely on a dierent estimation strategy, as each AD
case is implemented at a dierent point in time and thus has its own pre- and post-treatment
period. Another robustness test instead replicates the experiment for dierent samples. First
of all, the baseline experiment is carried out for EU15 countries, with the years 2003 and 2005
as pre- and post treatment period respectively.
Table 1.6: The Eect of AD Duties on Imports, Placebo Tests and PPML Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment 2004 EU15 2004 EU15 2002 2002 2004 2004 2004 2004
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS PPML PPML PPML PPML
Dep. var. ∆ ln price ∆ ln quantity ∆ ln price ∆ ln quantity price price quantity quantity
AD 0.0082 -0.2810 0.0608 -0.1013 0.7668* -1.4427***
(0.0572) (0.1854) (0.0590) (0.1520) (0.4105) (0.3276)
AD*MES 0.8301* -1.5243***
(0.4261) (0.2939)
AD*NMES -0.2786 -1.8040***
(0.3109) (0.3311)
Observations 267,578 267,578 151,943 151,943 289,996 290,026 289,996 289,996
R2 0.9384 0.9382 0.9329 0.9266
Note: OLS regressions (first dierences) with country and product fixed eects. PPML regressions with country-product,
country-time and product-time fixed eects. Robust standard errors clustered by Exporter-Product in parenthesis. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The results are summarised in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.6. Both price and quantity
coeicients are not significantly dierent from zero. This shows that EU15 import prices and
quantitiesofproducts targetedbyAD in2003and2005didnot changebetween the twoperiods.
In addition, it demonstrates the absence of variation over time in any unobserved exporting
60 Even though the sample is similar to the one used for the natural experiment, it is by nomeans identical, so
that results do not constitute suicient evidence to say without doubt that estimates obtained without the use
of the experiment are biased towards zero. Making such a statement would require a comparison of the two
methods using the same sample, which is not feasible.
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country-product specific variables that correlate with imports and AD duties andmay cause
omitted variable bias. Similarly the experiment is carried out for accession states, but with
an assumed accession year of 2002, using 2001 and 2003 as pre- and post-treatment periods
respectively. Results are provided in Columns (3) and (4). As expected, both coeicients are
not significantly dierent from zero.
To show that results are not drivenby the the regressionmethodused, thebaseline regressions
are also carried out using the poisson-pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimator. Results
are provided in Columns (5) to (8) of Table 1.6. Price eects lose some significance but increase
in magnitude by a factor of 3.5. Results continue to be driven by MES countries. Quantity
eects remain stable in magnitude and significance.
The sample used in thebaseline regressiondoesnot includeADcases thatwere revokedbefore
2006 tomake sure only cases actually in force in 2005 are included in thepost-treatment period.
When including cases that were revoked in 2004 and 2005 (results reported in Columns (1) -
(6) of Table A.4 in the Appendix) estimated coeicients remain significant but become smaller
in magnitude. This is not surprising as wrongly assigning treatment to products that are not
treated (anymore), leads to an underestimation of the treatment eect.
Since all ten EU accession countries are subject to the same treatment, import values and
quantities are aggregated to one single importing entity. As an additional robustness check,
the baseline regression is rerun on a sample with ten individual importing countries. The
estimation is adjusted by expanding the fixed eects by the importer dimension.61 This also
ensures that bilateral exchange rate fluctuations are controlled for. The results are reported in
Columns (7) and (8) of Table A.4 in the Appendix. Coeicients are similar in magnitude and
significance to those of the baseline estimation shown in Table 1.2.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper exploits the EU enlargement of 2004 as a natural experiment to estimate treatment
eects of AD duties on import prices and quantities. Following their accession to the European
Union, the newmember states inherited the EU’s AD duties. Under the plausible assumptions
that the accession countries did not join the EU because of its AD policy and that the EU did
61 The regression hence includes exporter-importer and importer-product fixed eects. Standard errors are
clustered by exporter-importer-product.
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not act on behalf of the newmember states before their entry, this implementation can be
seen as exogenous. The resulting estimation consequently does not suer from endogeneity
bias due to simultaneity (larger import values increasing the likelihood and size of AD duties)
that has not suiciently been addressed in the existing AD literature. Omitted variable bias
by means of unobserved changes in preferences or subsidies is also addressed. The paper’s
main contribution to the literature consists of the estimation of price eects over time and
the demonstration that these (together with quantity eects) dier depending on the AD
methodology applied.
The paper provides evidence that AD duties do increase producer prices and reduce import
quantities. These eects are larger than suggested by previous studies that estimate treat-
ment eects by relying on their direct implementation. With regard to the recent change in
European AD legislation, this paper shows that price eects of AD duties are only presentwhen
implemented against countries with market economy status, suggesting that the methodol-
ogy used does play a role in achieving the set policy objective of “fair” prices. This result aligns
seemingly contradicting findings of previous studies by showing that diering estimates of
price eects are driven bymarket economy status of the exporter investigated in the respective
sample. Imports from non-market economies fall by more following the imposition of AD
duties, which can be explained by the larger average AD duties they receive. The paper also
finds evidence for spillover eects, as import prices of products from non-targeted countries
also increase. This has strategic implications for the use of AD policy, as the imposition of AD
duties against one country may aect prices of imports from other countries, too.
Eects are not driven by a reversal of trade deflection and do not seem to be specific to
EU accession states, as their imports react similar to those of EU15 countries when using
alternative estimation strategies. Finally, evidence is presented that trade dampening eects
of AD duties tend to persist over several years and even beyond their revokement, indicating
that exporters find it hard to re-enter a market once AD duties are lied.
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Appendix A.1 Additional Figures
Figure A.1: Average Import Values by Treatment Status
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Note: EUaccession (beginning of treatment) inMay 2004. Ln import value on vertical axis, year
on horizontal axis. Missing observations represent non-reported values and canbe interpreted
as zero trade flows.
Figure A.2: Average Import Quantities by Treatment Status, excluding EU Exporters
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Note: EU accession (beginning of treatment) in May 2004. Ln import quantity on vertical axis,
year on horizontal axis. Missing observations represent non-reported quantities and can be
interpreted as zero trade flows.
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Figure A.3: Average Import Prices by Treatment Status, excluding EU Exporters
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Note: EU accession (beginning of treatment) in May 2004. Ln import price on vertical axis, year
on horizontal axis. Missing observations represent non-reported prices and can be interpreted
as zero trade flows.
Figure A.4: Average Import Values by Treatment Status, excluding EU Exporters
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Note: EUaccession (beginning of treatment) inMay 2004. Ln import value on vertical axis, year
on horizontal axis. Missing observations represent non-reported values and canbe interpreted
as zero trade flows.
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Figure A.5: Eect of AD Duties on Import Prices and Quantities, 2000 - 2009
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Note: EU accession (beginning of treatment) in May 2004. Percentage change in import prices
and quantities of treated products on vertical axis, year on horizontal axis. The plot shows
point estimates with 95% confidence intervals, indicating large and significant price and
quantity eects of AD duties since their introduction in 2004.
Appendix A.2 Additional Regressions
Table A.1: The Eect of AD Duties on Import Prices and Quantities, varying Fixed Eects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var. ∆ ln price ∆ ln price ∆ ln quantity ∆ ln quantity
AD 0.2130** 0.2598*** -1.3071*** -1.1357***
(0.0887) (0.0860) (0.2084) (0.2107)
R2 0.0000 0.0312 0.0003 0.0428
Exporter FEs NO YES NO YES
Product FEs NO NO NO NO
Note: OLS regression with first dierences. Robust standard errors clus-
tered by Exporter-Product in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
144,998 observations.
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Table A.2: The Eect of AD Duties on Import Prices and Quantities over Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample 1999 - 2007 1999 - 2007 1999 - 2007 1999 - 2007 1999 - 2008 1999 - 2008 1999 - 2009 1999 - 2009
AD Cases baseline baseline if 2007 if 2007 baseline baseline baseline baseline
Dep. var. ln price ln quantity ln price ln quantity ln price ln quantity ln price ln quantity
2000 0.0346 0.1714 0.0351 0.1705
(0.0586) (0.1475) (0.0587) (0.1480)
2001 -0.0001 -0.0631 0.0669 -0.0991 0.0226 0.0098 0.0228 0.0116
(0.0567) (0.1461) (0.0811) (0.1990) (0.0626) (0.1737) (0.0625) (0.1736)
2002 -0.0088 0.0303 -0.0237 0.0898 0.0127 0.0953 0.0108 0.0948
(0.0563) (0.1533) (0.0782) (0.2146) (0.0620) (0.1847) (0.0619) (0.1855)
2003 0.0492 -0.0322 -0.0583 0.1285 0.0630 0.0425 0.0598 0.0406
(0.0574) (0.1584) (0.0743) (0.2132) (0.0646) (0.1805) (0.0649) (0.1813)
2004 0.1545** -0.4459*** 0.0585 -0.2762 0.1731** -0.3729* 0.1743** -0.3838**
(0.0655) (0.1725) (0.0825) (0.2308) (0.0683) (0.1907) (0.0683) (0.1917)
2005 0.3035*** -1.2927*** 0.3147** -1.3430*** 0.3240*** -1.1848*** 0.3192*** -1.1665***
(0.0955) (0.2379) (0.1232) (0.3055) (0.0976) (0.2496) (0.0977) (0.2497)
2006 0.3224*** -1.4998*** 0.3435** -1.7155*** 0.3344*** -1.3881*** 0.3313*** -1.3779***
(0.1229) (0.3326) (0.1735) (0.4732) (0.1253) (0.3459) (0.1254) (0.3450)
2007 0.3367** -1.5096*** 0.4105** -2.0314*** 0.3531** -1.3744*** 0.3471** -1.3535***
(0.1441) (0.4007) (0.2010) (0.6034) (0.1464) (0.4116) (0.1465) (0.4094)
2008 0.3187*** -0.8147** 0.3161*** -0.8170**
(0.1077) (0.3562) (0.1065) (0.3503)
2009 0.2157** -1.1313***
(0.1064) (0.3945)
Obs. 1,716,485 1,716,485 1,716,485 1,716,485 1,930,787 1,930,787 2,127,801 2,127,801
R2 0.8537 0.8471 0.8537 0.8471 0.8498 0.8435 0.8456 0.8388
Clusters 313891 313891 313891 313891 340108 340108 352556 352556
Note: OLS regressions including exporter-product, exporter-year and product-year fixed eects. Robust standard errors
clustered by Exporter-Product in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.3: Lagged Eect of revoked AD Cases
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. var. ln price ln quantity ln price ln quantity ln value
ADt 0.0261 -0.4073
(0.1777) (0.2990)
revoked_0 0.0355 0.1138 -0.0809
(0.1926) (0.2528) (0.3125)
revoked_1 -0.0414 0.6594 0.6204**
(0.2578) (0.4109) (0.2999)
revoked_2 -0.0732 0.6729 0.6020
(0.1778) (0.4759) (0.4421)
revoked_3 -0.4085* 0.3889 -0.0555
(0.2099) (0.5118) (0.4187)
Observations 904,290 904,290 904,290 904,290 1,121,074
R2 0.8781 0.8910 0.8781 0.8910 0.8734
Clusters 239477 239477 239477 239477 292665
Note: OLS regression (fixed eects). Regressor: AD Dummy (time variant,
Columns 1 and 2) and revokement. All regressions include exporter-product,
exporter-year and product-year fixed eects. Robust standard errors clus-
tered by Exporter-Product in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Import data 2005 - 2009, revoked cases 2006 - 2009
Table A.4: The Eect of AD Duties on Imports, further Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample including including including including including including individual individual
rev cases rev cases rev cases rev cases rev cases rev cases countries countries
Dep. var. ∆ ln price ∆ ln price ∆ ln quantity ∆ ln quantity ∆ ln value ∆ ln value ∆ ln price ∆ ln quantity
AD 0.1563** -0.9112*** -0.7549*** 0.1680*** -0.9261***
(0.0639) (0.1707) (0.1600) (0.0620) (0.1570)
AD*MES 0.1496** -0.7232*** -0.5735***
(0.0709) (0.1904) (0.1748)
AD*NMES 0.1852 -1.7249*** -1.5398***
(0.1406) (0.3192) (0.3287)
Obs. 144,998 144,998 144,998 144,998 144,998 144,998 337,822 337,822
R2 0.9099 0.9099 0.9016 0.9016 0.8922 0.8922 0.9154 0.8946
Note: OLS regression with first dierences. Robust standard errors clustered by Exporter-Product in parenthesis. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns (1) to (6) include cases revoked in 2004 and 2005 and country and product fixed eects. Columns
(7) and (8) include importer-product and exporter-importer fixed eects, with standard errors clustered by exporter-importer-
product in parenthesis.
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2 The Trade Effects of Anti-Dumping Duties:
Firm-level Evidence from China∗
2.1 Introduction
Trade protection is on the rise again and anti-dumping (AD) duties remain a common in-
strument in this respect, especially against China. With an average of 60 initiations per year
between 2000 and 2014, the country has been the target of a quarter of global AD investi-
gations. Given a rule change with respect to China’s treatment in AD investigations in 2017,
EU policy makers are demanding to move closer to the US system, which is characterized by
significantly higher AD duties compared to the EU - a dierence that we put into perspective.
Against the background of this reawakened interest in trade protection in general and AD in
particular, it is all the more important to obtain unbiased estimates of the eect of AD duties
on exports.
This paper uses Chinese customs data to investigate the eects of AD duties on exporters,
exploitingdierences induties acrossdierent firmsexporting the sameproductwith thehope
to minimize endogeneity concerns which have alicted previous work. As a first step, we use
simple theory to derive a firm-level gravity equation. This framework imposes some structure
which helps uncovering potential sources of endogeneity andmotivates the empirical strategy.
We argue anddemonstrate empirically that existing firm-level estimationswhich fail to include
the appropriate fixed eects are indeed subject to omitted variable bias.
∗ This chapter is based on joint work with Gabriel Felbermayr. It is based on the paper “The Trade Eects of
Anti-Dumping Duties: Firm-level Evidence from China”, CESifo Working Paper No. 7208, August 2018. Parts of the
chapter have been featured in “Reformen der EU-Handelsschutz-Instrumente”, 2016 on behalf of the Bertels-
mann Foundation by Philipp Lang, Alexander Sandkamp and Erdal Yalcin. We would like to thank conference
participants at the ETSG 2016, the FIW Research Conference 2016, the ifo Christmas Conference 2016, the EGIT
Research Meeting 2017, the CESifo Area Conference on the Global Economy 2017, the Annual Conference of the
Canadian Economic Association 2017, the Congress of the European Economic Association 2017, the Annual
Conference of the German Economic Association 2017 as well as seminar participants at the FIW-wiiw Seminar
in International Economics and the LMU IO and Trade Seminar for their helpful comments. We are particularly
grateful to Daniel Baumgarten, Meredith Crowley, Carsten Eckel, Jens Wrona, Erdal Yalcin and Maurizio Zanardi
for valuable comments and suggestions as well as to Luisa Kinzius and Tobias Lieb for excellent research assis-
tance. We gratefully acknowledge the Frontiers of Economics in China (FEC) Best Paper Award for outstanding
research relating to China at the annual conference of the Canadian Economics Association, 2017.
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Focusing on the EU and theUS, we find that the eect of AD duties diers strongly between the
two. Although trade elasticities cannot be distinguished at conventional levels of statistical
significance at the firm-level, extensivemargin eects do dier. Overall, the estimated average
trade eect of US anti-dumping policies on Chinese exporters is stronger than that of EUpolicy.
Another contribution of the paper is a sectoral comparison of the eects of AD duties. In line
with theory, we find that the eect of AD duties diers strongly across sectors, suggesting that
average treatment eects hide significant heterogeneity.
Trade dampening eects are stronger for smaller firms, implying a shi in exports from small
to large exporters. These reallocation eects may well reduce the protective eects that
AD-duties have on firms in the importing countries. Finally, this paper is the first to look at
trade deflection following AD at the firm-level. We find that Chinese firms increasingly enter
newmarkets following AD investigations in the EU and the US. In addition, we find evidence
for falling average export prices to third countries following US duties, accompanied by an
increase in average export quantity.
The causes and consequences of dumping have interested economists for quite some time.1
Indeed, the eects of AD duties on exporters are the subject of an extensive body of research.2
Blonigen andPark (2004) have constructed adynamic pricingmodel inwhich thedevelopment
of export prices and AD duties depends on the exporter’s ex ante expectations of AD enforce-
ment. The authors set out conditions under which exporters pass duties on to consumers in
excess of 100% so as to reduce duty levels in subsequent periods.3 Their empirical findings
support themodel’s prediction. A static model constructed by Blonigen and Haynes (1999)
predicting pass through rates of up to 200% is confirmed empirically by the same authors,
who find AD pass-through rates of 160% (Blonigen and Haynes, 2002).
These findings are in contrast to those of Lu et al. (2013), who empirically examine the eects
of US AD duties on Chinese exports and who find no significant eects on producer prices,
indicating 100% pass-through. While the authors do not seek to explain this seeming contra-
diction with the literature, our paper sheds some light on the issue by accounting for China’s
status as a NME. In addition, the authors do not look at composition eects. While surviving
firms may increase or decrease prices, Melitz (2003) suggests exit of firms with high marginal
1 See for example Ethier (1982); Brander and Krugman (1983); Dixit (1988); Gruenspecht (1988); Staiger and
Wolak (1992); Clarida (1993); Blonigen and Wilson (2010)
2 Overviews of the AD literature are provided by Blonigen and Prusa (2003a, 2016) and Nelson (2006).
3 The associated welfare loss is examined by Gallaway et al. (1999) and Blonigen and Prusa (2003b).
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costs, which would push average prices down. In order to help disentangling these channels,
we look at the within firm price variation as well as the change in average prices.
Indirect evidence for the eect of duties on export prices is given by Gourlay and Reynolds
(2012), who find that US duties paid by Chinese exporters decreased on average by 28.1%
following the First Administrative Review. This indicates that Chinese exporters do increase
their prices following the imposition of duties. In contrast, Nita and Zanardi (2013) find a small
increase in average EU duties paid by Chinese exporters following the First Interim Review,
indicating further dumping.
Regarding the eect of AD duties on export volumes, Staiger and Wolak (1994) find that
the initiation of an AD investigation in the United States significantly lowers imports. Prusa
(1997, 2001) finds that US AD duties reduce exports to the United States by up to 50% (50%
- 70% for named countries), while Egger and Nelson (2011) only find small negative eects.
Carter and Gunning-Trant (2010) find strong negative eects of AD duties on trade volume
in the agricultural sector. Looking at the European Union, Messerlin (1989) finds that AD
measures reduce imported quantities by 40%. Eects of comparablemagnitude are estimated
by Lasagni (2000) as well as by Konings et al. (2001). Baran (2015) finds strong and long lasting
negative impacts of final EU AD duties on imports, while withdrawn and rejected cases aect
imports only for the duration of provisional measures. Extending the sample of AD imposing
countries to so called “new adopters”, Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2010) find trade chilling
eects of AD duties on bilateral trade flows. While most studies have focused on either EU
or US AD duties, we contribute by examining eects of EU and US AD duties simultaneously,
thus permitting a comparison of their eectiveness in reducing import volumes and inducing
price adjustments. Beyond that, our data structure allows us to use country-time fixed eects
to account for changes in multilateral resistance terms (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007).
For China, Lu et al. (2013) show that while the initiation of an AD case does not have any eect,
a one percentage point increase in preliminary (final) US AD duties reduces Chinese exports
to the United States by 0.27% (0.6%). These results are driven by the intensive as well as by
the extensive margin.4 However, the authors’ estimates of intensive margin eects may be
subject to several biases. We base our estimation on a firm-level gravity equation, exploring
an additional identification channel in order to obtain unbiased estimates. Lu et al. (2013)
argue that duties cause less productive firms to exit the market, leaving only the productive
4 Besedeš and Prusa (2013) also find US AD to induce firm exit.
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ones behind. In support of that, Jabbour et al. (2016) find that Chinese exporters reduce their
exports to the EU following the imposition of EU AD duties. However, they do grow larger and
more productive. Our results indicate that exit could also be caused be dierent duties applied
to dierent firms. Chandra and Long (2013) find evidence that AD duties reduce exporter
productivity.
All of these studies look at aggregate eects of duties on prices and export volumes, ignoring
potential heterogeneity across individual sectors. In fact, Feenstra (1989) finds very dierent
pass-through rates of taris and exchange rates for Japanese cars, trucks andmotorcycles in
the United States, ranging from 0.6 to unity. The author credits this variation to dierences in
demand, cost structures, institutions and the degree of competition across industries. For
example, Feenstra observed incomplete pass through for trucks as increased competition
meant exporters had to reduce f.o.b. prices in order not to lose market share. In contrast,
motor cycles exhibited complete pass through as prices were already close to marginal cost,
leaving no room tomanoeuvre.
If such dierences can occur within an individual (transport) industry, it is not unreasonable to
expect similar heterogeneity across industries when it comes to AD duties.5 Vandenbussche
and Zanardi (2010) take a first step in this direction in their estimation of the eect of AD duties
on exports by successively excluding iron and steel, chemicals, textiles and agricultural goods
from their estimation. We extend this research strand by simultaneously estimating AD eects
for individual sectors.
Regarding third-country eects of AD policy, Bown and Crowley (2007) find that the imposition
of US AD duties on Japanese exports increases the country’s exports of aected products to
third countries by 5 - 7% (trade deflection). Looking at the Vietnamese footwear industry,
Nguyen et al. (2016) find that EU duties on these goods increase Vietnamese exports to the US.
Similarly, Baylis and Perlo (2010) find that Mexican exports of tomatoes to Canada increased
significantly following the imposition of US AD duties on tomatoes against Mexico.
Evidence is mixed when it comes to China. While Chandra (2016) also finds evidence for trade
deflection, Lu et al. (2013) find no such eects. One reason for this dierence in findings
5 Other reasons for variation across industries can be political (larger industries have greater bargaining power
when it comes to pushing through AD protection (Baldwin, 1985)), behavioural (firms and industries learn how
to best pursue AD (Morck et al., 2001; Blonigen, 2006)), or sectoral interdependence (AD action in one product
raises costs for downstream firms so that these also ask for AD protection (Hoekman and Leidy, 1992; Feinberg
and Kaplan, 1993)).
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could be that Chandra (2016) uses annual data, whereas Lu et al. (2013) use monthly data,
so that results might reflect dierences in short- and long-run responses. Bown and Crowley
(2010) look at the eect of more general EU and US import restrictions against China and find
no systematic evidence of increased exports to third countries. In contrast, they find some
evidence for reduced exports to third countries. We expand the literature by also studying
trade deflection at the firm-level, examining the eect of AD duties on both the number
of exporters as well as firm sales to third countries. We also look at export prices to third
countries.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Aer briefly describing the ADmecha-
nisms, Section 2.2 presents the model on which we base our estimation. This is followed by a
discussion of our estimation strategy and the data used (Section 2.3). Section 2.4 contains our
empirical results, followed by robustness checks in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
2.2.1 Some Remarks on the Institutional Setup
TheWTO defines “dumping” as selling a product at a price below its normal value (GATT, 1947;
WTO, 1994). For exporters from countries withmarket economy status (MES),6 this means that
the importer is permitted to impose AD duties whenever export prices (net of transport costs)
in the importing country are below the exporting country’s domestic market prices or, if price
data are not available, production costs (European Union, 2009; United States Government
Accountability Oice, 2006).7 Traditionally, AD duties are associated with higher prices, and
thus lower export volumes, because firms have an incentive to increase prices in an eort
to reduce the gap between export and domestic prices and thus reduce AD duties following
reviews in consecutive periods (Feenstra, 2008). Thismeans that the consumer price increases
by more than the duty, implying a pass-through rate greater than 100%.
For countries with non-market economy status (NMES), AD duties work more like taris.
This is because the dumpingmargin is calculated as the dierence of average export prices
and production costs and prices in a third country with MES (European Union, 2009; United
6 These are almost all WTOmember states.
7 Under this definition, a producer is found to dump if she sells a product at the same price at home and abroad,
as the export price used to determine the dumpingmargin excludes transport costs. See Hindley (1988) or Detlof
and Fridh (2006) for a more detailed discussion.
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States Government Accountability Oice, 2006; United States International Trade Commission,
2016).8 As average export prices, rather than individual companyprices are used, firmshaveno
incentive to adjust prices to avoid theduty, unless theyhave significantmarket poweror unless
a few large exporters are able to collude and jointly raise prices to induce a reassessment of
dumping margins.
China is a special case since, as of 2017, it is still classified as aNMEbyboth the EuropeanUnion
and the United States.9 However, the European Union grants individual Chinese exporters
market economy treatment (MET) if they can prove that they are active in a market economy
environment, in which case individual company export and production prices are used to
calculate the dumpingmargin (Felbermayr et al., 2016). Alternatively, companies may also
apply for individual treatment (IT) whichmeans that individual rather than average export
prices are used to calculate the dumping margin. If companies fail to qualify for one of these
firm-specific treatments, they are subject to a product-wide duty that is the same for all
firms exporting a particular product. Similarly, cooperating exporters to the United States
may receive individual treatment. In the United States, MET can only be granted to an entire
sector, something that has not yet happened. AD duties imposed against MET and IT firms are
significantly below those imposed against NMES firms (see Figure 2.1 further down).
2.2.2 Deriving a Firm-level Gravity Equation
In order to guide our estimation strategy and to get a better understanding of potential
endogeneity issues involved, we incorporate dumping into what probably is the simplest
model of firm heterogeneity. We do not aim tomake a theoretical contribution here. Dumping
in the legal sense - i.e. exporting a good at a price below “normal value” - is easy to capture in
a Melitz (2003) type model. We can then use this framework to identify the determinants of
bilateral firm-level exports that need to be controlled for.
The representative consumer in country j gains utility from consuming varieties ω (product-
firm combination hf ) of dierent products h imported from country i (China) according to
8 This is because it is assumed that domestic prices are distorted and thus do not reflect supply and demand,
e.g. due to state subsidies. The European Union uses analogue (third-country) prices and costs to construct
the normal value (reference price). The Unites States use surrogate (third-country) input prices but estimate
production costs using (average) production functions of the exporter. A comparison of dierent countries’
methodologies is provided by Detlof and Fridh (2006).
9 The EU abandoned NMES for WTOmembers in December 2017 (European Parliament, 2017).
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the utility function Uj =
∏H
h=1
(∫
Ωhj
q(ω)
σhj−1
σhj dω
) σhj
σhj−1
µhj
, with Cobb-Douglas preferences
across products h such that
∑H
h=1 µhj = 1 for each j.
10 The elasticity of substitution between
varieties σhj is allowed to vary by destination country j and product h.
This implies the following firm-level demand equation:
qhfijt(ϕ) =µhjYjt
(phfijt(1 + Thfijt))
−σhj
P
1−σhj
hjt
, (2.1)
where Yjt is the income of consumers in country j at time t, µhj is the share of Yjt spent
on good h, Phjt is the product-specific price index in country j at time t and Thfijt is the ad
valorem AD duty imposed by country j on imports from China (i) of product h produced by
firm f at time t. The producer price (excluding the AD duty) phfijt(ϕ) charged by firm f for
product h sold to destination country j at time t is
phfijt(ϕ) =
σhj
σhj − 1
chfitτhijt
ϕhfit
. (2.2)
As usual, the price depends on the elasticity of substitution σhj , iceberg transport costs
τhijt ≥ 1 and productivity ϕhfit.11 We view unit production costs chfit as functions of wages,
the cost of capital, the cost of materials, and potentially also of product or firm-specific
subsidies. These components vary across dierent dimensions. Overall, this means that
costs of production vary at the product-firm-time dimension. It follows that the export value
xhfijt(ϕ) = phfijt(ϕ)qhfijt(ϕ) is given by
⇒ xhfijt(ϕ) =
µhjYjt
P
1−σhj
hjt
(
σhj
σhj − 1
chfitτhijt
ϕhfit
)1−σhj
(1 + Thfijt)
−σhj , (2.3)
which can be log-linearized to yield a firm-level gravity equation:
ln (xhfijt(ϕ)) = ln (µhj) + ln (Yjt)− σhj ln (1 + Thfijt) (2.4)
+(1− σhj)
(
ln
(
σhj
σhj − 1
)
+ ln (chfit) + ln (τhijt)− ln (ϕihft)− ln (Phjt)
)
.
10 This set-up borrows from Chaney (2008) with the dierence that we do not include a homogeneous good.
11 τhiit = 1
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In order for the model to constitute an appropriate framework for our empirical analysis,
dumping needs to be both possible and profitable. In Section B.2.1 in the Appendix, we
propose two types of dumping behaviour which can be replicated within the Melitz world:
tougher competition in China’s export market as reflected by a higher demand elasticity, and
the presence of distortions that artificially lower production costs. Both configurations are
very relevant in the case of China.
2.2.3 Strategic Price Setting
The above model allows us to make predictions regarding the eects of AD duties on Chinese
exporters. From Equations (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) it can be seen that following the imposition of
AD duties, firm export quantity and export value fall, while producer prices remain unchanged.
Profits go down, forcing the least profitable firms to exit the market once they are no longer
able to recover fixed export costs.
The absence of endogenousmarkups and of reciprocal dumpingmay put in doubt the use-
fulness of the Melitz model for our purposes. However, the literature and our own work do
not suggest that Chinese firms adjust their prices. Moreover, as discussed above, the NMES
regime does not provide exporting firms with incentives to adjust prices strategically in order
to lower duties. Even under the MET and IT regime, there are conditions under which firms do
not adjust prices. First, Gourlay and Reynolds (2012) argue that formany firms, applying for an
administrative review - or even for MET in the first place - is very costly. If these costs outweigh
the increase in profits from adjusting prices and thus receiving a lower duty in the long run, it
might be optimal for firms to just take duties as given. Second, asking for a reduction of duties
requires exporters to raise producer prices. Since duties respond to such price increases with
a lag of several years (duties are recalculated based on past prices), this implies a temporary
increase in consumer prices by more than the level of the duty. Depending on the degree
of competition in the industry, such price increases - even if only temporary - may not be
feasible.
Another popular framework to think about dumping duties is the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)
model in whichmarkups are endogenous and reciprocal dumping occurs. This framework
does not give rise to a log-linear firm-level gravity equation and, thus, is not useful to guide
our empirical strategy. Nonetheless, it oers an interesting way to rationalize the stability of
producerprices in the faceof anti-dumpingpolicy. As sketched inSectionB.2.2 in theAppendix,
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uncertainty regarding the AD regimemay be key to explain why we (and the literature) do not
find producer prices to react to AD duties.
In particular, the model is consistent with the following predictions. First, prices under AD
will be higher than prices in the absence of AD. However, it will not be optimal for firms to
raise prices to fully eliminate the duty. Second, under uncertainty, prices will be larger than in
the absence of AD but lower than under certain AD. Hence, the firm raises prices even before
becoming subject to AD.12 Third, if fixed costs of applying for a review following the imposition
of AD are prohibitively high, the firmmay not raise prices at all. The increase in prices following
the AD duty will thus be smaller than expected because firms will already have raised prices
and because they will never raise prices suiciently to fully eliminate the duty. If some firms
don’t adjust prices at all due to the associated fixed costs, it is not unreasonable to observe
no significant change in average prices empirically.
2.3 Estimation Strategy, Identication and Data
2.3.1 Firm-level Gravity
Following the firm-level gravity equation (2.4), our baseline specification is
lnYjhft =
Nc∑
c
βc ln(1 +Duty
c
jhft) + νjhf + νjht + νhft + εjhft, (2.5)
with c ∈ {EU,US, other}, where lnYjhft is the natural logarithm of export value, price or
quantity at the destination country-product-firm-time level, and Dutychfjt is the AD duty
(value added). As we want to knowwhether the eects of AD duties vary by duty imposing
countries, we nest AD duties by imposing countries.13 νjhf , νjht and νhft are country-product-
firm, country-product-time and product-firm-time fixed eects,14 respectively and εjhft is an
error term.
12 Blonigen and Park (2004) argue that firms typically act under uncertainty as the imposition of AD duties also
depends on factors exogenous to the exporter such as the industry structure and the strength of lobbies in the
importing country. Sandkamp (2018) shows that export prices of non-targeted exporters increase following the
imposition of AD duties against exporters in other countries. In the context of this model, this could constitute
probability updating of firms’ regarding AD duties.
13 Nesting is chosen over the alternative of running separate regressions for each country and product group in
order to allow for better comparability of estimated coeicients and enable testing for equality.
14 To implement all three-dimensional fixed eects simultaneously, we use the STATA command “reghdfe”
provided by Correia (2016).
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The fixed eects aremotivated by the firm-level gravity equation (2.4), which informs us about
potential sources of omitted variable bias. In themodel, AD duties imposed against China vary
by product, firm, destination country and time. Hence all explanatory variables varying across
the same dimensions should be examined closely. In particular, we can divide the variables
on the right hand side of the equation into demand side and supply side variables. Demand
side variables are µhj , Yjt and Phjt. It is reasonable to assume that thesemay vary with the AD
duty Thfijt as higher imports - which may or may not be caused by dumping - may increase
the probability of an AD duty being implemented as well as its size. Bown and Crowley (2013)
show that the likelihood of AD duties increases with the size of imports.
Not accounting for demand side eects may thus lead to an underestimation of the true treat-
ment eect. To see this, consider a standard dierence-in-dierences approach as employed
by Lu et al. (2013), in which the change in exports of the treatment group is compared to
the change in exports of the control group. This methodology relies heavily on the common
trends assumption. If products subject to AD are characterized by larger underlying growth
rates than the control group, it is possible that export growth of these treated products is
lower than it would be without the AD duty but still higher than that of the control group. The
estimated treatment eect would be smaller than the true treatment eect.
Lu et al. (2013) approach this problem by using a synthetic control group. Instead of using
the entire population of exports as the control group, the authors use only exports of HS6
products that are in the same HS4 product group as the treated goods subject to AD duties.15
They thus examine how treated exports react to AD duties relative to similar products. While
this should reduce the bias, we show further down that it is by nomeans eliminated.
Instead of using a synthetic control group, our data structure allows us to control for demand
side variables directly using country-product-time fixed eects, which completely eliminates
the bias. This is possible because of the dierent AD duties faced by MET (IT) and NMES
exporters. Itmeans thatdierent firmsexporting the sameproduct to the samecountry receive
dierent duties, allowing the exploitation of within product across firm variation to estimate
the treatment eect. If all firms exporting the same product received the same duty, it would
15 The authors also construct an artificial control group using matching. However, the estimated coeicients are
very similar.
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be impossible to control for time varying factors specific to country-product combinations.16
Country-product-time fixed eects also take into account time-varying multilateral resistance
terms (Feenstra, 2008) which is necessary since the sample includes several destination
countries.
Beyondour fixed eects specification it is essential to control for firm-specific ADduties. Figure
2.1 below illustrates that MET (IT) duties are significantly lower than NMES duties. Incorrectly
assigning the higher product wide duty to firms that in reality receive lower duties due to
MET (IT) would lead to attenuation bias and thus an underestimation of the treatment eect.
Given the non-negligible market share of these firms (Figure B.2 in the Appendix), distortions
caused by not controlling for MET (IT) duties may be significant.
Regarding the supply side, costs chfit including potential product or even firm-specific sub-
sidies and productivity ϕihft can be controlled for using product-firm-time fixed eects. All
other explanatory variables vary at a higher level of aggregation and are thus also controlled
for. Given China’s transition from cheapmanufacturing goods to more advanced products,
product-firm-time fixed eects also enable us to control for product-specific time trends.
A final source of bias needs to be discussed. In their firm-level estimation, Lu et al. (2013) only
control for product and time fixed eects (the country dimension is redundant since they
only use Chinese exports to the US). While this approach constitutes the desired dierence-in-
dierences specification at the product-level, it does not represent a time invariant dummy
identifying the treatment group at the firm-level. Instead, the product fixed eect captures
several firms receiving dierential treatment. The result is a biased estimator of the duty
coeicient. This is because firms receiving product-specific treatment are subject to larger
AD duties (Figures 2.1 and B.1 in the Appendix) and have, on average, lower export volumes
than firms subject to individual firm-specific AD duties (Figure B.3 in the Appendix). The AD
dutymay thus simply identify firms that were smaller to begin with rather than a causal eect,
resulting in an overestimation of the intensive margin eect of AD duties on firm exports. A
proper dierence-in-dierences estimation hence also requires country-product-firm fixed
eects. The estimated coeicient of the AD duty tells us how a given firm changes its exports
of a particular product to a particular country, if this product becomes subject to AD duties.
16 As we only have information on firm-specific duties for the EU and the US, we can only estimate treatment
eects for these two economies. In other specifications we are less restrictive to allow treatment eects of AD
duties imposed by other countries to be estimated.
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Finally, Equation 2.4 also suggests that dierent products react dierently to AD duties as σhj
can be product-specific.17 We therefore also nest AD duties by sector.18 Here it is particularly
important to control for country-specific product-time trends, as otherwise there is a risk that
our treatment variables simply capture sector-specific trends. The corresponding estimation
specification is
lnYjhft =
Nc∑
c
Nsector∑
sector=1
βc ln(1 +Duty
c,sector
jhft ) + νjhf + νjht + νhft + εjhft, (2.6)
where c ∈ {EU,US, other}.
2.3.2 Data and stylised Facts
We use annual export data at the firm-product-destination-country (HS8 digit) level for the
years 2000 – 2009, provided by the Chinese customs oice. From this dataset we use exports
to 193 countries, 22 of which impose AD duties against China.19 Information on bilateral AD
duties comes from the World Bank’s Global Anti-Dumping Database (Bown, 2015), fromwhich
we extract information for 330 AD cases against China, including 51 US AD cases as well as 43
EU cases. These are only cases that received a final AD duty.20 AD duties can be at the HS6,
HS8 or HS10 (US only) digit level.
As products are comparable only at the HS6 digit level (Lu et al., 2013; Bown and Crowley,
2016), we match the two datasets at this level of aggregation. At this level of aggregation,
17 Beyond the Melitz model, in the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) framework, Bagwell and Lee (2015) show that
individual exporter responses to taris depend on several parameters, including the distribution of marginal
cost, transport cost, firm-specific marginal costs, degree of product dierentiation between varieties and entry
costs. As these parameters dier across industries (Cebeci and Fernandes, 2012; Bremus et al., 2013; Spearot,
2013), AD duty elasticities are very likely to vary across dierent industries within a country, as well as across
firms and duty imposing countries.
18 A list of sectors is provided in Table B.1 in the Appendix.
19 These are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Columbia, the EU, Indonesia, India, Israel, Jamaica, Japan,
Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Taiwan, the US and South
Africa.
20 EU AD investigations against China may also result in the imposition of alternative trade barriers such as
negotiated price undertakings (Bown and Crowley, 2016; Crowley and Song, 2015). The share of such cases in
EU AD proceedings against all exporters has however decreased from 41% in 1981 - 2001 to 21% in 2002 - 2012
(Steinbach, 2014). Regarding imports from China, only 9% of investigations resulted in the impositions of price
undertakings between 2002 and 2012. These are excluded from the sample.
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there are 523/129/91 treated HS6 products subject to global/US/EU AD duties.21 Tables B.1,
B.2 and B.3 in the Appendix provide summary statistics.
The firm-level analysis requires information on firm-specific AD duties. Wemerge firm-specific
duties with exports using firm names. As the export dataset has firm names in Chinese
characters, whereas firm names in the AD dataset are in English, some information is lost in
the translation process. Overall, we have successfully matched 69% (711) of Chinese firms
subject to US AD duties and 84% (192) of Chinese firms subject to EU AD duties.
Figure 2.1: AD Duty Rate against China in the EU and the US
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Note: Panel (a): “Product-specific Duty” is the unweightedmean of country-wide duty levels over all aected
HS6 products; “Weighted Duty” is the mean of firm-specific duty levels weighted by export value in USD; “Firm
Duty (IT and MET only)” is the unweighted mean of firm-specific duties over all firm-product combinations
receiving individual or market economy treatment; Panel (b): Boxplots show the distribution of ad valorem AD
duties across all Chinese exporters to the EU and the US.
21 If products are treated at the HS8 product-level but we only observe trade flows at the HS6 level, wemight
underestimate the true treatment eect due to aggregation bias. Lu et al. (2013) show that aggregation bias is
not problematic in this context. Nevertheless, we address this potential problem in Section 2.4 by relying on
firm-level duties which are less prone to aggregation bias.
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Panel (a) of Figure 2.1 summarizes average AD duty rates imposed against China by the EU
and the US. It illustrates the dierence in average AD duty levels between the US (156%) and
the EU (42%). One reason for this dierence is the so called lesser duty rule applied by the EU
whichmeans that the AD duty is equal either to the dumpingmargin or to the injury margin of
domestic companies, whichever is lower. Since the injury margin is oen below the dumping
margin, this practice results in lower duties. Hence, it is worth investigating the role played by
this dierence in duty rates when it comes to their eect on Chinese exporters.
However, this dierence is only so extreme for product-specific duties (imposed against firms
with NMES). Average duties against firms receiving IT or MET are closer together (35% US and
20% EU).22 It is thus worth looking at the eectively applied duty rate, i.e. the mean duty
across all exporting firms, weighted by their export value in USD. This is also considerably
below the simple product duty mean. The dierence is more pronounced for the US because
there are more firms receiving some form of individual treatment per AD case in the US (3
firms per treated HS6 product) than in the EU (1). Consequently, average applied AD duties,
weighted by export values, are only 106% for the US and 33% for the EU. This is also reflected
in the distribution of duties across firms (Panel (b) of Figure 2.1). The median duty is 38% for
the EU and 124% for the US.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Endogeneity of AD Duties
In Sections 2.2 and 2.3, we stressed the importance of applying the correct fixed eects
specification in order to address several sources of omitted variable bias. We now show
that not doing so indeed biases the estimated coeicients. In order to do this, we start by
replicating the results estimated by Lu et al. (2013).23 The authors investigatemonthly exports
from China to the US in the years 2000 - 2006 to estimate eects of the dierent stages of
an AD investigation. These are the initiation of the case (a dummy indicating whether an
investigation has been launched), a preliminary duty (temporary pending the final result of
the investigation) that is the same for all firms exporting the aected product and a final duty
22 Our data does not allows us to dierentiate between MET and IT.
23 Note that their sample diers from our preferred sample. To ensure replicability of their results, we use
the sample investigated by Lu et al. (2013) in this subsection and switch to our preferred sample in the next
subsection.
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that may be firm or product-specific. The authors limit the control group to only include HS6
products that are in the sameHS4 product category as products subject to AD duties.24 Finally,
the authors estimate semi-elasticities, regressing the log of exports on the duty rate.25
Table 2.1: The Eect of AD Duties on Firm Export Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Importers US only US only US only US only US only US only US only all countries all countries
Products HS4 control HS4 control HS4 control HS4 control HS4 control HS4 control HS4 control all products all products
Initiation 0.0025 -0.0950*** -0.0061 -0.0341
(0.0268) (0.0348) (0.0251) (0.0369)
Preliminary -0.0008*** -0.0013*** -0.0000 -0.0006***
AD Duty (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Final -0.0026*** -0.0027*** -0.0003* -0.0118*** -0.0014*** -0.0023*** -0.0026*** -0.0017*** -0.0435**
AD Duty (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0181)
Observations 707,100 406,718 406,718 406,718 406,718 406,718 406,718 28,558,296 28,145,387
R2 0.1734 0.1405 0.6952 0.1617 0.5452 0.7071 0.8150 0.8339 0.8347
Product FEs YES YES NO NO YES NO NO NO NO
Time FEs YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO
Prod.-Firm FEs NO NO YES NO NO YES YES YES YES
Prod.-Time FEs NO NO NO YES NO YES YES YES YES
Firm-Time FEs NO NO NO NO YES NO YES YES YES
Clusters 127,658 41,725 41,725 41,725 41,725 41,725 41,725 3,656,326 3,618,802
Note: Dependent Variable: ln firm export value in USD. AD Variables: Initiation (dummy) preliminary and final AD duty rate in percent; Surviving
firms only. (8) and (9): EU and other countries’ duties controlled for but not reported. (9): Product-specific duties excluded. Robust standard errors
clustered by (Country-)Product-Firm in parenthesis, Country-Product-Firm, Country-Product-Time and Product-Firm-Time FEs in (8) and (9). ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Column (1) of Table 2.1 replicates the firm-level estimation results by Lu et al. (2013). It reports
results from regressing firm export values in USD on the three AD variables as well as product
and firm fixed eects. The initiation coeicient is not significantly dierent from zero, indicat-
ing that launching an AD investigation does not aect export value. The estimated coeicient
of preliminary (final) duties is significantly negative, indicating that a one percentage point
24 They also construct an alternative control group using matching. However, the estimated coeicients are very
similar.
25 In line with our model, our preferred specification estimates elasticities. However, for better comparison with
the results of Lu et al. (2013), we stick to semi-elasticities for now.
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increase in preliminary (final) AD duties reduces firm-level exports of the aected product by
0.08% (0.26%). All coeicients are comparable to Lu et al. (2013).26
As discussed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, we suspect this estimation to be subject to two main
biases. As our preferred fixed eects estimation is more restrictive, it reduces the sample size
as some observations get kicked out. In order to ensure that our results are not driven by
dierences in sample composition, we start by running the Lu et al. (2013) specification on our
restricted sample. The results are presented in Column (2) of Table 2.1. While the initiation
coeicient now becomes negative and significant, coeicients for preliminary and final duties
remain similar in magnitude.
The next step is to perform a correct dierence-in-dierences estimation, replacing product
fixed eects with product-firm fixed eects to take into account unobserved product-firm
characteristics. This allows for a causal interpretation of the coeicients as the AD variable
now identifies how a given firm changes exports of a particular product if this product is
subject to AD duties. There is no “selection” in the sense that AD duties identify firms with
smaller export values as was the case in Specifications (1) and (2).
The results are reported in Column (3). The first thing to note is the much largerR2 statistic
(0.7) compared to Specification (2) (0.14). This confirms that - unsurprisingly - a lot of variation
in firm export sales is explained by firm characteristics. All three AD coeicients are much
smaller inmagnitude than those presented in Column (2). While the initiation and preliminary
AD duty coeicients turn insignificant, the final duty coeicient remains significant but is only
one ninth the size of the estimated coeicient in Specification (2). This result shows that the
specification performed by Lu et al. (2013) indeed suers from omitted variable bias, leading
to an overestimation of the treatment eect.
Following our model, we suspect another bias stemming from the omission of demand-
side variables. To address this, we control for product-time fixed eects in Specification (4).
Coeicients for initiation and preliminary duties cannot be estimated as these variables do
not vary across firms exporting the same product. Comparing the estimated coeicient of
final duties with the estimate by Lu et al. (2013) in Column (2) shows that controlling for
26 The initiation coeicient in Lu et al. (2013) is negative but insignificant. The coeicient for preliminary duties is
identical. The coeicient for final duties is slightly less negative. However, we would not expect a perfect match
for the final duty coeicient as this depends on the successfully merged firm-specific duties which most likely
will not be the same. The coeicients are however in the same order of magnitude.
58
2 The Trade Eects of Anti-Dumping Duties: Firm-level Evidence from China
product-time fixed eects increases the magnitude of the coeicient by a factor of four. This
is again evidence for an omitted variable bias in Specification (2), this time resulting in an
underestimation of the true treatment eect.
Our model also suggests the use of product-firm-time fixed eects. As the sample used by Lu
et al. (2013) only includes one destination country, using product-firm-time fixed eectswould
eliminate all variation in AD duties and exports. However, it is possible to control for firm-time
fixed eects, which we do in Specification (5). Relative to Column (2) coeicients halve in size.
Once we have seen the eects of adding the three dierent fixed eects separately, Column
(7) shows regression results of controlling for all three simultaneously.27
Having demonstrated the importance of controlling for the three sets of fixed eects using
the Lu et al. (2013) sample, we can introduce the destination country (henceforth country)
dimension and increase product scope. Rather than just using Chinese exports to the US, we
now include exports to all countries in our dataset. We also include all traded HS6 products.
We then perform a regression similar to the one in Specification (7) with a few important
adjustments. Since we now have a country dimension, our panel variable is the country-
product-firm combination. As suggested in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, we now control for country-
product-firm, country-product-time, and product-firm-time fixed eects. Note that while the
country dimension was redundant in Specification (1) to (7), and country-product-firm and
country-product-time fixed eects are merely the equivalent to product-firm and product-
time fixed eects with a single country pair, the additional dimension allows us to control for
product-firm-time, rather than just firm-time fixed eects. The regression results are reported
inColumn (8). While smaller inmagnitude, the final duty coeicient isnot significantlydierent
from that in Column (7).
A final problem ismeasurement error. As described in Section 2.3, AD duties can be product or
firm-specific. While product-specific duties can be assigned via HS code, firm-specific duties
are more diicult to assign without identifiers, leading to matching rates of less than 100%. If
a firm receives a (low) firm-specific duty but is not matched in the data set, it is incorrectly
assigned a (high) product-specific duty. The estimated coeicient suers from attenuation
bias and constitutes an underestimation of the true treatment eect. In order to eliminate
this bias, we hence exclude all firm-product combinations that received product-specific
27 Comparing Columns (6) and (7) shows that once product-firm and product-time fixed eects are controlled
for, adding firm-time fixed eects does not change the AD coeicients. However, it does increase theR2.
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treatment.28 The estimation results are presented in Column (9). As may be expected, the
coeicient increases dramatically in size.
2.4.2 Baseline Results
Wenowmove to our baseline specification (estimating elasticities rather than semi elasticities)
using annual exports for the years 2000 - 2009.29 We switch frommonthly to annual data for
two reasons. First of all, transactions for the years 2007 - 2009 are only availably at an annual
level. Since a lot of AD investigations were launched in this period (especially in the EU), this
provides a lot of additional variation for identification of the treatment eect. Second, most
firms do not export every month, so that they are only observed infrequently. Aggregating
up to the annual level provides a more balanced panel. The disadvantage of using annual
data is that we cannot dierentiate between initiation, preliminary and final duties anymore,
since all three stages typically take place within one year. Given that our estimation strategy
precludes the estimation of treatment eects for initiation and preliminary duties anyway,
forgoing the monthly dimension does not aect our ability to estimate a treatment eect.
Table 2.2 presents our baseline results estimated using Equation (2.5). Column (1) shows that
Chinese firm exports fall following the imposition of AD duties. In particular, a one percent EU
(US) AD duty increase is associated with a 7.5% (4.8%) fall in exports.30 Within the model, this
correlation can be interpreted to be causal. Despite the dierence in magnitude, EU and US
coeicients are not statistically dierent from each other, indicating that exports to the EU do
not react more sensitively to the imposition of AD duties than exports to the US.
The second column of Table 2.2 presents price eects. In line with the optimal pricing rule in
Equation (2.2), we find no eect of AD duties on producer prices. This indicates 100 % pass-
through, meaning that AD duties are fully passed on to consumers. The final column in Table
2.2 presents quantity eects. It can be seen that these are very similar in magnitude to value
eects, indicating that adjustments in firm export values are primarily driven by adjustments
in quantity rather than adjustments in prices. Given that the coeicients in Columns (1) and
28 This procedure also tackles aggregation bias. Some AD duties are assigned at a more disaggregated level than
HS6, so that a treated HS6 product may actually include untreated HS8 products. This problem is reduced when
focusing on duties that are specific to product-firm combinations.
29 The regressor is thus ln
(
1 + Duty rate in %100
)
.
30 Given that these elasticities are estimated using within product across firm variation, it is not surprising that
they are larger than if estimated at a more aggregated level. The results are broadly in line with the literature on
trade elasticities (Caliendo and Parro, 2014).
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(3) are both estimates of the price elasticity of demand, it is not surprising to see them being
not significantly dierent from each other.
Table 2.2: Firm-level Estimation - Elasticities - Firm-specific Duties only
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable ln value ln price ln quantity
AD Duty EU -7.5353*** -0.3997 -7.1355***
(1.5936) (0.3246) (1.6494)
AD Duty US -4.7992*** -0.0628 -4.7364***
(1.5762) (0.2734) (1.5368)
EU = US (p value) 0.2207 0.4224 0.2851
R2 0.8413 0.9586 0.8787
Note: AD Variable: ln (1 + AD Duty Rate/100). Robust
standard errors clustered by Country-Product(HS6)-Firm
in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Surviving
firms and firms exporting before treatment only. Country-
Product-Firm, Country-Product-Time and Product-Firm-
Time FEs. 17,995,095 observations, 5,381,311 clusters
2.4.3 The Role of Firm Size
In Section 2.3 we have already shown that small firms are more likely to receive product-level
- and thus larger - AD duties than large ones. Nowwe are also interested if firms of dierent
size react dierently to the imposition of AD duties. For each destination country and year,
we therefore rank firm-product combinations by export value and divide them into three
categories of equal size (small, medium and large). These are then interacted with AD duties.
Columns 1 and 3 of Table 2.3 show that the eect of AD duties on export value and quantity
declines with firm size, indicating that large firms react less sensitively to AD duties than small
firms. The dierence between the coeicients for the individual size clusters is statistically
significant. Price eects reported in Column (2) are insignificant for all size clusters except for
large firms exporting to the EU. Here the coeicient is significantly negative, indicating that
these firms absorb parts of the AD duty.
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Against the background of the correlation between firm size and productivity observed in the
literature, this implies that given the same AD duties, productive firms’ exports decline by
less than those of less productive firms. Taken together with the aforementioned negative
correlation of firm size and AD duties, AD action may intensify competition as productive
exporters expand relative to less productive ones.
Table 2.3: Duty interacted with Firm Size
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable ln value ln price ln quantity
AD Duty EU x small -14.7694*** -0.2613 -14.5080***
(2.0719) (0.5658) (2.0844)
AD Duty EU xmedium -11.2412*** 0.0450 -11.2861***
(1.7196) (0.3850) (1.7827)
AD Duty EU x large -5.3170*** -0.5967* -4.7203***
(1.5223) (0.3239) (1.5445)
AD Duty US x small -12.1460*** -0.1615 -11.9845***
(2.7361) (0.4834) (2.7199)
AD Duty US x medium -7.5355*** 0.0557 -7.5912***
(2.0890) (0.2627) (2.0661)
AD Duty US x large -3.5262* -0.0690 -3.4572*
(1.9722) (0.2744) (1.9440)
R2 0.8408 0.9586 0.8783
Note: AD Variable: ln (1 + AD Duty Rate/100) interacted with
firm size clusters. Robust standard errors clustered by Country-
Product(HS6)-Firm in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Surviving firms and firms exporting before treatment only.
Country-Product-Firm, Country-Product-Time and Product-
Firm-Time FEs. 18,060,430 observations, 5,396,449 clusters.
2.4.4 Decomposition: Extensive versus Intensive Margin
Next we want to see how results at the firm-level extend to the product-level. The change
in total exports at the product-levelXjht can be decomposed into a change in the number
of exporters exporting a particular product to a particular country njht (extensive margin)
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as well as a change in the average firm export value (intensive margin) which in turn can be
decomposed in the change in average export prices p̄jht and quantities q̄jht:
lnXjht = ln njht + ln p̄jht + ln q̄jht.
As both dependent variable and AD duties now only vary across country, product and time,
we have to adjust our estimation strategy. Since we can no longer use firm-specific AD duties,
we need to use one single AD duty per aected HS6 product. One possibility is to use the
product-specific duty. This may however lead to attenuation bias as the product-level exports
would incorporate exports of firms receiving low duties. As these will be larger than they
would be if these firms had received the higher product wide duty, incorrectly associating
high export - low duty firms with the high duty through aggregation would underestimate the
treatment eect.
An alternative which we will use henceforth is to calculate an average AD duty over all firms
exporting agivenproduct at apoint in time,weightedby the firm’s export value.31 Wealsohave
to adjust our fixed eects as the firm dimension disappears. We hence use country-product
(the panel identifier), country-time and product-time fixed eects. It can be seen directly that
the country dimension allows us to control for product-time fixed eects, something that is
not possible when restricting the sample to a single country pair. Nevertheless, there may
still be omitted variable bias following the omission of country-product-time specific demand
side control. We hence do the next best thing and use country-HS4-time fixed eects to at
least account for country-specific product group trends. They also provide a proxy for time
varying transport costs of certain kinds of goods as well as the strength of lobbying groups in
a particular industry in the destination country.
Table 2.4 presents regression results for each of the components. Column (1) shows that
a one percent increase in EU (US) AD duties is associated with a 1.4% (1%) reduction in
Chinese exports of the aected product. Not surprisingly, the elasticities estimated across HS6
products are smaller than those estimated within HS6 products as the degree of competition
declines. Column (2) provides the estimated coeicients of a regression of the log of the
number of exporters on AD duties. Coeicients for the EU and the US are both negative
31 A potential problem with this approach is an automatic adjustment of the duty downwards as high duty
firms reduce exports or exit the market and low duty firms expand. In a robustness check, we thus also use
product wide duty rather than a weighted average. As expected, the estimated coeicients are slightly smaller in
magnitude but remain similar.
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and statistically significant, indicating that AD duties drive out exporters. However, the EU
coeicient is significantly larger inmagnitude than theone for theUS, indicating that exporters
react more sensitively to EU duties. Column (3) looks at the eect of AD duties on average
firm export prices. EU and US coeicients are both not statistically dierent from zero. Finally,
Column (4) shows the eects of AD duties on average firm export quantity. Both EU and
US coeicients are negative and significant, confirming that aggregate results are driven by
changes in average export quantity rather than by changes in average export prices.
Table 2.4: Decomposition: Extensive versus Intensive Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable ln value ln no. firms ln mean price ln mean quantity
Duty EU -1.4391*** -0.8409*** 0.0844 -0.6826**
(0.3771) (0.1306) (0.1594) (0.3197)
Duty US -1.0051*** -0.3792*** 0.0319 -0.6578***
(0.1695) (0.0525) (0.0600) (0.1583)
Duty other -0.3764*** -0.1771*** 0.0311 -0.2304***
(0.0964) (0.0485) (0.0445) (0.0850)
EU = US (p value) 0.2940 0.0010 0.7578 0.9447
R2 0.8860 0.9454 0.9500 0.9074
Note: AD Variable: ln (1 + Trade weighted AD Duty Rate/100). Robust standard errors
clustered by Country-Product(HS6) in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Country-Product, Country-HS4-Time and Product-Time FEs. 1,765,887 Observations;
293,660 clusters.
2.4.5 The overall Eect of AD Duties
The elasticities presented in Table 2.4 show how sensitive Chinese exports react to the imposi-
tion of AD duties. They fail to show the overall impact, as this also depends on the magnitude
of the AD duties which was shown to dier dramatically between the US and the EU. We thus
also regress export values, prices and quantities on dummies that indicate if a duty is in place
against a particular product at a certain point in time. The estimated coeicient captures both
the elasticities as well as the magnitude of the duty.
The estimation results are provided in Table 2.5. Estimated eects of AD duties on export
value (1), the number of exporters (2) as well as mean export quantity (4) remain significantly
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negative. However, once the magnitude of the AD duties is taken into account, EU and US
duty coeicients switch places. As can be seen in Columns (1), and (4), US coeicients are now
significantly larger in magnitude than EU coeicients, indicating that once the size of the duty
is taken into account, US duties have a stronger trade dampening eect than EU duties. The
coeicients in Column (1) can be interpreted in the way that on average the imposition of EU
(US) AD duties tends to reduce exports of aected products by 100 ∗ (eβ − 1)% = 41% (62%).
Hence while the larger average US AD duties mean that the US is overall more eective in
reducing Chinese imports than the EU, the larger EU elasticity as well as the greater number
of firms receiving individual treatment in the USmean that the dierence is not as big as may
be inferred from only looking at the dierence in product-level duty rates (Figure 2.1 above).
Price eects in Column (3) remain insignificant for the EU and the US, while they turn positive
and significant for other countries.
Table 2.5: Decomposition: Extensive versus Intensive Margin, overall Eect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable ln value ln no. firms ln mean price ln mean quantity
Duty Dummy EU -0.5196*** -0.2970*** 0.0112 -0.2338**
(0.1333) (0.0483) (0.0473) (0.1168)
Duty Dummy US -0.9574*** -0.3560*** 0.0352 -0.6366***
(0.1555) (0.0489) (0.0528) (0.1452)
Duty Dummy other -0.4899*** -0.2413*** 0.0692** -0.3178***
(0.0788) (0.0322) (0.0286) (0.0694)
EU = US (p value) 0.0327 0.3908 0.7349 0.0305
R2 0.8860 0.9454 0.9500 0.9074
Note: AD Variable: AD Dummy. Robust standard errors clustered by Country-
Product(HS6) in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country-Product, Country-
HS4-Time and Product-Time FEs. 1,765,887 observations; 293,660 clusters.
2.4.6 Trade Eects by Sector
It was suggested that exports in dierent sectors may react quite dierently to AD duties.
Following Equation (2.6), AD duties are nested by sector to obtain sector-specific coeicients.
Figure 2.2 summarizes the regression results for US and EU duties at the product-level.32 The
32 For a full list of aected sectors see Table B.1 in the Appendix.
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figure reveals that aggregate elasticities hide significant heterogeneity across sectors. The
results for the EU in the right panel of Figure 2.2 show that EU imports react very dierently to
AD duties compared to US imports.33
Figure 2.2: The Eect of AD Duties on Export Value, nested by Sector
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Note: Regression of ln exports on ln (1 + Trade weighted AD Duty Rate/100), Country-Product, Country-HS4-
Time and Product-Time FEs. Robust standard errors clustered by Country-Product. 293,660 clusters. 1,765,887
observations. Vertical line corresponds to zero. Sorted by sector classification.
Figure 2.3 shows that price eects are absent in most sectors. However, average prices rise
following EUADduties in the footwear sector and fall in themetals sector. The findings suggest
that Chinese exporters react dierently to duties in dierent sectors. One possible explanation
for the positive coeicients observed in some sectors could be that these sectors either have
a lot of firms receiving MET or that they are dominated by a few large exporters that are able
to collude and jointly increase prices in order to reduce AD duties in subsequent periods.
33 The positive coeicient for EU Footwear and headwear products is driven by entry.
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Figure 2.3: The Eect of AD Duties on average Export Price, nested by Sector
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Note: Regression of ln average export price on ln (1 + Trade weighted AD Duty Rate/100), Country-Product,
Country-HS4-Time andProduct-Time FEs. Robust standard errors clustered by Country-Product. 293,660 clusters.
1,765,887 observations. Vertical line corresponds to zero. Sorted by sector classification.
2.4.7 Trade Deflection
In order to investigate the eect of a country’s AD duties on Chinese exports to other countries
(trade deflection), we regress Chinese export values, prices and quantities to countries other
than the EU and the US on duties imposed by the EU and the US, while still controlling for
the importing country’s own duties.34 As before, we restrict our sample to firms surviving the
treatment, i.e. exporting to at least one country following the introduction of the AD duty.
Table 2.6 presents the results. The estimated value and quantity eects of EU (US) AD duties
on exports to the EU (US) are similar in magnitude to those presented in Table 2.2. However,
we do observe a significantly negative price coeicient for EU duties, indicating that Chinese
firms reduce export prices to the EU following the imposition of EU AD duties. Looking at
the eects of EU and US AD duties on firm-level exports to third countries, we do not find
34 Exports to the US are also regressed on EU duties and vice versa.
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significant eects, indicating that firms do not adjust their exports to third countries following
the imposition of AD duties in the EU or the US.
Table 2.6: The Eect of AD Duties on Firm Exports to third Countries
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable ln value ln price ln quantity
Duty EU -7.2399*** -0.6991** -6.5408***
(1.7201) (0.3452) (1.7752)
Duty US -4.9281*** -0.1941 -4.7340***
(1.7262) (0.2965) (1.6899)
Duty EU 3rd 0.2902 -0.2152 0.5054
(0.5387) (0.1373) (0.5593)
Duty US 3rd -0.0839 0.0353 -0.1192
(0.1307) (0.0392) (0.1298)
EU 3rd = US 3rd (p) 0.4998 0.0793 0.2766
R2 0.8411 0.9597 0.8791
Note: AD Variable: ln (1 + AD Duty Rate/100). Robust
standard errors clustered by Country-Product(HS6)-Firm in
parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Surviving firms
and firms exporting before treatment only. Country-Product-
Firm, Country-Product-Time and Product-Firm-Time FEs.
16,737,202 observations, 4,957,495 clusters clusters
We also examine trade deflection at the product-level, dierentiating between extensive
and intensive margin. As in Table 2.4, the dependent variable is regressed on ln (1 + Trade
weighted AD Duty Rate/100). Given the way the variables “Duty EU 3rd” and “Duty US 3rd” are
constructed, we however have to adjust our fixed eects specification. If a US AD duty is in
place at a particular point in time against a particular product, the variable “Duty US” takes
on the ln duty rate for exports to the US and zero to all other countries. At the same time, the
Variable “Duty US 3rd” takes on the ln duty rate for exports to all other countries and zero for
exports to the US. Consequently, given an AD duty is in force at a particular point in time for a
particular product, the two variables “Duty US” and “Duty US 3rd” are perfectly collinear at
the product-time dimension. Consequently, we cannot control for product-time fixed eects
anymore as this would lead to one of the two variables dropping out. For the same reason,
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wemove from using country-HS4-time fixed eects towards using country-sector-time fixed
eects.
Table 2.7 reports the results. Estimated coeicients for the direct eects of EU and US AD
duties are similar to those provided in Table 2.4. One notable dierence is the significantly
positive coeicient of the EU duty in Column (3), indicating that average export prices to the
EU rise following the imposition of EU AD duties. Combined with the negative EU coeicient
in Column (2) of Table 2.6, this indicates that while surviving firms reduce export prices, AD
duties may drive low price firms out of the market which may be expected if these receive
higher duties.
Table 2.7: The Eect of AD Duties on Exports to third Countries - Decomposition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable ln value ln no. firms ln mean price ln mean quantity
Duty EU -1.2524*** -0.6632*** 0.2977** -0.8869***
(0.3460) (0.1729) (0.1507) (0.3244)
Duty US -0.8164*** -0.2060*** -0.0301 -0.5804***
(0.1912) (0.0721) (0.0531) (0.1639)
Duty other -0.5762*** -0.2609*** 0.0303 -0.3456***
(0.0911) (0.0561) (0.0405) (0.0698)
Duty EU 3rd 0.1461*** 0.1199*** 0.1208*** -0.0946**
(0.0447) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0384)
Duty US 3rd 0.2114*** 0.1704*** -0.0947*** 0.1357***
(0.0166) (0.0077) (0.0089) (0.0155)
EU 3rd = US 3rd (p) 0.1799 0.0326 0.0000 0.0000
R2 0.8012 0.8815 0.9151 0.8439
Note: AD Variable: ln (1 + Trade weighted AD Duty Rate/100). Robust standard errors
clustered by Country-Product(HS6) in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Country-Product and Country-Sector-Time FEs. 2,101,917 observations; 351,684
clusters.
Regarding third country eects, Column (1) shows that higher EU and US duties increase
Chinese exports to other countries. This is evidence of trade deflection and in line with
findings by Chandra (2016), who finds evidence of trade deflection with regard to US trade
barriers against Chinese exporters. The extensive margin eects are reported in Column (2).
They give evidence that firms tend to start exporting to newmarkets following the imposition
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of EU and US AD duties. This suggests that the decision of market entry is not independent
across markets but may depend on capacity. Eects of US duties on average firm prices and
export quantities to third countries are as expected. Average export prices to third countries
fall (Column 3) along with rising average export quantities to third countries following the
imposition of US AD duties (Column 4). This may indicate increased dumping activity to third
countries, although we fail to find evidence for this at the firm-level.
For the EU, mean price and quantity coeicients have the opposite signs. It is, however,
unclear whether firms exposed to EU duties increase prices and hence experience falling
demand in third countries to avoid investigations in those countries. Since we do not find
evidence for this at the firm-level, a selection eect is more likely, meaning that high price
firms with lower sales enter newmarkets, thus driving average prices up and average export
quantity down.
2.4.8 The EU Enlargement 2004 - A Natural Experiment
As demonstrated above, using an elaborated fixed eects strategy reduces omitted variable
bias at the firm-level. Nevertheless, the risk of endogeneity due to reverse causality (large
exports increasing the probability of receiving AD duties or their level) may not be completely
eliminated, especially at the product-level. In this subsection, we hence propose a strategy
based on Sandkamp (2018) to ensure exogeneity of the AD treatment also at the product-level.
Namely, we use the enlargement of the European Union in 2004 as a natural experiment.
When the ten accession countries joined the EU,35 they also adopted the EU’s taris and AD
duties. Under the plausible assumption that these countries did not join the EU because of its
AD policy, the treatment can be seen as exogenous from the perspective of the newmember
states.
Using a sub-sample of product-level exports to the ten EU accession countries for the years
2003and2005 (symmetric around theaccession),wehence conduct adierence-in-dierences
estimation (Equation 2.7). ln exports are regressed on a time dummy (zero in 2003 and one in
2005), an AD dummy identifying the treatment group which is equal to one if the product is
subject to AD duties by the EU in 2003 and 2005 and zero otherwise and a treatment dummy
which is an interaction of the time and the AD dummy. The latter identifies the treatment
eect. The treated products were hence not subject to AD duties in the ten accession countries
35 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
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in 2003 but became subject to AD duties in 2004 (and still were in 2005) simply because the
countries joined the EU (cases initiated since 2004 are ignored).
lnYjht =β1ADh + β2Timet + β3(ADh x T imet) + εjht (2.7)
The regression results are presented in Table 2.8 below. Column (1) shows results for the
basic di-in-di estimation described in Equation 2.7 above. The coeicients for Time and AD
are positive and statistically significant. The first indicates that exports on average increase
over time. The second shows that the average value of products exported to EU accession
states that are subject to AD duties in the EU is above the average value of those products not
subject to AD duties in the EU. The interaction term (“AD Duty”) is negative and statistically
significant, indicating that exports of treated products to EU accession states fell following the
imposition of AD duties (relative to products not subject to AD duties). Qualitatively this result
is in line with the coeicients estimated in Column (1) of Table 2.5 above. Quantitatively, the
coeicient estimated in the experiment is larger in magnitude.
Table 2.8: The Eect of AD Duties on Exports to EU Accession Countries
Dependent variable: ln value (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AD Duty (dummy) -0.9368** -1.0420*** -1.0234*** -1.5769*** -1.4991**
(0.3945) (0.3756) (0.3705) (0.4594) (0.6356)
Time 0.2955*** 0.6475***
(0.0212) (0.0187)
AD 1.5398***
(0.3149)
Observations 29,182 21,670 21,670 21,440 17,676
R2 0.0041 0.8320 0.8351 0.8684 0.9058
Country-Product FEs NO YES YES YES YES
Country-Time FEs NO NO YES YES N/A
HS4-Time FEs NO NO NO YES N/A
Country-HS4-Time FEs NO NO NO NO YES
Clusters 18347 10835 10835 10720 8838
Note: AD Variable: AD Dummy. Robust standard errors clustered by Country-Product(HS6) in
parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The remaining columns of Table 2.8 show regression results for specifications using dierent
sets of fixedeects, similar to thoseused in theprevious specifications. Controlling for country-
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product fixed eects (Column (2)) increases magnitude and significance of the treatment
coeicient. While controlling for country-time fixed eects does not significantly alter the
estimated coeicient (Column 3), adding HS4-time fixed eects - either separately in Column
(4) or interacted with country fixed eects in Column (5) - increases its magnitude.
Overall, the experiment provides further evidence that AD duties significantly reduce exports.
The magnitude of the estimated coeicient under the most restrictive fixed eects specifica-
tion is three times larger than those estimated in Table 2.5. It is however not clear if this is
driven by the estimation strategy or the very specific sample (Eastern Europe).
2.5 Robustness Checks
2.5.1 Firm-level Regressions
In this section we perform several robustness checks. Detailed regression results are reported
in Section B.3 of the Appendix. We have shown in Table 2.1 Columns (8) and (9) that including
firm-product combinationswithwrongly assignedproduct-specific duties leads to attenuation
bias. To see if this bias is also present in our preferred sample, we perform our baseline
specification, now including product-specific duties. The results are reported in the first panel
of Table 2.9 below. As can be seen in Columns (1) and (3), the estimated price elasticities of
demand fall dramatically in magnitude relative to the coeicients reported in Table 2.2. The
bias is stronger for the US than for the EU. This is in line with the dierence in successfully
matched firm-specific duties between the EU (84%) and the US (69%). Given that more US
firm-product combinations are wrongly assigned a higher product-specific duty, it is not
surprising to see a larger bias for the US coeicient.
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Table 2.9: Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable ln value ln price ln quantity
(I) Including product specific duties
AD Duty EU -2.3292*** 0.2052 -2.5344***
(0.6617) (0.1474) (0.6486)
AD Duty US -0.4212** -0.0040 -0.4172***
(0.1692) (0.0312) (0.1619)
(II) Excluding products receiving product treatment only
AD Duty EU -2.3829*** 0.2000 -2.5830***
(0.6644) (0.1497) (0.6499)
AD Duty US -0.4124** -0.0047 -0.4077**
(0.1691) (0.0312) (0.1617)
(III) Firms entering post treatment
AD Duty EU -7.5175*** -0.3994 -7.1181***
(1.5916) (0.3244) (1.6472)
AD Duty US -4.8946*** -0.0526 -4.8419***
(1.5668) (0.2740) (1.5305)
(IV) Excluding intermediaries
AD Duty EU -7.0956*** -0.4530 -6.6426***
(1.7704) (0.3621) (1.8373)
AD Duty US -5.1766*** 0.1731 -5.3497***
(1.9601) (0.2577) (1.9165)
(V) Excluding producers
AD Duty EU -6.1620*** -0.3942 -5.7677***
(1.6294) (0.3096) (1.6749)
AD Duty US -5.4369*** -0.1148 -5.3221***
(1.8265) (0.3321) (1.7989)
Note: For detailed tables please refer to Section B.3 in the
Appendix.
An alternative explanation for the dierence in coeicients when including product-specific
duties could be sample selection. Some products do not receive firm-specific treatment.
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Excluding these might aect estimated coeicients. As a further robustness check, we thus
perform once again our baseline regressions, excluding products that only receive product-
specific AD duties. Firms that receive product-specific duties but export products that are
also subject to firm-specific duties remain in the sample. The results are summarized in the
second panel of Table 2.9. It can be seen that coeicients are very similar to those reported in
the first panel, indicating that the jump in coeicients does not stem from a selected sample,
but instead from eliminating firms wrongly associated with product-specific treatment.36
As we are interested in the intensive margin eects, we have dropped firms exiting or entering
post treatment. However, Lu et al. (2013) only drop firms exiting following the treatment.
We hence perform a further robustness test by keeping firms that only entered the market
following the imposition of AD duties as well as those that le the market. The results are
reported in the third panel of Table 2.9. Relative to our baseline results, coeicients remain
similar.
In our baseline regressions, we include exports from producers as well as from trade inter-
mediaries. In a robustness check, we perform the firm-level regression excluding all trade
intermediaries (fourth panel in Table 2.9). Coeicients remain robust. If weonly look at exports
by intermediaries (fih panel),37 the EU coeicient slightly decreases in magnitude while the
US coeicient slightly increases, so that the twomove closer together.
2.5.2 Product-level Regressions
Moore andZanardi (2009, 2011) find evidenceof a correlationbetween theuseof anti-dumping
and trade liberalization in general. Consequently, if AD duties correlate with taris, this could
contribute to omitted variable bias. In our baseline firm-level regression, taris are controlled
for through country-product-time fixed eects. This is however not the case at the product-
level. In another robustness check,38 we thus perform the product-level regression controlling
forMFN tari rates. Coeicients remain robust, with the exception of the EUADduty coeicient
for average export quantity, which turns insignificant. MFN tari coeicients are insignificant
throughout. This is however not surprising given our fixed eects specification and the limited
36 Given the use of country-product-time fixed eects, products not subject to firm-specific duties do not provide
any remaining variation to identify the treatment eect.
37 In the customs data set, some firms are labeled as intermediaries while others are labeled as producers. Firms
for which this information is missing are included in both the fourth and the fih panel.
38 Detailed tables are reported in Section B.3 in the Appendix.
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within country variation of MFN taris across time. In addition to using the weighted AD
duty, we also estimate trade deflection eects using dummy regressions. Results remain
qualitatively similar.
In the product-level regression (Table 2.4), we include country-HS4-time fixed eects. Doing
this reduces the number of observations as any treated product requires an untreated prod-
uct in the same country-HS4-time dimension to be included. We hence run amore relaxed
specification with country-time rather than country-HS4-time fixed eects. Coeicients for
value, number of firms and mean quantity remain robust. However, average price eects
become positive and significant. This can be driven either by exit of low price firms following
the imposition of high AD duties or by surviving firms raising prices. The latter is however not
observed in the firm-level regressions. One possible explanation would be that all firms in an
industry start raising prices following the imposition of AD duties against a particular product.
Given such spillover eects, one would not observe positive price eects when controlling for
industry time trends using country-HS4-time fixed eects. However, the coeicients could also
be driven by unobserved country and industry-specific time trends, which is why controlling
for country-HS4-time fixed eects remains our preferred specification. The same robustness
test is carried our for trade deflection at the product-level. Performing dummy regressions
yields qualitatively similar results.
Using weighted average AD duties for the product-level regression might give rise to endo-
geneity concerns. This is because firms receiving high AD duties reduce their exports, such
that their AD duties receive smaller weights in subsequent periods. To address this issue, we
perform the product-level regression using product-specific duties rather than a weighted
average including both product and firm-specific duties. As predicted, coeicients are smaller
inmagnitude as firms receiving low firm-specific duties are implicitly assigned higher product-
specific dutiesdue toaggregation from firm toproduct-level. Nevertheless, coeicients remain
similar in magnitude and significance.39
2.5.3 Results by Sector
Beyond sectoral eects of AD duties on export value and average export prices, we also
examine eects on the number of exporters as well as average export quantity. Detailed
39 Coeicients for other countries are identical as weighted averages could only be calculated for the EU and the
US.
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regressions results (weighted duty as well as dummies) for the key sectors chemicals, metals
andmachinery are reported in the Appendix, which also provides further summary graphs,
illustrating the heterogeneity across sectors.
2.6 Conclusions
AD duties remain a common trade defence instrument, the use of which having increased over
the past decade. Given their role and controversies around them, it is essential that the eects
of AD dumping duties on trade are correctly measured. We take a step into this direction by
basing our estimation on a theoretical model, incorporating firm heterogeneity that informs
us about potential sources of omitted variable bias. Using Chinese customs data on firm-level
transactions, we find that existing firm-level estimations indeed suer from twomain biases
that work in opposite directions.
Exploiting within product across firm variation in exports and AD duties, we identify separate
treatment eects of EU and US AD duties. We find that AD duties do reduce firm export
value but do not aect producer prices, so that AD duties are completely passed through to
consumers. However, eects dier between the EU and the US as the number of exporters
reacts more sensitively to EU duties, meaning that higher duties are required in the US to
achieve the same overall eect. In addition, only comparing product-level duties overstates
the dierence in applied duty levels between the EU and the US. When considering the use of
firm-specific duties - which is more common in the US than in the EU - and weighing duties
by export volume of the aected firms, it becomes clear that the dierence in eectively
applied duties is smaller than commonly stated. When considering both elasticities as well as
duty levels, exports to the US fall by more than exports to the EU following the imposition of
AD duties. Nevertheless, the dierence is smaller than implied by the dierence in product-
specific duties. EU duties also significantly impact firm export values, meaning that there is
no need for the EU to move closer to the US system in order to protect its domestic market.
Beyond a fall in firm-level exports, falling exports at the product-level are driven by firm exit
as well as a fall in average firm export quantity. Interpreted through the lens of our model
and combined with the finding that small firms are aected more strongly by the imposition
of duties, this implies that AD duties force out the least eicient exporters, thus increasing
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the overall competitiveness of Chinese exporters. All results vary significantly across sectors,
indicating that a one size fits all AD policymay lead to very dierent eects in dierent sectors.
Finally, we find evidence for trade deflection at the firm-level. At the product-level, exports
to third countries increase following the imposition of AD duties in the EU and the US. For
both economies, this is driven by the extensive margin, as firms enter newmarkets following
the imposition of EU or US AD duties. In addition, average export prices to third countries
fall following US AD duties, implying that firms dump products to third countries. This is
accompanied by an increase in average export quantities. For the EU,mean prices actually rise
and average quantity falls, indicating that the composition eect (high price producers with
low sales entering newmarkets as they are driven out of the EU) dominates. This illustrates the
deep interdependence of global markets which has to be taken into account when designing
new trade policies.
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Appendix B.1 Summary Statistics
Table B.1: Distribution of global AD Cases across Sectors
Exports (m) Total (m) Ratio N hs6 N hs6 d Cases Revenue (m) Ratio
Animals 17 6,522 0.00 238 1 1 26 0.00
Vegetables 19 8,609 0.00 350 2 2 7 0.00
Foodstus 77 11,158 0.01 204 7 8 109 0.01
Mineral Products 359 18,666 0.02 158 2 3 593 0.03
Chemicals 658 32,931 0.02 856 77 75 543 0.02
Plastics rubber 863 22,516 0.04 227 41 33 664 0.03
Raw Hides Skins 1 13,445 0.00 105 1 1 0 0.00
Wood 350 12,507 0.03 298 44 18 412 0.03
Textiles 647 108,271 0.01 900 88 34 302 0.00
Footwear headwear 514 22,438 0.02 55 19 3 107 0.00
Stone Glass 222 17,304 0.01 219 26 17 150 0.01
Metals 2,073 60,535 0.03 613 126 81 937 0.02
Machinery Electrical 1,500 314,018 0.00 875 56 40 1,017 0.00
Transportations 312 32,135 0.01 137 7 7 855 0.03
Miscellaneous 2,612 71,046 0.04 409 35 30 2,166 0.03
Service . 1,309 . 3 . . 0 0.00
Total 10,224 753,413 0.01 5652 532 330 7,889 0.01
Note: The table reports the average annual export value of HS6 products aected by AD, the average
annual total export value, the share of export value aected by AD, the total number of HS6 products in
the sample, the number of treated HS6 products, the number of AD cases, the AD revenue as well as the
average annual revenue in percent of total exports.
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Table B.2: Distribution of US AD Cases across Sectors
Exports (m) Total (m) Ratio N hs6 N hs6 d Cases Revenue (m) Ratio
Animals 17 964 0.02 126 1 1 26 0.03
Vegetables . 474 . 276 . . 0 0.00
Foodstus 51 1,464 0.03 178 2 1 94 0.06
Mineral Products 266 1,364 0.20 142 1 1 535 0.39
Chemicals 198 4,388 0.05 806 16 13 361 0.08
Plastics rubber 456 5,891 0.08 226 11 4 424 0.07
Raw Hides Skins . 3,245 . 75 . . 0 0.00
Wood 197 2,958 0.07 278 22 5 361 0.12
Textiles 61 13,917 0.00 869 3 3 26 0.00
Footwear headwear . 8,045 . 55 . . 0 0.00
Stone Glass 92 2,840 0.03 208 2 2 118 0.04
Metals 900 10,446 0.09 594 47 15 563 0.05
Machinery Electrical 893 65,436 0.01 862 13 6 644 0.01
Transportations 246 5,450 0.05 119 2 1 828 0.15
Miscellaneous 2,309 21,101 0.11 405 9 6 2,022 0.10
Service . 75 . 2 . . 0 0.00
Total 5,685 148,058 0.04 5222 129 51 6,004 0.04
Note: The table reports the average annual export value of HS6 products aected by AD, the average
annual total export value, the share of export value aected by AD, the total number of HS6 products in
the sample, the number of treated HS6 products, the number of AD cases, the AD revenue as well as the
average annual revenue in percent of total exports.
79
2 The Trade Eects of Anti-Dumping Duties: Firm-level Evidence from China
Table B.3: Distribution of EU AD Cases across Sectors
Exports (m) Total (m) Ratio N hs6 N hs6 d Cases Revenue (m) Ratio
Animals . 1,188 . 130 . . 0 0.00
Vegetables 16 1,028 0.02 296 1 1 5 0.01
Foodstus 8 1,180 0.01 185 1 1 10 0.01
Mineral Products 92 1,791 0.05 143 1 1 57 0.03
Chemicals 168 6,207 0.03 819 16 13 60 0.01
Plastics rubber 313 3,674 0.09 227 5 4 80 0.02
Raw Hides Skins 1 3,049 0.00 96 1 1 0 0.00
Wood 109 2,269 0.05 285 2 2 43 0.02
Textiles 230 17,161 0.01 891 6 2 110 0.01
Footwear headwear 369 3,875 0.10 55 7 1 61 0.02
Stone Glass 42 3,031 0.01 214 5 1 15 0.01
Metals 1,042 10,846 0.10 595 35 14 315 0.03
Machinery Electrical 381 64,916 0.01 863 8 5 168 0.00
Transportations 33 7,031 0.00 121 2 1 9 0.00
Miscellaneous 254 14,750 0.02 400 1 1 75 0.01
Service . 26 . 2 . . 0 0.00
Total 3,058 142,021 0.02 5323 91 43 1,009 0.01
Note: The table reports the average annual export value of HS6 products aected by AD, the average
annual total export value, the share of export value aected by AD, the total number of HS6 products in
the sample, the number of treated HS6 products, the number of AD cases, the AD revenue as well as the
average annual revenue in percent of total exports.
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Figure B.1: Average EU and US AD Duties by Treatment Status and Sector
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Note: Sector on the horizontal axis. Product and firm-specific duties are simple averages. Within each case and
HS6 product, the firm-specific duty is below the product wide duty.
Figure B.2: Total Export Market Share of Firms by Treatment Status and Sector
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Note: Sector on the horizontal axis. Treated products only. Export market share over entire
period. Data for export market share at the firm-level comes from the Chinese customs oice.
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Figure B.3: Average Export Market Share of Firms by Treatment Status and Sector
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Note: Sector on the horizontal axis. Treated products only. Export market share over entire
period. Data for export market share at the firm-level comes from the Chinese customs oice.
Appendix B.2 Details on Conceptual Frameworks
B.2.1 Modeling Dumping in a Melitz Model
This section shows how certain pricing decisions of firms that are consistent with the WTO’s
definition of dumping can bemodelled within a Melitz framework. The aim of this section is
not to make predictions regarding the eects of AD on firms but rather to illustrate that the
resulting firm-level gravity equation is also applicable in the context of anti-dumping so that
it can oer guidance for the empirical strategy.
Type 1: Classic Dumping
In line with the WTO definition, we define type 1 dumping as charging an export price below
the domestic price. In the model, this can happen for two reasons:
1. Pricing to market
σhj > σhi ⇒
phfijt(ϕ)
τhijt
< phfiit(ϕ) since
∂phfijt
∂σhi
< 0.
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Following the optimal pricing condition in Equation (2.2) of Section 2.2 of the paper, a profit
maximising firm will charge an export price (adjusted for transport costs) below the domestic
pricewhenever theelasticityof substitution ishigher in the foreignmarket than in thedomestic
market. In the context of the Melitz model, this elasticity is taken as exogenously given.
2. Indirect export subsidies such as reduced fuel taxes
τ distortedhijt < τ
true
hijt ⇒
phfijt(ϕ, τ
distorted
hijt )
τ truehijt
< phfiit(ϕ).
Transport costs are distorted through subsidies such that they are below the “fair” transport
cost used by the importer’s authorities to calculate the dumping margin. Consequently, the
export price adjusted by “fair” transport costs is below the domestic price. From a legal
perspective, this constitutes dumping, even if the export price adjusted by the distorted
transport cost is not lower than the domestic price.
Type 2: Production distortions
cdistortedhfit < c
true
hfit but
phfijt(ϕ)
τhijt
= phfiit(ϕ).
In this case production costs c are distorted due to distorted cost of capital r (state finance),
distorted cost of materialm (energy subsidies) or direct subsidies s. In this case the exporter
dumps both at home and abroad. Adjusted export price and domestic price are both below the
undistorted production cost and dumping cannot be identified any longer by comparing the
two. Such a case justifies the use of third country prices to identify dumping. However, when
using third countryprices, “dumping” canalso result formexportershavinghigherproductivity
ϕ than the third country firms used to construct the comparison price (normal value). In this
case productivity dierences are impossible to disentangle from unfair competition.
Both types of dumping are thus possible in the model. To investigate if dumping can be
profitable, let us consider a two stage game. At stage one, firms set prices p∗ = arg maxE(π).
At stage two, AD duties are imposed with probability ρhj(Dumping, Injury, Causality, Lobby-
83
2 The Trade Eects of Anti-Dumping Duties: Firm-level Evidence from China
ing,...) with 0 < ρ < 1 exogenous from the perspective of the firm.1 This probability varies by
destination country and industry. Given an AD investigation is launched, dumping is detected
if
pxhfijt
τhijt
< pnhfijt in which case (Thfijt + 1) =
pnhfijt
pxhfijt/τhijt
,
where pnhfijt is normal value and
pxhfijt
τhijt
is the net export price used by the investigators to
calculate the dumpingmargin.2 Given AD action, the exporter faces three possible treatments:
1 MET with probability αj : pxhfijt = phfijt(ϕ) = the firms own export price and pnhfijt =
phfiit(ϕ) = the firms own domestic price,
2 IT with probability βj : pxhfijt = phfijt(ϕ) = the firms own export price and pnhfijt = phkkt
= domestic price in a third country k which has MES,
3 NMES with probability γj : pxhfijt = p̄hijt = the average export price across all Chinese
exporters selling product h to country j and pnhfijt = phkkt = price in third country k.
αj +βj +γj = 1. Once the duty is implemented, firms sell at consumer prices p∗hfijt(1+Thfijt).
At stage one, the expected duty given AD duties are imposed is:
E(Thfijt + 1)|AD = αj
phfiit(ϕ)
phfijt(ϕ)/τhijt
+ βj
phkkt
phfijt(ϕ)/τhijt
+ γj
phkkt
p̄hijt/τhijt
.
Under NMES, the firm has no incentive to adjust its export price as it cannot influence the
calculated dumping margin. While this is not true for MET and IT firms, we nevertheless
assume price adjustments are not possible in stage two. This is realistic for several reasons.
First of all, applying for a reassessment of dumpingmargins is a very costly and timely process
so that for most firms (especially those receiving lower MET duties) it is simply not worth the
eort. Second, in order to get AD duties reduced, firms first have to raise consumer prices
which means that consumer prices including the AD duties would be even higher until the
1 Of course the probability of an AD investigation is not completely exogenous but is probably decreasing with
the firm’s export price (Ruhl, 2014). However, especially for a country with non-market economy status, the
probability of an AD investigation depends onmany other things such as export prices across all exporters and
strength of the industry in the importing country which are exogenous from the point of view of the individual
exporter.
2 The export price used by the authorities pxhfijt does not necessarily equal the true export price phfijt.
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reassessment is completed, further reducing demand. Firms would need deep pockets to
survive that.
Hence, firms set prices under uncertainty at stage one. A firm will never set a price below
the monopoly price pmhfijt(ϕ) and never one higher than pahfijt = phkktτhijt which would
completely avoid the duty in case the firm receives IT.3 Hence, the firm chooses a price p∗hfijt(ϕ)
for which pmhfijt(ϕ) 6 p∗hfijt(ϕ) 6 pahfijt to maximise expected profits:4
Eπ(p∗(ϕ), 1 + Thfijt) = (B.1)
(1− ρhj)π(p∗(ϕ), 1)
+ ρhj
(
αjπ(p
∗(ϕ),
phfiit(ϕ)
p∗(ϕ)τhijt
) + βjπ(p
∗(ϕ),
phkkt
p∗(ϕ)/τhijt
) + γjπ(p
∗(ϕ),
phkkt
p̄hijt/τhijt
)
)
.
Let us first look at TYPE 2 dumping. Under this type of dumping, if the firm gets MET, it pays
no AD duty as phfijt(ϕ)
τhijt
= phfiit(ϕ) and dumping cannot be identified. If it gets IT, it can
influence the duty by increasing its export price (net of transport cost) up to a maximum
of the constructed price to reduce or eliminate the duty. If the firm receives NMET, there is
nothing it can do to aect the size of the duty. It can be seen that charging themonopoly price
is preferred to charging the high price in three out of four possible states (no investigation,
MET and NMET). In the case of IT, the firm is better of if it had chosen the high price. Given
uncertainty around the AD investigation and that the firmmaximises expected profits, there
are values for ρhj ,αj , βj and γj for which charging a price p∗ below phkkt is the optimal strategy.
Under TYPE 1, MET firms will pay a duty which is however lower than that paid by IT or NMES
firms assuming its domestic price is below the constructed normal value. Charging pmhfijt(ϕ) is
the better strategy in case no AD investigation is launched and in case the firm receives NMES.
With IT, setting a high price in stage one is preferable. With MET it is unclear as
pahfijt
τhijt
= phkkt
may be larger than pmhfijt(ϕ) inclusive of the MET duty. Once again dumping is the profit
maximising strategy for certain values of ρhj , αj , βj and γj . Given uncertainty, the firm will
set a price p∗hfijt which is somewhere between pmhfijt(ϕ) and pahfijt and hence constitutes
dumping under at least one regime. To sum up, given uncertainty around the AD investigation
- dumping is not only possible but also a firm’s preferred pricing strategy in the model given
certain perceived parameter values of ρhj , αj , βj and γj .
3 In reality, there is also uncertainty around phkkt.
4 The indices for p∗ are omitted in the equation for better legibility. They should read p∗hfijt.
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B.2.2 Anti-Dumping in Melitz-Ottaviano
In this section, we sketch a simple Melitz-Ottaviano type model which incorporates AD duties
in order to get a better understanding of their eects on exporters. Following Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008), consumers in country j consuming product hmaximise the quadratic utility
function
U j = qj0 + α
∫
hεΩ
qjhdi−
1
2
γ
∫
hεΩ
(qjh)
2di− 1
2
η
(∫
hεΩ
qjhdh
)2
, (B.2)
with qj0and q
j
h representing consumption of the numeraire good and each varietyh. α and η are
positive demand parameters indexing the degree of substitutability between the numeraire
and dierentiated varieties. γ is a positive demandparameter representing the degree of prod-
uct dierentiation between varieties. Consumer maximisation yields the following demand
function for individual varieties:
qjh =
1
γ
(pjmax − p
j
h), (B.3)
where pjmax is the cut-o price. Given demand, an exporting firm f in country i sets (con-
sumer) export prices phfij to maximise export profits πhfij subject to AD duties T hfij set by
the importing country j:
πhfij =
(
phfij
1 + Thfij
− τhijchfi
)
Lj
γ
(
pjmax − phfij
)
, (B.4)
where τhij is the iceberg transport cost, chfi the firm’s marginal cost and Lj the size of the
destination country. The duty T hfij depends on the export price pxhfij :
1 + Tfhij =
pnfhij
pfhij/τhij
= p−1fhijp
n
hfijτhij, (B.5)
where pn is “normal value”. In the case of China, this is either the price charged domestically
(in the case of Market Economy Treatment) or a reference price in a third country (Individual
Treatment or Non-Market Economy Treatment).
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Reference Case - Pricing in the absence of AD duties:
In the absence of AD duties, firms set export prices to maximise the following profit function
as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008):
πhfij = (phfij − τhijchfi)
Lj
γ
(
pjmax − phfij
)
, (B.6)
⇒ pNADhfij =
1
2
(pjmax + chfiτhij), (B.7)
where pNADhfij is the optimal price in the absence of AD. From Equation (B.7), it can be seen that
the price charged depends on the degree of competition in the destination market modelled
by pjmax. In this model, dumping takes place if pNADhfij < pNADhfii which is the case whenever
pjmax < p
i
max. Of course the model can also accommodate the legal definition of dumping, i.e.
phfij < p
n
hfij , which is the “normal value”. We now examine two possible states of AD.
State 1 - Pricing under AD uncertainty:
In state 1, there is uncertainty surrounding the AD process. The firm does not know whether it
will become subject to AD duties when setting prices. AD duties are realised with probability
ρhj . The firm sets a price pfhijto maximise expected profits:
Eπfhij(pfhij, T (pfhij), ρhj) =(1− ρhj)[(pfhij − τhijcfhi)
Lj
γhj
(pmaxhj − pfhij)] (B.8)
+ρhj[(pfhij(pfhij(p
n
fhij)
−1τ−1hij )− τhijcfhi)
Lj
γhj
(pmaxhj − pfhij)].
Dierentiating yields:5
∂π
∂p
=(1− ρ)L
γ
[(pmax − p)− (p− τc)] (B.9)
+ρ
L
γ
[2pp−1n τ
−1(pmax − p)− (p2p−1n τ−1 − τc)] = 0,
5 The indices are omitted from now on for better legibility.
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⇒(1− ρ)pmax − 2(1− ρ)p+ (1− ρ)τc+ 2ρpp−1n τ−1pmax − 2ρp2p−1n τ−1 − ρp2p−1n τ−1 + ρτc = 0,
⇒(1− ρ)pmax + 2p[ρp−1n τ−1pmax − (1− ρ)] + (1− ρ)τc+ ρτc− 3ρp2p−1n τ−1 = 0,
⇒3ρp2p−1n τ−1 − 2p[ρp−1n τ−1pmax − (1− ρ)] = (1− ρ)pmax + τc,
⇒(3ρp−1n τ−1)p2 − 2[ρp−1n τ−1pmax − (1− ρ)]p− [(1− ρ)pmax + τc] = 0,
So that the optimal export price under uncertain AD is
p∗1 =
2[ρp−1n τ
−1pmax − (1− ρ)]±
√
4[ρp−1n τ
−1pmax − (1− ρ)]2 + 12ρp−1n τ−1[(1− ρ)pmax + τc]
6ρp−1n τ
−1 .
(B.10)
Dierentiating with respect to ρ yields
∂p∗1
∂ρ
=f(pmax,pn, τ, c, ρ), (B.11)
⇒ ∂p
∗
1
∂ρ
=
pmax
3ρ
+
pnτ
3ρ
+
2ρp2max − 2p2nτ 2 + 3cpnτ 2 + 2ρpn2τ 2 + pnpmaxτ − 2ρpnpmaxτ
3ρ(2(ρ2p2nτ
2 − ρ2pnpmaxτ + ρ2p2max − 2ρp2nτ 2 + ρpnpmaxτ + 3cρpnτ 2 + p2nτ 2)(1/2))
−(ρ
2p2nτ
2 − ρ2pnpmaxτ + ρ2p2max − 2ρp2nτ 2 + ρpnpmaxτ + 3cρpnτ 2 + p2nτ 2)(1/2)
3ρ2
+
ρpmax − pnτ + ρpnτ
ρ2
.
It will be shown further down that there exist values for the parameters so that p∗1 is increasing
in ρ. Hence, the firm increases prices if it expects AD duties to be implemented.
State 2 - Certain AD duties:
In state 2, prices and AD duties are set simultaneously.6 The firm knows that AD duties are
calculated according to Equation (B.5) and sets prices accordingly. The two states can also be
6 This is a simplification. As discussed in Section 2.2 of the paper, AD duties in period t are a function of prices in
period t− 1. This dynamic relationship is ignored for simplicity.
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seen as a sequential game. The firm operates under state 1 until duties are realised. Once this
is the case, the firm can either stick to its pricing decision or pay a fixed cost F to apply for a
review and face the decision problem of state 2. The profit equation in state 2 is
π2 =
(
p2
1 + T2
− τc
)
L
γ
(
pjmax − p2
)
, (B.12)
⇒ π2 =
(
p2(p2p
−1
n τ
−1)− τc
) L
γ
(
pjmax − p2
)
.
Dierentiating yields
∂π2
∂p2
=cτ − p
2
2
pnτ
− 2p2(p2 − pmax)
pnτ
= 0,
p∗2 =
pmax
3
+
(p2max + 3cpnτ
2)1/2
3
. (B.13)
Calibration:
In order to make predications on firms dumping behaviour, we now calibrate the model by
setting plausible values for parameters. The aim of this exercise is not to show that certain
results must hold but instead that our empirical results regarding price setting by firms are
consistent with the model. The parameter values must fulfil several conditions. First, a firm
will never set a price p below the profit maximising price in the absence of dumping. Second,
assuming pn > pNAD which is required for dumping to take place, firms will never set a price
above the normal value. Consequently, pNAD = 1
2
(pmax + τc) ≤ p ≤ pn. In addition, it is
realistic to assume pn < pmax. For simplicity, we take τ = 1. Given the above conditions, we
set pmax = 4, pn = 3.5 and c = 2.
Wecannowderive the following results: FromEquationsB.7andB.13wesee that theconsumer
price in the absence of AD pNAD = 3 is smaller than under certain AD p∗2 = 3.36which is in turn
smaller than the price necessary to eliminate the duty (pn = 3.5). Hence, in a Melitz-Ottaviano
world, firms will absorb part of the duty in order to avoid losing too much demand. If (1 + T )
was exogenous (as is the case for NMES) and set such that 1 + T = p
nτ
pNAD
= 1.167, this would
imply a consumer price of pT = 1
2
(pmax + cτ(1 + T )) = 3.167which is smaller than under
the endogenous AD duty. This is not surprising since the endogenous duty provides the firm
with an incentive to raise prices, as the duty will fall in response.
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Under uncertainty and assuming ρ = 0.5, firms would set p∗1 = 3.2263, which is between
pNAD and p∗2. In addition, for the parameters set above,
∂p∗1
∂ρ
> 0 so that p∗1 is strictly increasing
in ρ for all 0 < ρ < 1. Firms hence set higher prices when they think AD is more likely.
Finally, as in the Melitz world, firms will only adjust prices if π2(p∗2)− F > π2(p∗1). If the costs
of applying for a review are suiciently high, the costs from doing so might outweigh the
benefits of raising prices and lowering the duty.
CONCLUSION:
Themodel implies that there exist plausible parameter values such that:
1. Prices under AD will be higher than prices in the absence of AD. However, it will never be
optimal for firms to raise prices to fully eliminate the duty.
2. Under uncertainty, prices will be larger than in the absence of AD but lower than under
certain AD. Hence, the firm raises prices even before becoming subject to AD.
3. If fixed costs of applying for a review following the imposition of AD are prohibitively
high, the firmmay not raise prices at all.
Taken together, these threemechanisms provide an explanation for the empirical observation
that on average firms do not change prices following the imposition of AD duties. The model
also provides additionalmotivation for our empirical strategy as export prices depend on pmax
and chfi. These reflect demand and supply side variables and should be taken into account
by using product-destination-time and firm-product-time fixed eects respectively.
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Appendix B.3 Detailed Robustness Checks
Table B.4: Firm-level: Elasticities, including Product-specific Duties
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable ln value ln price ln quantity
AD Duty EU -2.3292*** 0.2052 -2.5344***
(0.6617) (0.1474) (0.6486)
AD Duty US -0.4212** -0.0040 -0.4172***
(0.1692) (0.0312) (0.1619)
EU = US (p value) 0.0052 0.1647 0.0015
R2 0.8410 0.9584 0.8783
Note: AD Variable: ln(1 + AD Duty Rate/100). Robust
standard errors clustered by Country-Product(HS6)-Firm
in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Surviving
firms and firms exporting before treatment only. Country-
Product-Firm, Country-Product-Time and Product-Firm-
Time FEs. 18,187,189 observations, 5,419,324 clusters.
Table B.5: Firm-level: Excluding Products receiving Product Treatment only
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable ln value ln price ln quantity
AD Duty EU -2.3829*** 0.2000 -2.5830***
(0.6644) (0.1497) (0.6499)
AD Duty US -0.4124** -0.0047 -0.4077**
(0.1691) (0.0312) (0.1617)
EU = US (p value) 0.0040 0.1805 0.0012
R2 0.8406 0.9585 0.8781
Note: AD Variable: ln(1 + AD Duty Rate/100). Robust
standard errors clustered by Country-Product(HS6)-Firm
in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Surviving
firms and firms exporting before treatment only. Country-
Product-Firm, Country-Product-Time and Product-Firm-
Time FEs. 18,156,972 observations, 5,415,5574 clusters.
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Table B.6: Firm-level: Including Firms entering and exiting post Treatment
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable ln value ln price ln quantity
AD Duty EU -7.5175*** -0.3994 -7.1181***
(1.5916) (0.3244) (1.6472)
AD Duty US -4.8946*** -0.0526 -4.8419***
(1.5668) (0.2740) (1.5305)
EU = US (p value) 0.2387 0.4095 0.3092
R2 0.8413 0.9586 0.8787
Note: AD Variable: ln(1 + AD Duty Rate/100). Robust
standard errors clustered by Country-Product(HS6)-Firm
in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country-
Product-Firm, Country-Product-Time and Product-Firm-
Time FEs. 17,995,219 observations, approx. 5,381,000 clus-
ters.
Table B.7: Firm-level: Excluding Intermediaries
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable ln value ln price ln quantity
AD Duty EU -7.0956*** -0.4530 -6.6426***
(1.7704) (0.3621) (1.8373)
AD Duty US -5.1766*** 0.1731 -5.3497***
(1.9601) (0.2577) (1.9165)
EU = US (p value) 0.4677 0.1591 0.6264
R2 0.8514 0.9623 0.8868
Note: AD Variable: ln(1 + AD Duty Rate/100). Robust
standard errors clustered by Country-Product(HS6)-Firm
in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Surviv-
ing firms only. Country-Product-Firm, Country-Product-
Time and Product-Firm-Time FEs. 13,118,639 observations,
4,077,722 clusters.
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Table B.8: Firm-level: Excluding Producers
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable ln value ln price ln quantity
AD Duty EU -6.1620*** -0.3942 -5.7677***
(1.6294) (0.3096) (1.6749)
AD Duty US -5.4369*** -0.1148 -5.3221***
(1.8265) (0.3321) (1.7989)
EU = US (p value) 0.7664 0.5374 0.8557
R2 0.8464 0.9589 0.8822
Note: AD Variable: ln(1 + AD Duty Rate/100). Robust
standard errors clustered by Country-Product(HS6)-Firm
in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Surviv-
ing firms only. Country-Product-Firm, Country-Product-
Time and Product-Firm-Time FEs. 15,790,108 observations,
4,931,772 clusters.
Table B.9: Product-level: Decomposition - MFN Taris - Weighted Duties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable ln value ln no. firms ln mean price ln mean quantity
Duty EU -1.1602*** -0.7590*** 0.1032 -0.5044
(0.3753) (0.1335) (0.1620) (0.3204)
Duty US -1.0431*** -0.3815*** 0.0231 -0.6848***
(0.1815) (0.0540) (0.0677) (0.1676)
Duty other -0.3308*** -0.1558*** 0.0254 -0.2005**
(0.0946) (0.0476) (0.0443) (0.0828)
MFN Tari 0.0135 -0.0468 0.0251 0.0352
(0.0856) (0.0346) (0.0443) (0.0788)
EU = US (p value) 0.7790 0.0086 0.6479 0.6169
R2 0.8938 0.9507 0.9513 0.9098
Note: AD Variable: ln(1 + Trade weighted AD Duty Rate/100). Robust standard errors
clustered by Country-Product(HS6) in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Country-Product, Country-hs4-Time and Product-Time FEs. 1,297,588 observations;
208,595 clusters.
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Table B.10: Product-level: Trade Deflection - Decomposition - Dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable ln value ln no. firms ln mean price ln mean quantity
Duty EU -0.4981*** -0.2885*** 0.1191*** -0.3287***
(0.1223) (0.0565) (0.0448) (0.1139)
Duty US -0.8245*** -0.1998*** -0.0423 -0.5825***
(0.1775) (0.0669) (0.0549) (0.1547)
Duty other -0.7024*** -0.3370*** 0.0702*** -0.4355***
(0.0730) (0.0387) (0.0265) (0.0569)
Duty EU 3rd -0.0034 -0.0090 0.0599*** -0.0543***
(0.0165) (0.0082) (0.0072) (0.0140)
Duty US 3rd 0.2354*** 0.1778*** -0.1241*** 0.1818***
(0.0154) (0.0072) (0.0082) (0.0145)
EU 3rd = US 3rd (p) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R2 0.8013 0.8815 0.9151 0.8439
Note: AD Variable: AD Dummy. Robust standard errors clustered by Country-
Product(HS6) in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country-Product and
Country-Sector-Time FEs. 2,101,917 observations; 351,684 clusters.
Table B.11: Product-level: Decomposition - Weighted Duties - simple FEs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable ln value ln no. firms ln mean price ln mean quantity
Duty EU -1.6787*** -0.9768*** 0.2076* -0.9095***
(0.3247) (0.1135) (0.1221) (0.3012)
Duty US -1.1103*** -0.4602*** 0.0995** -0.7497***
(0.1591) (0.0515) (0.0436) (0.1424)
Duty other -0.5965*** -0.2746*** 0.0752** -0.3972***
(0.0983) (0.0471) (0.0325) (0.0742)
EU = US (p value) 0.1158 0.0000 0.4043 0.6311
R2 0.8222 0.9089 0.9241 0.8569
Note: AD Variable: ln(1 + Trade weighted AD Duty Rate/100). Robust standard errors
clustered by Country-Product(HS6) in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Country-Product, Country-Time and Product-Time FEs. 2,102,174 observations;
351,745 clusters.
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Table B.12: Product-level: Trade Deflection - Decomposition - Weighted Duty - simple FEs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable ln value ln no. firms ln mean price ln mean quantity
Duty EU -1.3274*** -0.7342*** 0.3077** -0.9009***
(0.3515) (0.1844) (0.1518) (0.3208)
Duty US -0.8739*** -0.2605*** -0.0030 -0.6103***
(0.1912) (0.0700) (0.0515) (0.1629)
Duty other -0.6016*** -0.2666*** 0.0409 -0.3760***
(0.0944) (0.0579) (0.0402) (0.0704)
Duty EU 3rd 0.1259*** 0.1060*** 0.1200*** -0.1001***
(0.0452) (0.0223) (0.0218) (0.0385)
Duty US 3rd 0.2218*** 0.1750*** -0.0937*** 0.1405***
(0.0167) (0.0078) (0.0089) (0.0156)
EU 3rd = US 3rd (p value) 0.0510 0.0040 0.0000 0.0000
R2 0.7965 0.8775 0.9138 0.8410
Note: AD Variable: ln(1 + Trade weighted AD Duty Rate/100). Robust standard errors
clustered by Country-Product(HS6) in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country-
Product Country-Time and Sector-Time FEs. 2,102,083 observations; 352,152 clusters.
Table B.13: Product-level: Decomposition - Dummies - simple FEs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable ln value ln no. firms ln mean price ln mean quantity
Duty EU -0.6235*** -0.3571*** 0.0638* -0.3303***
(0.1139) (0.0392) (0.0339) (0.1051)
Duty US -1.1379*** -0.4549*** 0.1043*** -0.7874***
(0.1477) (0.0497) (0.0375) (0.1271)
Duty other -0.7410*** -0.3369*** 0.1110*** -0.5152***
(0.0684) (0.0316) (0.0219) (0.0530)
EU = US (p value) 0.0058 0.1221 0.4229 0.0055
R2 0.8222 0.9089 0.9241 0.8569
Note: AD Variable: AD Dummy. Robust standard errors clustered by Country-
Product(HS6) in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country-Product, Country-
Time and Product-Time FEs. 2,102,174 observations; 351,745 clusters.
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Table B.14: Product-level: Trade Deflection - Decomposition - Dummies - simple FEs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable ln value ln no. firms ln mean price ln mean quantity
Duty EU -0.5343*** -0.3232*** 0.1248*** -0.3359***
(0.1197) (0.0590) (0.0445) (0.1107)
Duty US -0.8733*** -0.2508*** -0.0164 -0.6060***
(0.1784) (0.0670) (0.0537) (0.1545)
Duty other -0.7043*** -0.3393*** 0.0793*** -0.4443***
(0.0737) (0.0390) (0.0258) (0.0564)
Duty EU 3rd -0.0121 -0.0141* 0.0593*** -0.0573***
(0.0167) (0.0084) (0.0072) (0.0141)
Duty US 3rd 0.2425*** 0.1810*** -0.1230*** 0.1845***
(0.0156) (0.0073) (0.0083) (0.0146)
EU 3rd = US 3rd (p) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R2 0.7965 0.8776 0.9138 0.8410
Note: AD Variable: AD Dummy. Other countries’ own duties controlled for but not
reported. Robust standard errors clustered by Country-Product(HS6) in parenthesis,
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country-Product, Country-Time and Sector-Time FEs.
2,104,083 observations; 352,152 clusters.
Table B.15: Product-level: Decomposition - Product-specific Duties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable ln value ln no. firms ln mean price ln mean quantity
Duty EU -1.3606*** -0.8282*** 0.0642 -0.5967**
(0.3537) (0.1260) (0.1449) (0.3040)
Duty US -0.9266*** -0.3692*** 0.0195 -0.5769***
(0.1577) (0.0489) (0.0577) (0.1481)
Duty other -0.3764*** -0.1771*** 0.0311 -0.2303***
(0.0964) (0.0485) (0.0445) (0.0851)
EU = US (p value) 0.2625 0.0007 0.7741 0.9533
R2 0.8860 0.9454 0.9500 0.9074
Note: AD Variable: ln(1 + Product-specific AD Duty Rate/100). Robust standard errors
clustered by Country-Product(HS6) in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Country-Product, Country-hs4-Time and Product-Time FEs. 1,765,887 observations;
293,660 clusters.
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Table B.16: Product-level: Decomposition - Chemicals - Weighted Duties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable ln value ln no. firms ln mean price ln mean quantity
Duty EU -0.3592 -0.7928** -0.0055 0.4391
(0.5656) (0.3152) (0.1696) (0.6061)
Duty US -1.3511*** -0.5289*** 0.0210 -0.8432**
(0.4632) (0.1021) (0.1439) (0.3739)
Duty other -0.5008 -0.3837** 0.0298 -0.1469
(0.3928) (0.1514) (0.1299) (0.3669)
EU = US (p value) 0.1736 0.4223 0.9053 0.0694
R2 0.8860 0.9454 0.9500 0.9074
Note: AD Variable: ln(1 + Trade weighted AD Duty Rate/100). Robust standard errors
clustered by Country-Product(HS6) in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Country-Product, Country-HS4-Time and Product-Time FEs. 1,765,887 observations;
293,660 clusters.
Table B.17: Product-level: Decomposition - Chemicals - Dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable ln value ln no. firms ln mean price ln mean quantity
Duty EU -0.1517 -0.2921*** -0.0346 0.1750
(0.2386) (0.1007) (0.0671) (0.2349)
Duty US -1.4835*** -0.5426*** 0.0007 -0.9416***
(0.4500) (0.0984) (0.1478) (0.3641)
Duty other -0.2974* -0.1665** 0.0758 -0.2066
(0.1551) (0.0703) (0.0699) (0.1709)
EU = US (p value) 0.0088 0.0720 0.8274 0.0095
R2 0.8860 0.9454 0.9500 0.9074
Note: AD Variable: AD Dummy. Robust standard errors clustered by Country-
Product(HS6) in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country-Product, Country-
HS4-Time and Product-Time FEs. 1,765,887 observations; 293,660 clusters.
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Table B.18: Product-level: Decomposition - Metals - Weighted Duties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable ln value ln no. firms ln mean price ln mean quantity
Duty EU -1.3002** -0.5388** 0.1537 -0.9151
(0.6025) (0.2353) (0.1795) (0.5987)
Duty US -1.7958*** -0.5932*** 0.1807* -1.3834***
(0.4811) (0.1660) (0.1038) (0.4355)
Duty other -0.6097** -0.2424*** 0.0531 -0.4203*
(0.2587) (0.0876) (0.0804) (0.2381)
EU = US (p value) 0.5195 0.8500 0.8959 0.5258
R2 0.8860 0.9454 0.9500 0.9074
Note: AD Variable: ln(1 + Trade weighted AD Duty Rate/100). Robust standard errors
clustered by Country-Product(HS6) in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Country-Product, Country-HS4-Time and Product-Time FEs. 1,765,887 observations;
293,660 clusters.
Table B.19: Product-level: Decomposition - Metals - Dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable ln value ln no. firms ln mean price ln mean quantity
Duty EU -0.5297** -0.2367*** 0.0291 -0.3220*
(0.2187) (0.0863) (0.0600) (0.1936)
Duty US -1.2103*** -0.4012*** 0.1368* -0.9458***
(0.3677) (0.1304) (0.0774) (0.3208)
Duty other -0.8861*** -0.3760*** 0.0611 -0.5712***
(0.1736) (0.0640) (0.0581) (0.1593)
EU = US (p value) 0.1114 0.2922 0.2707 0.0951
R2 0.8860 0.9454 0.9500 0.9074
Note: AD Variable: AD Dummy. Robust standard errors clustered by Country-
Product(HS6) in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country-Product, Country-
HS4-Time and Product-Time FEs. 1,765,887 observations; 293,660 clusters.
98
2 The Trade Eects of Anti-Dumping Duties: Firm-level Evidence from China
Table B.20: Product-level: Decomposition - Machinery - Weighted Duties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable ln value ln no. firms ln mean price ln mean quantity
Duty EU -0.5811 -0.7756*** 0.2012 -0.0067
(0.9222) (0.2519) (0.7513) (0.4562)
Duty US -0.7839*** -0.1726** 0.2041 -0.8153**
(0.2282) (0.0761) (0.2130) (0.3637)
Duty other -0.4185** -0.1105 0.1871** -0.4951***
(0.1983) (0.0909) (0.0878) (0.1839)
EU = US (p value) 0.8309 0.0220 0.9970 0.1655
R2 0.8860 0.9454 0.9500 0.9074
Note: AD Variable: ln(1 + Trade weighted AD Duty Rate/100). Robust standard errors
clustered by Country-Product(HS6) in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Country-Product, Country-HS4-Time and Product-Time FEs. 1,765,887 observations;
293,660 clusters.
Table B.21: Product-level: Decomposition - Machinery - Dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable ln value ln no. firms ln mean price ln mean quantity
Duty EU -0.2908 -0.3098*** 0.0039 0.0151
(0.3202) (0.1131) (0.2593) (0.1962)
Duty US -0.7930*** -0.2231*** 0.1474 -0.7173**
(0.2198) (0.0817) (0.1886) (0.3243)
Duty other -0.6139*** -0.2426*** 0.1170 -0.4883***
(0.1819) (0.0649) (0.0879) (0.1630)
EU = US (p value) 0.1955 0.5348 0.6541 0.0531
R2 0.8860 0.9454 0.9500 0.9074
Note: AD Variable: AD Dummy. Robust standard errors clustered by Country-
Product(HS6) in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country-Product, Country-
HS4-Time and Product-Time FEs. 1,765,887 observations; 293,660 clusters.
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Figure B.4: The Eect of AD Duties on the Number of Exporters, nested by Sector
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Note: Regression of ln (no. of exporters) on ln(1 + Trade weighted AD Duty Rate/100), Country-Product, Country-
HS4-Time and Product-Time FEs. Robust standard errors clustered by Country-Product. 293,660 clusters.
1,765,887 observations. Vertical line corresponds to zero. Sorted by sector classification.
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Figure B.5: The Eect of AD Duties on average Export Quantity, nested by Sector
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Note: Regression of ln (average export quantity) on ln(1 + Trade weighted AD Duty Rate/100), Country-Product,
Country-HS4-Time andProduct-Time FEs. Robust standard errors clustered by Country-Product. 293,660 clusters.
1,765,887 observations. Vertical line corresponds to zero. Sorted by sector classification.
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3 Trade Protection and the Role of Non-Tariff Barriers∗
3.1 Introduction
Applied taris have declined steadily over the past two decades, having decreased from an
average level of 9.7% in 2000 to less than 6.5% in 2015.1 Nevertheless, the International
Monetary Fund warns that protectionism is increasing and poses a threat to global economic
growth (International Monetary Fund, 2017). In particular, governments increasingly resort to
non-tari barriers (NTBs),2 with around 300 of such measures implemented in 2014 alone. In
addition, NTBs play an increasing role in the design of trade agreements (Felbermayr, 2016;
Felbermayr et al., 2017), so that understanding their eects should be a key concern for policy
makers.
Considering a broad range of government measures that lead to a discriminatory treatment
of foreign competitors relative to domestic firms as a non-tari barrier, this paper exploits
the recently updated Global Trade Alert (GTA) database, that collects information about
protectionist instruments.3 We empirically quantify how bilateral trade flows change on
average if at least one non-tari barrier is implemented. By estimating a structural gravity
equation at the CPC4 three-digit product level for 152 country pairs for the period 2010 to
2015, we find that bilateral import values of a particular product fall by 6% to 12% if at least
one NTB is implemented by the importing country. Additionally, our estimations account for
trade defence instruments (TDIs) such as anti-dumping duties. This enables us to compare
the trade dampening eects of NTBs and TDIs, showing that they are on average of similar
size.
∗ This chapter is based on joint work with Luisa Kinzius and Erdal Yalcin. It is based on the Master Thesis
entitled “Trade Protection and the Role of Non-Tari Barriers”, 2017 by Luisa Kinzius and the ifo study “Hidden
Protectionism: Non-tari Barriers and Implications for International Trade”, ifo Forschungsberichte 91, 2017 on
behalf of the Bertelsmann Foundation by Gabriel Felbermayr, Luisa Kinzius and Erdal Yalcin. We are grateful to
Gabriel Felbermayr, Yoto Yotov, Thomas Zylkin as well as two anonymous referees for helpful comments and
suggestions.
1 Tari data used in this paper is accessible via the World Integrated Trade Solution database provided by the
World Bank.
2 See for example studies by Datt et al. (2011), Kee et al. (2013) or Evenett (2014).
3 The Global Trade Alert (GTA) database was launched in 2009 following the global financial crisis. The following
analysis is based on the recent update published in July 2017.
4 Central Product Classification.
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As non-tari barriers can be very diverse, we distinguish four groups of NTBs: (1) import
controls, (2) state aid and subsidy measures, (3) public procurement and localisation policies
and (4) other non-tari barriers, which include sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS),
technical barriers to trade (TBT) and capital controls. While we provide strong evidence that
import controls reduce trade on average by 4% to 11%, the eect of the remaining NTBs is
less pronounced.
Methodologically, our analysis contributes to the ongoing discussion on how to correctly
identify the eect of NTBs that aect all trading partners equally. Most of the NTBs identified
in the GTA database are so-called behind-the-border (BTB) measures. This means they are not
targeted against specific trading partners but aect all trading partners equally. As soon as
one accounts for importer-product-time fixed eects in a gravity equation, all variation within
the BTB policy variable is absorbed. Hence, the eect of BTBmeasures on trade cannot be
identified in a gravity equation with directional fixed eects. We apply a two-step estimation
procedure following Head and Ries (2008) to identify the eect of BTBmeasures on trade and
illustrate that suchmeasures significantly reduce market access.
Our analysis relates to several strands of the trade literature. Regarding studies that examine
how the overall level of non-tari barriers aects trade, Kee et al. (2009) construct an overall
restrictiveness index for over 70 developed and developing countries. The authors estimate
ad valorem tari equivalents to facilitate a direct comparison between the restrictiveness of
non-tari barriers and taris. They find that on average, non-tari barriers contribute almost
as much to trade restrictions as taris. According to Niu et al. (2017), even though taris
have generally fallen between 1997 and 2015, the increase in the use of NTBs has meant
that the overall protection level for countries and products has not decreased. Hoekman
and Nicita (2011) find that on average trade decreases more strongly if non-tari barriers
are implemented rather than taris. More specifically, trade decreases on average by 1.7%
if the level of non-tari barriers increases by 10%. Similar ad valorem tari equivalents are
calculated by Bouët et al. (2008) and Bratt (2017). We contribute to this recent literature by
estimating trade eects using a dataset which incorporates a broad variety of dierent NTBs,
comparing trade dampening eects to those of traditional TDIs.
With regard to the studies examining the eects of specific types of non-tari barriers, a large
strand of literature investigates the eects of technical barriers to trade as well as sanitary
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and phytosanitary standards on trade.5 Crivelli and Gröschl (2016) use a gravity model in
order to investigate the intensive as well as extensive margin eects of SPS on agricultural
and food trade. They find that SPS reduce the probability of exporting to a protected market
but increase exports of incumbents, indicating that they serve as a barrier to market entry.
Beestermöller et al. (2017) look at food safety border inspections, examining how the risk
of rejection at European borders on safety grounds aects Chinese agri-food exporters. The
authors find that inspections aect both entry to and exit from the Europeanmarket as well
as the value of incumbent exports.
Ghodsi et al. (2017) study dierent types of non-tari barriers. Covering the period from 1995
to 2014, the authors estimate average trade reducing eects that vary between 5% to 30%
depending on the type of non-tari barrier. They conclude that the trade reducing eects of
non-tari barriers can be similar to those of traditional trade defence instruments. However,
82% of non-tari barriers investigated are SPS or TBTmeasures.6 Non-tari barriers such as
subsidies, state aid or public procurement measures are not included as their database is
limited to direct trade policies.7 Furthermore, the authors are unable to distinguish whether
non-tari measures are likely to have a trade liberalising or a protectionist impact, a distinc-
tion we are able to make with our data. This paper adds to the literature by comparing the
protectionist impact of several dierent types of non-tari barriers beyond those used in
previous studies.
Non-tari barriers can bemeasured directly or indirectly (Chen and Novy, 2012). If non-tari
barriers are directly measured, information about the actual incidence of a non-tari barrier
is used to construct counts, coverage or frequency ratios. This allows to distinguish dierent
types of non-tari barriers (Henn and McDonald, 2014; Ghodsi et al., 2017). The indirect
approach exploits information frommarket anomalies, such as price gaps or unexpectedly
large or small trade flows to estimate the eects of non-tari barriers (Andriamananjara et al.,
2004; Bradford, 2003; Ferrantino, 2006). However, the identification of a single type of non-
tari barrier is not feasible (Ederington and Ruta, 2016). Since we aim to disentangle dierent
trade eects for varying types of non-tari barriers, we use the direct approach.
5 A comprehensive overview of studies that focus on specific non-tari measures is provided by Ederington and
Ruta (2016).
6 In this analysis less than 1% of all measures have been SPS or TBTmeasures.
7 Ghodsi et al. (2017) use the WTO’s I-TIP database.
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The greatest disadvantage of using the directmeasurement approach is that data on non-tari
barriers is still relatively scarce.8 We use the recently updated GTA database, which collects
protectionist policies thatwere implementedworldwide since 2009. Most studies that use data
on non-tari barriers from the GTA database either focus on determinants of protectionism
(Georgiadis and Graeb, 2016) or restrict their study to a specific protectionist measure or
region (Shingal, 2009; Evenett, 2014).
To the best of our knowledge, Henn and McDonald (2014) are the only ones who use the GTA
database to assess the impact of dierent types of non-tari barriers on bilateral trade. The
authors find that border controls (defined as non-tari and tari measures) reduce trade by
about 8%. We build on their analysis by relying on an updated version of the database which
allows us to extend their estimation strategy substantially.9 Specifically, we cover a broader
period of time andmore countries (six years from 2010 to 2015 for 152 countries compared to
three years (2008 - 2010) for G20 countries). Our analysis thus overcomes the potential caveat
of Henn and McDonald (2014), who look at trade flows that were still largely aected by the
world economic crisis.
In addition, it is reasonable to assume that trade flows do not immediately react to newly
implemented trade barriers. Therefore, having the possibility to analyse yearly and not
monthly trade flows as done by Henn and McDonald (2014) might capture the impact of non-
tari barriers on trade more accurately. The information on the types of products targeted by
eachmeasure is now available at the CPC three-digit level instead of the CPC two-digit level.10
A further strand of related literature is concerned with eects of BTB measures on trade.
Their estimation is problematic as BTB measures do not vary by exporter and hence, they
are absorbed in a gravity setting by importer-product-time fixed eects. Henn and McDonald
(2014) address this problem by constructing dyads and tetrads of trade flows, which represent
changes in imports relative to a reference importer and exporter. They argue that variation
among exporters would be preserved particularly in cases where the reference exporter is not
aected by protectionism in a certain import market, while most other exporters are subject
to such protectionism. However, the problem is exactly that all exporters are equally aected
8 See Section 3.3 for details on dierent databases used.
9 Section 3.2 provides details on the estimation strategy.
10 Data is also available at the HS six-digit product level. However, the aected HS six-digit product code is
systematically missing for a subset of observations. See Section 3.3 for details.
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by BTBmeasures. Hence, there cannot be this one reference exporter that is less aected in a
certain import market.
Three alternative solutions have been suggested in the recent related literature: First, instead
of including the full set of fixed eects into the regression, one could use proxies to account
for multilateral resistance (Baier and Bergstrand, 2009). However, Yotov et al. (2016) do
not recommend relying on remoteness indices, as they cannot account for all multilateral
resistances and therefore still lead to biased estimates.
A second solution is to extend international trade data with intra-national trade data. This is
done by Heid et al. (2015) to identify the eect of non-discriminatory trade policies on trade.
By adding intra-national trade, BTB measures become bilateral by definition and thus can
be identified. The major issue here is that intra-national trade data is not yet available for
all years and all countries considered in this analysis. The databases available to construct
intra-national trade (i.e. databases that include bilateral trade and production data) do only
cover data until 2004 (the World Bank’s Trade Production and Protection database) or 2006
(CEPII’s TradeProd database).
The third alternative suggested by Head and Mayer (2014), Egger and Nigai (2015) and Yotov
et al. (2016) is to estimate the eect of BTBmeasures in two steps. In the first step the gravity
equation is estimatedwith the full set of fixedeects. In the secondstep thepredicted importer-
product-time fixed eects from the first stage are regressed on importer-specific determinants
to assess their impact on the importer’smarket access.11 Head andMayer’s derivation neglects
the time dimension, as the model is assumed to hold in all time periods. In addition, the
two-step estimator is only derived at the importer-exporter dimension. We extend Head and
Mayer (2014)’s model to the product level. In doing so, we are close to Anderson and Yotov
(2016), who also use a two-step procedure, regressing estimates of importer-exporter-product
fixed eects on standard gravity variables.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents the empirical strategy,
emphasizing the identification of the eect of behind-the-border measures using a two-step
11 Eaton and Kortum (2002) apply the two-step procedure as they are interested in the determinants of exporters’
competitiveness. They use exporter fixed eects derived from a gravity equation and show that technology and
human capital are important exporter-specific determinants. Head and Ries (2008) adopt Eaton and Kortum’s
approach to assess country-specific determinants of foreign direct investments. In a very recent approach
Agnosteva et al. (2017) use the two-step procedure to estimate systematic unobserved trade barriers based on
standard gravity variables and predict pair-fixed eects from a first stage gravity estimation.
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estimationprocedure. Anoverviewof thedataused is given inSection3.3. Section3.4 presents
the main findings, followed by some robustness checks. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Estimation Strategy
We estimate a structural gravity equation based on Yotov et al. (2016) and extend it to the
product level as proposed by Larch and Wanner (2017). Modelling the gravity equation ex-
plicitly with taris allows the estimates to be interpreted as trade elasticities. This enables
a direct comparison of the trade eect caused by non-tari barriers and by taris. For each
trade policy parameter tari equivalents can be estimated (Yotov et al., 2016).
Extending the gravity model to the product level avoids potential underestimation of the
eects of non-tari barriers. Non-tari barriers are mostly targeted at specific products and
do not target all imported or exported goods. The sectoral gravity equation captures all inter-
sectoral linkages (Yotov et al., 2016) so that it accounts for substitution eects across dierent
goods. The gravity equation derived by Larch and Wanner (2017) is given by
Xkij =
Y ki γ
k
j Yj
Y W
(
tkij
πki P
k
j
)(1−σk)
(τ kij)
−σk , (3.1)
where Xkij are exports of product k from country i to country j. The equation can be de-
composed into two terms that determine trade flows: The size eect and the trade costs
eect. Y
k
i γ
k
j Yj
YW
represents the size of the respective economies. It includes production value of
product k in country i Y ki , the fraction of country j’s expenditure spent on good k γkj , country
j’s expenditure Yj and global expenditure Y W . The size eect determines the level of trade if
there are no trade costs. It can be interpreted as follows: Firstly, without any trade costs large
producers will export more to all destinations. Secondly, bigger or richer markets will import
more from all origins. And thirdly, bilateral trade flows will be larger, the more similar two
countries are in size.
The remaining term (
(
tkij
πki P
k
j
)(1−σk)
(τ kij)
−σk ) reflects the eect of trade costs on bilateral trade
flows. tkij contains all bilateral trade costs at the product level, which are assumed to be
symmetric. These are factors like distance, a common language or a shared border, but also
NTBs. P kj is defined as the inwardmultilateral resistance. It reflects importer j’smarket access,
which depends on economic size and bilateral trade costs. πki is defined as the outward multi-
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lateral resistance and reflects exporter i’s market access. Similar to the inwardmultilateral
resistance, outwardmultilateral resistance also depends on domestic production and bilateral
trade costs. It is assumed that both, inward and outward multilateral resistance terms are
product specific. Finally, τ kij are product specific trade costs induced by taris. All trade costs
are assumed to have negative eects on trade. σk is the elasticity of substitution between
varieties of good k (assumed> 1).12
3.2.1 Identification of the Trade Eects of Non-Tari Barriers
To empirically identify the eects of non-tari barriers, we exploit the fact that for each
implemented non-tari barrier, the GTA database contains the following information: Trading
partners that are most likely aected, products that are aected (at CPC three-digit product
level) and the date of implementation of any measure. We use this information to construct a
dummy variable which equals one if at least one non-tari barrier is implemented between a
destination country j and an origin country i that aects a product k at time t. Similar, a count
variable is constructed, which counts howmany non-tari barriers are implemented between
a country pair that aect product k at time t. For a more detailed analysis we split non-tari
barriers into four groups: (1) import controls, (2) state aid and subsidy measures, (3) public
procurement and localisation policies and (4) other non-tari barriers, which include SPS,
TBT and capital controls. We estimate how imports change in response to non-tari barriers
from 2010 to 2015 using the following equation:
Xijkt = (3.2)
exp[β1NTBijkt−1 + β2TDijkt−1 + σln(1 + tijkt−1) + β3FTAijt + λikt + γjkt + θijk]εijkt,
whereXijkt are bilateral trade flows in thousand USD from country i to country j at product
level k and time t.NTBijkt−1 identifies non-tari barriers imposed by the importing country j
against exporting country i and either consists of a dummy or count variable.13 TDijkt−1 does
the same for tradedefence instruments. Tarisare included in logarithmic form(ln(1+tijkt−1)),
so that σ provides a direct estimate of the trade elasticity of taris. Henn andMcDonald (2014)
estimate a gravity equation, which does not explicitly model taris. This has the disadvantage
12 For more detailed information on the individual components of the gravity equation the reader is referred to
Yotov et al. (2016) and Larch and Wanner (2017).
13 We use the year of implementation as the starting period and the year of removal as the end period. If the
policy was still in place at the beginning of 2015, we set the end date to 2014, the last year covered in our dataset.
Only measures that last for at least one year are included.
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that one cannot compare the impact of non-tari barriers on trade with trade elasticities from
tari estimates received directly fromwithin the model. To be able to make this comparison,
we estimate a structural gravity equation that includes taris. FTAijt is a dummy controlling
for the existence of a free trade agreement between two countries. λikt, γjkt and θijk are
exporter-product-time, importer-product-time and exporter-importer-product fixed eects
respectively. εijkt is the stochastic error term.
All trade policy variables are lagged by one year for two reasons: Firstly, non-tari barriers
and trade defence instruments are oen implemented in reaction to an unexpected or rapid
increase in imports. As we use annual trade data, our analysis cannot control for the exact
date of implementation of each policy. Therefore, without lagging, the estimates might be
biased towards zero, leading to an underestimation of the potentially negative treatment
eect. Secondly, as argued byGhodsi et al. (2017), it is reasonable to assume that intermediate
goods do not react immediately to changes in trade costs. Using lags ensures that we account
for changes in trade, which do not follow immediately, but only aer some time of adaptation.
Onemajor concernwhenestimating the gravity equation is to consistently account formultilat-
eral resistance terms. Wedo soby including importer-product-time and exporter-product-time
fixed eects (Feenstra, 2015; Head and Mayer, 2014; Yotov et al., 2016). Country-pair-product
fixed eects are included in order to absorb all time invariant bilateral trade costs at the
product level such as distance, a shared border or specific industry linkages. By controlling for
all trade costs that vary across the samedimensions as non-tari barriers, we can identify their
causal eect on trade.14 Given this identification, the estimated coeicient of the protectionist
dummy can be interpreted as the average change in bilateral yearly-imports at the product
level caused by the implementation of at least one protectionist policy by the importer. If
counts of protectionist policies are used, this interpretation changes to the average change in
imports following the implementation of one additional protectionist policy.
Regarding the estimationmethod used it is important to address zero andmissing trade flows
correctly. The gravity model does not explain the occurrence of zero trade flows. It assumes
that trade flows are positive. However, in the trade data one observes several missing and
zero trade flows. A missing trade flow can occur either because two countries do not trade
with each other or because trade is not correctly reported and thus missing. The problem of
14 Our data structure also allows us to include importer-exporter-time fixed eects. Unfortunately, the ppml
workhorse estimator employed does not accommodate this additional dimension. Importer-exporter-time fixed
eects can however be included in OLS estimations and we do so in Section 3.4.2.
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missing trade flows increases with the level of detail of the trade data. The more products are
distinguished, the more likely it is that countries do not trade certain specific goods with each
other.
If an OLS estimator is used, missing or zero trade flows are dropped from the estimation and
are thus ignored. The Poisson pseudomaximum likelihood (PPML) estimator constitutes an
alternative method which treats all missing trade flows as zeros and assumes that these are
statistical zeros, i.e. that the zeros occur randomly (Head and Mayer, 2014). As Santos Silva
and Tenreyro (2006) show, applying the PPML estimator has the additional advantage that
it accounts for heteroscedasticity in trade data.15 PPML is hence our preferred estimation
method. It is estimated in Stata using the command “ppml_panel_sg” by Larch et al. (2017).
OLS estimates are provided for comparison and are generated using the command “reghdfe”
by Correia (2014).16
3.2.2 Identification of the Trade Eects of behind-the-Border Measures
The bilateral structure in the dataset is constructed.17 Identifying which trading partners are
likely to be aected from a non-tari barrier based on past trade flowsmight cause substantial
endogeneity. In addition, most of the non-tari barriers identified in the GTA database are
typical behind-the-border measures. This means that they are not targeted against specific
trading partners, but aect all trading partners equally. As soon as one accounts for importer-
product-time fixed eects in the gravity equation, all variation within the behind-the-border
policy variable is absorbed by the fixed eects.
We follow the two-step procedure suggested by Head andMayer (2014), Egger andNigai (2015)
and Yotov et al. (2016) to correctly identify the eect of behind-the-border measures on trade,
extending Head and Mayer’s model to the product level. In the first stage, the gravity equation
is estimated as before with the full set of fixed eects, but without a dummy identifying non-
tari barriers. All non-tari barriers are treated as behind-the-border measures and are thus
15 Another solution to the problem of zero trade flows would be to estimate a Heckman selection model, which
is a two-step model. It first estimates the likelihood that two economies trade with each other at a product line
(extensive margin). Then it assesses the impact of trade policies in a second step conditional on the fact that
two economies trade with each other. Alternatively, Tobit models could be estimated, which assume that trade
flows are not randomly missing (Head and Mayer, 2014). However, these models are biased if trade costs are
heteroscedastic.
16 Please also see Correia (2016). For the OLS estimation Equation 3.2 is log-linearised, so that it takes an additive
form.
17 See Section 3.3 below.
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absorbed by the importer-product-time fixed eects. Trade defence instruments and taris,
which vary across all four dimensions, remain in the estimation equation. The first stage is
estimated using the PPML estimator and takes the following form:
Xijkt = exp [β1TDijkt−1 + σln(1 + tijkt−1) + β2FTAijt + λikt + γjkt + θijk] εijkt. (3.3)
In the second stage the predicted importer-product-time fixed eects from the first stage are
regressed on behind-the-border measures to assess their impact on the importer’s market
access. We hence assess how importer-specific trade costs on average change, if at least one
behind-the-border measure is implemented. The second stage is a linear estimation. The
importer-product-time fixedeect canbesplit intounobservedandobservedcountry-product-
time specific determinants (γjkt = αjkt+βBTBjkt). In this studybehind-the-border-measures
are the observed determinants (BTBjkt).
As noted by Yotov et al. (2016), directional fixed eects do not only absorb all multilateral
resistances, but also all economic size terms, like production and expenditures. Importer-fixed
eects for example also control for dierences across countries in the expenditure of domestic
consumers. Therefore, we have to eliminate as many confounding factors as possible to
capture a pure trade cost eect. We do so by including importer-product, importer-time and
product-time fixed eects. Importer-time fixed eects control for dierences in economic size,
which is an important determinant of importers’ market access. The product-time fixed eects
absorb changes in productivity which are product specific and vary over time. For example,
this could be a new production technology that is adopted across all countries. Finally,
importer-product fixed eects control for time invariant importer-product characteristics.
As Head and Mayer (2014) note, the importer-product-time fixed eects from the first stage
are estimated with error (denoted as νjkt). This error is included in the error term of the
second stage estimation. As the importer-product-time fixed eects are estimatedwith varying
precision, the error term of the second stage can be heteroscedastic (Head and Mayer, 2014).
Therefore, we choose to estimate bootstrapped standard errors to get consistent estimates.18
This gives the following second stage estimation equation:
lnγ̂jkt = βBTBjkt + ηjt + κkt + ζjk + (ψjkt + νjkt). (3.4)
18 This is in line with Agnosteva et al. (2017) who also used the OLS estimator with bootstrapped standard errors.
Head and Ries (2008) used weighted-least squares to account for heteroscedasticity in the error term, while
Eaton and Kortum (2002) used the OLS estimator without adjusting for heteroscedasticity.
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3.3 Data
3.3.1 The GTA Database
All data on non-tari barriers and trade defence instruments comes from the GTA database.
It collects all national policies that are imposed unilaterally and likely to change the treat-
ment of domestic commercial interest relative to foreign commercial interests. International
commercial flows are defined as trade in goods and services, as well as labour migration
and foreign direct investments. We only focus on policies that aect trade in goods. The
GTA database collects protectionist policies that were implemented worldwide since 2009,
covering non-tari barriers imposed by 152 countries.19 In July 2017, a comprehensive update
of the database was released. It covers an outstanding range of non-tari barriers, which
makes a detailed and up-to-date assessment of implemented non-tari barriers possible.
In our estimation, we rely onmeasures that were implemented between January 2009 and
December 2014.20 Products are identified according to the CPC product classification scheme
at three digit level (version 2.1) and the HS six-digit product level. Since information about
aected products at HS six-digit level is incomplete, we estimate the trade impact at CPC
three digit product level (177 product categories) to avoid any sample selection bias caused
by omitting observations with missing information.21
The dataset covers both measures that are likely to harm and likely to benefit trade in goods.
As we are interested in the role of non-tari barriers as protectionist instruments, only pro-
tectionist measures are included in the analysis. We further restrict our study to “inward”
measures, focusing on trade barriers that are likely to restrict imports into the implementing
country.22 The database distinguishes 44 dierent protectionist measures that can aect
trade in goods. These could either be standard trade policies such as tari increases and trade
defence instruments or non-tari barriers. For each policy intervention, the GTA database pro-
vides information on a) which trading partners are likely to be aected, b) which products are
targeted and c) the date of implementation. Typical examples of non-tari barriers included
19 A full list of countries is provided in Tables C.4 and C.5 in the Appendix.
20 Note that we use lagged dummies of non-tari barriers.
21 If an oicial policy document states that a measure is targeted at the agricultural sector and nomore detailed
information on which types of products are aected could be gained, no aected products at the HS six-digit
were identified. However, information about aected products at the CPC three-digit level is complete.
22 The large majority of non-tari barriers are inwardmeasures. In a robustness check we control for outward
measures, which are implemented by the exporting country.
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in the database are state aid measures, changes in public procurement rules, trading quotas,
licensing requirements or trade finance instruments.
The GTA database oers several advantages over alternative data sources.23 First, in contrast
to data collection eorts of the WTO, UNCTAD, ITC and the World Bank, GTA data does not
rely on oicial government notifications. Instead the GTA researchers systematically monitor
government’s websites and other oicial sources to depict all policy changes that potentially
aect trade. This renders under-reporting of the actual degree of protectionism less likely. The
set of policies covered is not predefined. Therefore, it can be expected that the GTA database
covers a broader range of policies than other sources.
Second, the database clearly distinguishes between discriminatory and non-discriminatory
non-tari barriers. The TRAINS database, which is one of the largest databases on non-tari
measures, does notmake this distinction. In the TRAINSdatabase this leads tomultiple entries
of SPS and TBT measures, which are not necessarily protectionist, but could also be trade
enhancing. In contrast, each policy intervention that is included in the GTA database has
to pass a six-step evaluation process. During this process it is evaluated whether the policy
discriminates against foreign exporters to the benefit of domestic producers.24
Third, the definition of non-tari barriers according to the GTA is not restricted tomerely trade
policies. The TRAINS database, as well as I-TIP restrict their collection of non-tari measures
to explicit trade policies. According to I-TIP, non-tari measures are “defined as the measures
subject to monitoring through notification under GATT-WTO agreements. Measures that are
not subject to monitoring are not considered”.25 As a consequence, these databases do not
include state aid or bailout measures. However, especially this kind of hidden protectionism
might play an increasingly important role for developed economies, as WTO regulations have
reduced the scope to use standard trade policies to restrict trade. Lastly, the GTA database is
superior to the Non-Tari-Measure business surveys, which are published by the ITC. These
surveys provide very detailed information on how specific non-tari measures aect busi-
23 Data on non-tari barriers is still relatively scarce. Most oen, researchers rely on data from the TRAINS
database, which is collectively published by the WTO, UNCTAD, ITC and the World Bank. It contains information
about implemented non-tari barriers at detailed HS six-digit product level, classified according to the UN
MAST classification of non-tari barriers. Another common source is the I-TIP database provided by the WTO in
cooperation with UNCTAD. It also collects trade policies classified according to the UN MAST classification.
24 See Evenett and Fritz (2017) for details.
25 http://i-tip.wto.org/goods/Default.aspx. For a comprehensive list of measures subject to notification, see:
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/33-dnotf_e.htm, last accessed: 25. September 2017.
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nesses. However, they are only conducted country-wide and are therefore not suitable for a
cross-country comparison.
One of the greatest drawbacks of the GTA database, however, is that it only contains informa-
tion on non-tari barriers from 2009 onwards, so that no comparison with pre-crisis levels
of protectionism is possible. In addition, its data collection method strongly relies on the
transparency of governments publishing their policies online. For example this problem:
Saudi-Arabia was listed as the least protectionist country among the G20 economies in 2015.
Only aer its state development fundmade information about all loans and financial grants
given to domestic companies publicly available, it jumped to the seventh rank in 2016 (Evenett
and Fritz, 2016). Similarly, governments dier in how they announce policies. As noted by the
GTA initiative, the US government tends to announce each policy separately, while European
governments tend to announce policies in bundles.
Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that the GTA database only provides indicators
of whether a certain measure is implemented or not. Indicators of non-tari barriers do
not reflect the degree of protectionism. The introduction of a protective non-tari barrier is
treated equivalently to a less protective barrier. Nevertheless, only measures which are likely
to impose a significant relative change on the treatment of domestic relative to foreign agents
pass the six-step evaluation process and are included in the database.
We group the 31 intervention types listed in the GTA database into four groups of non-tari
barriers: (1) import controls, (2) state aid and subsidy measures, (3) public procurement
and localisation requirements and (4) other non-tari barriers, which include SPSmeasures,
TBT and capital controls. We also use the GTA database to identify the existence of trade
defence instruments including anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, safeguard and anti-circumvention
policies. One potential problem for the estimation strategy is that TDIs are oen implemented
at a more disaggregated (HS6 or HS8 digit) level than the one observed in the data. If not
all HS6 products within a CPC three digit product classification are treated, this results in
an underestimation of the treatment eect. This has to be kept in mind when comparing
estimated coeicients of trade eects of NTBs and TDIs. Nevertheless, the coeicients do
show the overall impact of trade policy instruments on trade flows at the CPC three digit level.
A detailed overview of the types of non-tari barriers included in this study is provided in
Table C.1 in the Appendix. For each implemented trade barrier the database includes the date
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of implementation and the date of removal for any measure. About 20% of the measures
implemented aer 2009 have been removed before the end of 2015. For each non-tari barrier
that is implemented by a country, information is available about which trading partner(s)
will most likely be aected by the respective measures based on past trade flows.26 This
bilateralisation of unilateral policiesmay trigger a potential endogeneity bias. We address this
concern by applying the two-step estimation, eliminating the bilateral structure of non-tari
barriers and treating all measures as if they aect all trading partners equally. The constructed
bilateral structure of non-trade barriers means that they may vary even among EUmember
states so that each member state is included separately, even though trade policy is set at the
supranational level.
3.3.2 Other Data Sources
Data on applied taris at HS six-digit product level originates from TRAINS and the WTO’s
Integrated Database. As it is incomplete we use interpolated taris to cover all product lines.
The MFN tari is used as the applied tari if there is neither a preferential trade agreement
between two countries nor a tari according to the Generalized System of Preferences. In
all other cases, the preferential tari is used as the applied tari. Like imports, taris are
aggregated to the CPC three-digit product classification by calculating simple averages and
trade weighted averages.27 We use simple averages across all specifications and provide
estimation results usingweighted tari averages as robustness checks. An indicator ofwhether
a free tradeagreement is inplace is retrieved fromCEPII,whichbuildson free tradeagreements
notified to the WTO.
Data on bilateral imports is retrieved from BACI, which reports trade flows at the HS6 digit
product level using the HS-92 classification. Trade flows are aggregated to the CPC three-digit
product classification to fit the data on non-tari barriers. Since all policy variables (non-tari
barriers, trade defence instruments and taris) are lagged by one year, we use imports from
2010 to 2015 andmerge those with trade policy data from 2009 to 2014.
26 For trade in goods a country is identified as being aected, if in the year prior to the implementation of the
policy, exports of the respective product to the implementing country exceeded onemillion US-Dollars.
27 Both aggregation methods have their disadvantages: The problem with trade-weighted averages is that
extremely high taris with nearly no trade contribute to the weighted average in the same way as zero-taris
with high volumes of trade. The problem of using the simple averages of taris is that taris of products with a
small import share and a large import share have the same weight.
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3.3.3 Development of Non-Tari Barriers
Figure 3.1 plots the amount of newly implemented non-tari barriers for each year. The
number of NTBs implemented remains relatively stable over the sample period, averaging
around 280 per year.28 State aid and subsidymeasures constitute the largest share of NTBs, fol-
lowed by public procurement and localisation policies. Discriminatory SPS and TBTmeasures
(included in “other NTBs”) make up for only a very small group of non-tari barriers.29
Figure 3.1: Number of newly implemented NTBs by Type (2009-2014)
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Source: Data from Global Trade Alert Database
The world map in Figure 3.2 shows the number of newly implemented non-tari barriers by
country between 2009 and 2014. It is eye-catching that the United States implemented by far
themost non-tari barriers (662). Saudi-Arabia and India, as the second and third largest users,
28 In contrast to that, usage of trade defence instruments declined over the period of analysis. While 204 trade
defence instruments were implemented in 2009, this number dropped to 140 in 2014. Among the dierent types
of trade defence instruments, anti-dumping is by far the most oen applied instrument.
29 This stands in contrast to other data on non-tari barriers. For example, in the I-TIP database, SPS and TBT
measures are by far the most oen recorded non-tari barriers. This shows the importance of distinguishing
between discriminatory and non-discriminatory NTBs.
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only implemented 130 and 128 NTBs respectively. Germany and Brazil follow with 76 and 71
implemented measures.30 Each implemented non-tari barrier on average targets imports of
24 products and aects 40 countries. Products of electrical energy, domestic appliances and
parts thereof as well as products of iron and steel are most oen targeted.
Figure 3.2: Number of newly implemented NTBs by imposing Country (2009-2014)
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Source: Data from Global Trade Alert Database
The world map in Figure 3.3 shows how oen exporters from each country were likely to be
aected by a non-tari barrier imposed by another country between 2009 and 2014. Canada,
Germany and China are the three economies that were most oen likely to be aected by
an implemented non-tari barrier. Accumulated, Canadian exporters were aected by 1,101,
German exporters by 989 and Chinese exporters by 948 non-tari barriers between 2009
and 2014.31 In the majority of cases import flows are only distorted by one non-tari barrier.
There are a few outliers, where certain country-product pairs are aected by more than
10 non-tari barriers simultaneously. Overall, 2.6% of all importer-exporter-product-time
combinations in the sample faced at least one non-tari barrier (Table C.2 in the Appendix).
Trade defence instruments, including anti-dumping, countervailing duties and safeguards,
were implemented in 0.3% of all observations.
30 Most of the implemented non-tari barriers from the United States are concentrated in the group of public
procurement and localisation policies. They account for about 50% of all implementedmeasures worldwide.
Similar, the United States is responsible for close to 40% of all state aid and subsidies measures. To a certain
degree this extreme outlier might be driven by the fact that the US government tends to announce each policy
separately, while for example European governments tend to announce policies in bundles. We provide a
robustness check, excluding the United States from the estimation sample. Results are not driven by this outlier
(see Tables 3.4 and C.3 in the Appendix).
31 Tables C.4 and C.5 in the Appendix provide a list with the number of times a country implemented non-tari
barriers and the number of times it has been aected by a non-tari barrier.
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Figure 3.3: Number of newly implemented NTBs by Target Country (2009-2014)
Number of NTBs that affect country
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Source: Data from Global Trade Alert Database
3.4 Estimation Results
3.4.1 Gravity Estimation Results
Baseline estimation results are reported in Table 3.1. Columns (1) and (2) present results
using the OLS estimator. According to the most general specification in Column (1), imports
decrease on average by 11.9% following the implementation of at least one non-tari barrier.32
This eect is significant at the 1% level. Trade defence instruments have a similarly large
eect on bilateral trade flows. On average, imports of a particular product from a targeted
country fall by 10.8% if at least one trade defence instrument is implemented against this
product. The two coeicients are not significantly dierent from each other, indicating that
non-tari barriers have on average the same trade dampening eects as traditional trade
defence instruments.
Taris also have a significantly negative eect on imports. The estimated coeicient of 0.176
means that a one percent increase in taris reduces the import value by 0.18%.33 The existence
of free trade agreements has a significant trade enhancing eect with a reported coeicient
32 Percentage change = (eβNTB − 1) ∗ 100.
33 This estimate is very low and can be explained by the aggregation method (simple average) which gives every
tari the same weight, disregarding the trade volume of the related product. Using a weighted average yields
a significantly larger estimated coeicient, while those of the other variables remain unchanged (see Section
3.4.2).
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of 0.015 (statistically significant at the 5% level), meaning that the implementation of a free
trade agreement on average increases bilateral trade at the product level by 1.5%.
Table 3.1: Estimation Results using OLS and PPML with Dummies of NTBs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation Method OLS OLS PPML PPML
Dependent Variable ln imports ln imports imports imports
ln (1 + tari) -0.176*** -0.175*** -0.414** -0.414**
(0.0596) (0.0596) (0.179) (0.179)
Trade defence instruments -0.114*** -0.111*** -0.053*** -0.053***
(0.0175) (0.0175) (0.018) (0.018)
Non-tari barriers -0.127*** -0.067***
(0.00761) (0.026)
Import controls -0.117*** -0.042**
(0.0129) (0.021)
State aid and subsidies -0.0558*** -0.066
(0.0105) (0.043)
Public procurement/localisation policies -0.183*** -0.075***
(0.0142) (0.019)
Other NTBs (SPS, TBT, capital controls) -0.108*** -0.026
(0.0248) (0.045)
FTA dummy 0.0153** 0.0154** 0.062*** 0.062***
(0.00648) (0.00648) (0.017) (0.017)
Observations 4,405,016 4,405,016 6,810,966 6,810,966
R-squared 0.913 0.913
Note: All estimations include importer-product-time, exporter-product-time and country-pair-product fixed
eects. Standard errors are clustered at country-pair-product level. Variables for non-tari barriers, trade defence
instruments and taris are lagged by one year. Except for taris all explanatory variables enter the regression as
dummies. Imports in thousand USD. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Column (2) of Table 3.1 shows eects for the four disaggregated measures for non-tari
barriers using OLS. Estimated coeicients are negative and statistically significant for all
types of non-tari barriers. Public procurement and localisation policies (-0.183) have the
strongest negative impact on bilateral imports. On average, bilateral imports of a particular
product decrease by 17%, following the implementation of at least one public procurement
or localisation policy. In contrast, state aid and subsidies (-0.0558) have the smallest negative
impact on imports (-5%). Direct import controls andotherNTBs (SPS, TBT and capital controls)
reduce trade by 11% and 10% respectively.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.1 show estimation results using the PPML estimator. While
the eect of taris on trade increases compared to the OLS estimates (from 0.176 to 0.414),
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the estimated coeicients of TDIs and NTBs reported in Column (3) decrease in size by about
one-half compared to the OLS estimates. According to the PPML estimation results, bilateral
imports on average decrease by 6.5% if at least one non-tari barrier is implemented. For trade
defence instruments, the estimated coeicient decreases from -0.114 in the OLS estimation
to -0.053 in the PPML estimation, predicting a average decrease in imports of 5% if at least
one trade defence instrument is implemented. Both coeicients remain significant at the 1%
level and are not significantly dierent from each other.34
Looking at the disaggregate measures of non-tari barriers (Column 4), it is evident that only
public procurement and localisation policies as well as import controls significantly aect
imports, with reported coeicients of -0.075 and -0.042, respectively. State aid, subsidies and
other non-tari barriers do not significantly aect trade flows.
Estimation results using counts instead of dummies are provided in Table 3.2. Qualitatively,
the results are similar to those provided in Table 3.1. Column (1) of Table 3.2 shows that taris,
trade defence instruments as well as non-tari barriers all reduce imports. However, the
coeicients for TDIs and NTBs are now significantly dierent from each other, indicating that
each individual trade defence instrument reduces trade eight times more than a non-tari
barrier. This is also true, albeit to a lesser extent, in the PPML estimation (Column (3) of Table
3.2). However, as shown in Table C.2 in the Appendix, NTBs (113,725 cases) were applied
about nine times as oen as TDIs (12,432), so that the aggregated eect is similar.
The results change when looking at the individual groups of non-tari barriers (Column (2) of
Table 3.2). The estimated coeicients for import controls and other NTBs are both about twice
as large as the one for trade defence instruments (the dierence is significant at the 5% level),
while the coeicient for state aid is of very similar size. The small aggregate eect is driven
primarily by the small and insignificant coeicient of public procurement. Interestingly, while
the estimates of TDIs and Import controls both halve when estimated using PPML rather than
OLS (Column 4), the estimate for state aid doubles in magnitude.
34 The smaller coeicientsmightbeexplainedby the fact that oneaddsa substantial amountof zero trade flows to
the reference group, if the PPML estimator is applied (Anderson and Yotov (2016)). Applying the PPML estimator
using the OLS sample that excludes missing trade flows however also yields smaller estimated coeicients
(results reported in Column 6 of Table C.3 in the Appendix.) Therefore, the dierent PPML results might also be
explained by the fact that the PPML estimator corrects for heteroscedasticity.
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Table 3.2: Estimation Results using OLS and PPML with Counts of NTBs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation Method OLS OLS PPML PPML
Dependent Variable ln imports ln imports Imports Imports
ln (1 + tari) -0.174*** -0.173*** -0.415** -0.494***
(0.0596) (0.0596) (0.179) (0.179)
Trade defence instruments -0.0439*** -0.0411*** -0.019*** -0.019***
(0.00957) (0.00956) (0.004) (0.004)
Non-tari barriers -0.00519*** -0.005*
(0.00131) (0.003)
Import controls -0.0715*** -0.037**
(0.00862) (0.015)
State aid and subsidies -0.0489*** -0.076*
(0.00789) (0.039)
Public procurement/localisation policies -0.00149 0.001
(0.00134) (0.001)
Other NTBs (SPS, TBT, capital controls) -0.104*** -0.025
(0.0245) (0.044)
FTA dummy 0.0153** 0.0153** 0.063*** 0.063***
(0.00648) (0.00648) (0.017) (0.017)
Observations 4,405,016 4,405,016 6,810,966 6,810,966
R-squared 0.913 0.913
Note: All estimations include importer-product-time, exporter-product-time and country-pair-product fixed eects.
Standard errors are clustered at country-pair-product level. All variables for non-tari barriers, trade defence
instruments and taris are lagged by one year. Except for taris all explanatory variables enter the regression as
counts. Imports in thousand USD. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
3.4.2 Robustness of the Baseline Results
Since our variables of interest vary across the importer-exporter-product-time dimension,
it is also possible to include importer-exporter-time fixed eects to further reduce omitted
variable bias. Weabstain fromdoing so in thebaseline regressionbecauseourworkhorseppml
estimator does not easily accommodate this additional dimension. However, it is possible to
include importer-exporter-time fixedeects in theOLSestimationandwedo so in a robustness
check.
Estimates of the dummy regressions are reported in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.3 below.
Compared to the same Columns in Table 3.1, it can be seen that the estimated coeicient
of NTBs in Column (1) remains almost unchanged. The same is true for the estimates of
the dierent types of NTBs reported in Column (2). The tari coeicient becomes smaller
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and insignificant. This is not surprising since the country-pair-time dimension constitutes
a main source of variation for this variable. The estimated trade dampening eect of TDIs
also becomes smaller but remains strongly significant. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.3 report
results using counts. As with the dummy regressions, coeicients for NTBs are robust relative
to the Baseline, while those for TDIs become smaller in magnitude and tari eects turn
insignificant.
Table 3.3: Robustness Checks: OLS with full Fixed Eects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trade Policy Variable Dummies Dummies Counts Counts
ln(1+tari) -0.0144 -0.0135 -0.0153 -0.0140
(0.0765) (0.0765) (0.0765) (0.0765)
Trade defence instruments -0.0792*** -0.0777*** -0.0225** -0.0202**
(0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0098) (0.0098)
Non-tari barriers -0.1251*** -0.0054***
(0.0081) (0.0014)
Import controls -0.1116*** -0.0825***
(0.0134) (0.0092)
State aid and subsidies -0.0590*** -0.0454***
(0.0111) (0.0083)
Public procurement/localisation policies -0.1689*** -0.0017
(0.0152) (0.0014)
Other NTBs (SPS, TBT, capital controls) -0.1867*** -0.1799***
(0.0303) (0.0299)
Observations 4,393,589 4,393,589 4,393,589 4,393,589
R2 0.9164 0.9164 0.9164 0.9164
Note: OLS regression with ln(imports in thousand USD) as dependent variable. All estimations include importer-
product-time, exporter-product-time exporter-importer-time and and country-pair-product fixed eects. Standard
errors are clustered at country-pair-product level. All variables for non-tari barriers, trade defence instruments
and taris are lagged by one year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
To test whether results depend on the aggregation method for taris from the HS six-digit
to the CPC three-digit product level, a robustness check carries out the baseline regressions
with tari rates weighted by trade value. The results for the OLS estimation are reported in
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.4.35 Estimated coeicients for non-tari barriers and trade
defence instruments do not change if trade-weighted averages of taris instead of simple
35 Results for the PPML estimation are reported in Column (1) of Table C.3 in the Appendix. Unless indicated
otherwise, only results for aggregated NTBs are shown.
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averages are used. However, as expected, the estimated trade elasticity increases substantially
if weighted averages of taris are used.
Table 3.4: Robustness Checks: Baseline using OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Weighted taris Weighted taris Exporter NTBs Exporter NTBs w/o USA w/o USA Placebo Placebo
ln (1 + tari) -10.30** -10.23** -0.177*** -0.175*** -0.173*** -0.172*** 0.00362 0.00215
(4.226) (4.225) (0.0596) (0.0596) (0.0598) (0.0598) (0.0482) (0.0482)
TDI -0.114*** -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.113*** -0.110*** 0.0471*** 0.0467***
(0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0156) (0.0156)
Non-tari barriers -0.127*** -0.126*** -0.126*** 0.151***
(0.00761) (0.00761) (0.00790) (0.00702)
Import controls -0.117*** -0.117*** -0.118*** 0.106***
(0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0131) (0.0107)
State aid / subsidies -0.0559*** -0.0558*** -0.0490*** 0.0978***
(0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0109) (0.00916)
Public proc./loc. pol. -0.183*** -0.183*** -0.200*** 0.147***
(0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0164) (0.0141)
Other NTBs -0.108*** -0.108*** -0.108*** 0.135***
(0.0248) (0.0248) (0.0247) (0.0258)
Exporter NTB -0.197*** -0.196***
(0.0234) (0.0234)
FTA Dummy 0.0158** 0.0159** 0.0152** 0.0154** 0.0159** 0.0160** 0.0172*** 0.0171***
(0.00648) (0.00648) (0.00648) (0.00648) (0.00655) (0.00655) (0.00648) (0.00648)
Observations 4,405,016 4,405,016 4,405,016 4,405,016 4,323,498 4,323,498 4,405,016 4,405,016
R-squared 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.911 0.911 0.913 0.913
Note: OLS regression with ln(imports in thousand USD) as dependent variable. All estimations include importer-product-time, exporter-
product-time and country-pair-product fixed eects. Standard errors are clustered at country-pair-product level. All variables of non-tari
barriers, trade defence instruments and taris are lagged by one year. Except for taris all explanatory variables enter the regression as
dummies.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Second, non-tari barriers imposed by the exporting country might aect both its exports as
well as the importing country’s decision to impose non-tari barriers. To avoid any omitted
variable bias thatmay result from this relationship, we use an additional dummy to control for
the existence of non-tari barriers imposed by the exporter, targeting exports to the importing
country. The results are provided in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.4.36 Non-tari barriers
imposed by the exporter significantly reduce imports into the importing country. However,
they do not seem to simultaneously aect any other estimates. The estimated coeicients
of non-tari barriers implemented by the importing country remain robust to including this
additional control variable.
Third, the United States are responsible for more than half of global public procurement and
localisation policies. To ensure that our results are not driven by the US, we thus run our
baseline estimation excluding the United States. Regression results are reported in Columns
36 PPML results in Column (2) of Table C.3 in the Appendix.
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(5) and (6) of Table 3.4. All coeicients remain robust, indicating that the US is not driving the
results.37
Fourth, we conduct a placebo test, regressing bilateral imports on future changes in non-tari
barriers, using two-year leads.38 The placebo test yields positive and significant coeicients
for the non-tari barrier variables (Columns (7) and (8) of Table 3.4).39 This is reasonable, as it
underlines the argument that non-tari barriers are implemented in response to increasing
imports. It also shows that the estimated baseline coeicients are likely to be biased towards
zero, hence constituting a lower bound of the true treatment eect.
With regard to the PPML estimation, we perform an additional robustness check, excluding
all missing trade flows from the sample (rather than treating them as zeros). The results are
reported in Column (6) of Table C.3 in the Appendix. The estimated coeicients are very similar
in magnitude and significance to the Baseline results reported in Column (3) of Table 3.1.
3.4.3 Two-Step Estimation Results
The constructed bilateral structure of non-tari barriers based on past trade flows might lead
to substantial endogeneity that biases the estimation results. In addition, the constructed
bilateral structure might especially bias estimation results for those non-tari barriers that
classify as behind-the-border measures and aect all exporters equally. We address this issue
by applying a two-step estimation procedure. In the first step, We estimate a standard gravity
equation which omits any non-tari barriers. In the second step, we regress the predicted
importer-product-time fixed eects from the first stage on importer-product specific non-tari
barriers to assess their contribution to importer-specific trade costs.
37 Using the PPML estimator, the estimated coeicient for the aggregate measure of non-tari barriers decreases
by about one half to -0.0288 (Column (3) of Table C.3 in the Appendix). The eect remains significant at the
10% level. Looking at the four decomposed non-tari barriers (Column 4) however shows that the change in
the aggregate coeicient is driven exclusively by State aid and subsidies, which was already insignificant in
the baseline regression. The estimated coeicients for the other disaggregatedmeasures remain similar to the
baseline results in both size and significance. Public procurement and localisation policies as well as import
controls remain the drivers behind the negative eect of non-tari barriers on trade.
38 For the last two years, 2014 and 2015, we used data on non-tari barriers from 2009 and 2010 respectively, as
no future data was available.
39 PPML results are reported in Column (5) of Table C.3 in the Appendix.
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Results for the first stage are shown in Column (1) of Table 3.5. The coeicients for taris, trade
defence instruments and free trade agreements all remain similar to the baseline results in
magnitude and significance.40
Table 3.5: 2 Stage Estimation Results
1st stage 2nd stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln (1+tari) -0.4147**
(0.1788)
Trade defence instruments -0.0549***
(0.0178)
FTA dummy 0.0616***
(0.0173)
Behind-the-border measures -0.0232** -0.0232**
(0.0112) (0.0101)
BTB: Import controls -0.0299* -0.0299**
(0.0159) (0.0137)
BTB: Subsidies / state aid 0.0063 0.0063
(0.0140) (0.0134)
BTB: Puplic proc. / loc. pol. -0.0184 -0.0184
(0.0234) (0.0191)
BTB: Others 0.0357 0.0357
(0.0627) (0.0654)
R2 0.9899 0.9495 0.9495 0.9495 0.9495
Standard errors cluster: ijk cluster: jk bootstrapped cluster: jk bootstrapped
Note: Dependent variable: Import value in thousand USD (1st Stage) and importer-product-time fixed eects (2nd stage).
The 1st stage ppml estimation includes importer-product-time, exporter-product-time and country-pair-product fixed
eects. Standard errors are clustered at country-pair-product level. The 2nd stage OLS estimations include importer-
time, product-time and importer-product fixed eects. Standard errors are either clustered at country-product level or
bootstrapped. All explanatory variables except for the FTA dummy are lagged by one year. Except for taris all explanatory
variables enter the regression as dummies. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In the second stage, importer-product-time fixed eects are regressed on a dummy indicating
the existence of at least one non-tari barrier, controlling for importer-product, importer-time
and product-time fixed eects. We assume that any implemented non-tari barrier aects all
40 Importer-product-time fixed eects are predicted using the gen(M) option of the ppml_panel_sg command
from stata. The gen(M) option produces exponentiated importer-product-time fixed eects (Larch et al., 2017).
Therefore, we use the logarithm of the predicted fixed eects in the second stage as the dependent variable.
Taking the logarithm excludes all fixed eects that are zero. This is not problematic since fixed eects of the
value zero do only occur, if an importer did not import any goods of a respective product at time t. Aer taking
the logarithm, the predicted fixed eects vary between -22.9 and 15.53. The average predicted fixed eect is
-0.97. 147,667 non-zero fixed eects are predicted.
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exporters equally and therefore we refer to it as behind-the-border barrier.41 The estimated
coeicient can be interpreted as the average change in importer market access caused by at
least one implemented non-tari barrier. Due to the potential heterogeneity contained in the
error term from the predicted fixed eects from the first stage we report standard errors once
clustered at the importer-product level and once bootstrapped.42
Results of the second stage regression are reported in Table 3.5. Importer-product market
access on average decreases by 2.3% following the implementation of at least one behind-
the-border measure (Columns 2 and 3). This eect is significant at the 5% level regardless of
whether standard errors are clustered at importer-product level or bootstrapped. Looking
at the disaggregatedmeasures of non-tari barriers (Columns 4 and 5) it becomes clear that
the aggregate eect is driven by import controls. While these findings confirm the baseline
result that NTBs in general and import controls in particular negatively aect trade, they do
not oer evidence that all types of non-tari barriers are eective in reducing imports.
3.5 Conclusion
Ourempirical analysisprovidesevidence thatnon-taribarriers significantlydecrease the level
of trade. For the period from 2010 to 2015, our baseline results show that non-tari barriers
implemented by a country reduce imports of aected products from targeted exporters by 6%
to 12%, depending on the estimation method used. While an individual NTB does not reduce
trade as much as a traditional trade defence instrument, taking into account the number of
implemented non-tari barriers, their eect on trade is comparable to that of traditional TDIs
such as anti-dumping, countervailing duties or safeguards.
When looking at individual NTBs, it is demonstrated that import controls significantly reduce
imports across all specifications. Specifically, the implementation of one additional import
control reduces trade by 4% to 7%, so that imports fall on average by 4% to 11% if at least one
import control is implemented. Public procurement and localisation policies have an even
41 Bymaking this assumption the constructed bilateral structure of the GTA dataset becomes irrelevant. The
sample size naturally is much smaller than in the first stage, as the exporter-dimension is dropped. In total
147,667 observations are included.
42 If the bootstrapping method is used, the estimation is repeated 100 times for dierent draws from the es-
timation sample. Each time a sample of the same size of the estimation sample is drawn. Observations can
be includedmore than once in the drawn sample. Bootstrapping ensures that standard errors are estimated
consistently.
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larger average eect (7% to 17%), although evidence is less robust when it comes to marginal
eects of one additional such policy. State aid and subsidies aswell as other non-tari barriers
(SPS, TBT and capital controls) also reduce imports by up to 5% and 10% respectively, even
though their eect is less robust to changes in the estimation method. Overall the results
illustrate the importance of exploiting new data on non-tari barriers as they reveal the
significant protectionist impact of non-standard trade policies.
Methodologically, this study applies a two-step estimation procedure to identify trade eects
caused by behind-the-border measures. The two-step estimation confirms that non-standard
trade policies are important determinants of the trade costs faced by the importer. Imple-
menting at least one behind-the-border measure that discriminates all exporters equally on
average reduces market access of the importer by 2%.
The results imply that the WTO should follow recent developments in bilateral trade agree-
ments. More precisely, it should shi its focus towards multilateral agreements that aim at
limiting the use of non-tari barriers to avoid the increase in hidden protectionism that might
otherwise result in lower levels of trade and thus welfare.
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Appendix C.1 Additional Tables
Table C.1: Overview of Types of Non-Tari Barriers and Trade Defence Instruments
Non-tari barriers
(1) Import controls (3) Public procurement and localisation policy
Import ban Public procurement access
Import incentive Public procurement localisation
Import licensing requirement Public procurement preference margin
Import monitoring Local operations
Import quota Local sourcing
Import tari quota Localisation incentive
Import-related non-tari measure, nes
Internal taxation of imports (4) Other non-tari barriers
Trade balancing measure Competitive depreciation
Trade payment measure Price stabilisation
Instrument unclear
(2) State aid and subsidies Sanitary and phytosanitary measure
Bailout (capital injection or equity participation) Technical barrier to trade
Financial assistance in foreign market
Financial grant
In-kind grant
Interest payment subsidy Types of trade defence instruments
Loan guarantee Trade defence instruments
Production subsidy Anti-circumvention
State aid, nes Anti-dumping
State loan Anti-subsidy
Tax or social insurance relief Safeguard
Source: Data from Global Trade Alert Database
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Table C.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Imports in thousand USD 19725.189 317480.117 1 97142264 4,405,016
Tari (simple average, in percent) 6.28 20.066 0 2314.286 4,405,016
Count Percent
Trade defence instruments
0 4,392,584 99.7
1 12,432 0.3
Non-tari barriers
0 4,291,291 97.4
1 113,725 2.6
Import controls
0 4,368,891 99.2
1 36,125 0.8
State aid & subsidies
0 4,365,324 99.1
1 39,692 0.9
Public procurement & localisation policies
0 4,367,799 99.2
1 37,217 0.8
Other NTBs (SPS, TBT, capital controls)
0 4,390,576 99.7
1 14,440 0.3
Source: Data from Global Trade Alert Database
Table C.3: Robustness Checks: Baseline using PPML
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Weighted taris Exporter NTBs w/o USA w/o USA Placebo w/omissing trade
ln (1 + tari) -28.37** -0.413** -0.433** -0.434** -0.311* -0.405**
(12.76) (0.179) (0.182) (0.182) (0.175) (0.176)
Trade defence instruments -0.0532*** -0.0529*** -0.0498** -0.0476** 0.0319** -0.0539***
(0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0229) (0.0229) (0.0128) (0.0178)
Non-tari barriers -0.0672*** -0.0672*** -0.0288* 0.0515*** -0.0547**
(0.0259) (0.0259) (0.0165) (0.0129) (0.0256)
Import controls -0.0480**
(0.0218)
State aid and subsidies -0.000202
(0.0240)
Public procurement/localisation policies -0.0823***
(0.0230)
Other NTBs (SPS, TBT, capital controls) -0.0277
(0.0436)
Non-tari barriers by impl. by exporter -0.0563**
(0.0253)
FTA Dummy 0.0626*** 0.0617*** 0.0728*** 0.0731*** 0.0666*** 0.0578***
(0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0173) (0.0159)
Observations 6,810,966 6,810,966 6,703,950 6,703,950 6,810,966 4,660,786
Note: PPML regression with imports in thousand USD as dependent variable. All estimations include importer-product-time, exporter-
product-time and country-pair-product fixed eects. Standard errors are clustered at country-pair-product level. All variables of non-tari
barriers, trade defence instruments and taris are lagged by one year. Except for taris all explanatory variables enter the regression as
dummies. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table C.4: NTBs by Country (2009 - 2014)
Number of Number of Number of Number of
Country implemented times country is Country implemented times country is
NTB’s aected by NTB NTB’s aected by NTB
Afghanistan 0 0 Korea (DPR) 0 0
Albania 0 159 Congo (DR) 0 17
Algeria 0 0 Ecuador 9 125
American Samoa 0 0 Egypt 6 387
Andorra 0 0 El Salvador 0 40
Angola 1 22 Equatorial Guinea 0 0
Anguilla 0 0 Eritrea 0 0
Antigua and Barbuda 0 7 Estonia 21 318
Argentina 38 467 Ethiopia 0 0
Armenia 1 8 Fiji 0 14
Aruba 0 0 Finland 25 584
Australia 3 661 France 48 938
Austria 32 742 French Polynesia 0 0
Azerbaijan 0 0 Gabon 0 13
Bahamas 0 0 Gambia 1 4
Bahrain 0 212 Georgia 0 235
Bangladesh 1 138 Germany 76 989
Barbados 0 13 Ghana 3 34
Belarus 0 0 Greece 31 427
Belgium 34 823 Grenada 0 2
Belize 0 13 Guam 0 0
Benin 0 11 Guatemala 0 234
Bermuda 0 0 Guinea 0 7
Bhutan 0 0 Guinea-Bissau 0 2
Bolivia 0 34 Guyana 0 16
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0 0 Haiti 0 12
Botswana 0 17 Honduras 0 43
Brazil 71 674 Hong Kong 1 602
Brunei Darussalam 0 10 Hungary 23 608
Bulgaria 26 338 Iceland 2 143
Burkina Faso 0 10 India 128 683
Burundi 0 4 Indonesia 63 548
Cambodia 1 76 Iran 0 0
Cameroon 0 28 Iraq 0 0
Canada 17 1101 Ireland 32 581
Cape Verde 0 4 Israel 2 519
Cayman Islands 0 0 Italy 54 927
Central African Republic 0 3 Ivory Coast 0 30
Chad 0 7 Jamaica 0 25
Chile 2 431 Japan 29 802
China 42 948 Jordan 0 64
Taiwan, Province of China 0 47 Kazakhstan 0 0
Colombia 13 321 Kenya 1 42
Comoros 0 0 Kiribati 0 0
Congo 0 19 Kuwait 1 68
Costa Rica 0 297 Kyrgyzstan 1 6
Croatia 11 247 Laos 0 0
Cuba 0 26 Latvia 23 301
Cyprus 20 136 Lebanon 0 0
Czech Republic 28 634 Lesotho 0 10
Denmark 35 678 Liberia 0 0
Djibouti 0 1 Libya 0 0
Dominica 0 6 Liechtenstein 0 12
Dominican Republic 2 288 Lithuania 21 218
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Table C.5: NTBs by Country (2009 - 2014), continued
Number of Number of Number of Number of
Country implemented times country is Country implemented times country is
NTB’s aected by NTB NTB’s aected by NTB
Luxembourg 11 435 Saint Lucia 0 5
Macao 0 1 Saint Pierre and Miquelon 0 0
Macedonia 2 175 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 0 3
Madagascar 0 32 Samoa 0 0
Malawi 0 10 San Marino 0 0
Malaysia 6 601 Sao Tome and Principe 0 0
Maldives 0 6 Saudi Arabia 130 349
Mali 0 7 Senegal 1 30
Malta 9 119 Serbia 0 0
Marshall Islands 0 0 Seychelles 0 0
Mauritania 1 11 Sierra Leone 0 8
Mauritius 0 31 Singapore 0 605
Mayotte 0 0 Slovakia 22 480
Mexico 8 632 Slovenia 30 393
Micronesia 0 0 Solomon Islands 0 7
Mongolia 0 8 Somalia 0 0
Montenegro 0 0 South Africa 16 526
Montserrat 0 0 South Sudan 0 0
Morocco 3 138 Spain 52 768
Mozambique 0 97 Sri Lanka 6 101
Myanmar 0 43 Palestine, State of 0 0
Namibia 4 26 Suriname 0 55
Nauru 0 0 Swaziland 0 42
Nepal 0 30 Sweden 28 784
Netherlands 34 765 Switzerland 2 724
Netherlands Antilles 0 0 Syrian Arab Republic 0 0
New Caledonia 0 0 Tajikistan 0 0
New Zealand 2 452 Tanzania, United Republic of 0 31
Nicaragua 0 37 Thailand 3 690
Niger 0 3 Timor-Leste 0 0
Nigeria 12 86 Togo 1 22
Niue 0 0 Tokelau 0 0
Norway 1 521 Tonga 0 1
Oman 0 280 Trinidad and Tobago 0 253
Pakistan 13 297 Tunisia 0 171
Palau 0 0 Turkey 7 644
Panama 1 114 Turkmenistan 0 0
Papua New Guinea 0 25 Turks and Caicos Islands 0 0
Paraguay 5 39 Tuvalu 0 0
Peru 0 170 Uganda 2 19
Philippines 1 480 Ukraine 17 395
Pitcairn 0 0 United Arab Emirates 0 511
Poland 60 626 United Kingdom 39 915
Portugal 31 553 United States of America 662 833
Qatar 0 78 Uruguay 2 159
Korea (Republic of) 10 746 Uzbekistan 0 0
Moldova (Republic of) 0 24 Vanuatu 0 0
Sudan 0 0 Venezuela 14 299
Romania 24 523 Vietnam 13 494
Russian Federation 0 0 Western Sahara 0 0
Rwanda 0 4 Yemen 0 0
Saint Helena 0 0 Zambia 0 52
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0 2 Zimbabwe 3 205
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4 Where has the Rum gone? Firms’ Choice of Transport
Mode under the Threat of Maritime Piracy∗
4.1 Introduction
With 180 incidents in 2017which lead to 166 crewmembers being taken hostage or kidnapped
and three killed, maritime piracy remains a real threat to international merchant shipping
(ICC IMB, 2018).1 Beyond the risk faced by the crew, piracy increases the cost carried by
shipping companies, including higher wage premia, a rise in insurance payments due to a
lowerexpectedvalueof a shipment (since itmaybedamagedor sunkwithahigherprobability),
ransom payments, as well as the actual cost of protecting the ship throughmilitary escorts,
armed guards, electric fencing, razor wire, water cannons, non-lethal laser or acoustic devices
(Towergate Insurance, 2018; Gilpin, 2009). Increased fuel and time cost of altering routes can
also be substantial. For example, routing around the Strait of Malacca - one of the world’s
busiest sea lanes and frequently prone to pirate attacks - would mean a detour of about 1,000
nautical miles (Berg et al., 2006). Estimates for the direct costs of piracy due to suchmeasures
range from 7 billion USD to 12 billion USD in 2010 (Bowden et al., 2010).2
This paper combines Chinese firm-level customs data with data on maritime piracy to investi-
gate how exporting firms respond to such piracy induced costs. They cannot be modelled as
iceberg transport costs because they are transport mode specific - goods shipped by air are
not subject to pirate attacks - and accrue per journey, as one military escort or security sta is
required per ship, no matter whether the latter runs at full capacity. The paper shows that
pirate activity on a certain trade route induces firms to change transportation mode, shipping
∗ This chapter is basedon jointworkwithShuyaoYang. Wewould like to thankour supervisorGabriel Felbermayr
for his support throughout this project. We are also grateful to participants of the ifo Center for International
Economics Internal Seminar for their helpful comments and suggestions.
1 The reasons for piracy are manifold and include traic along particular trade routes, economic conditions
(Percy and Shortland, 2009; Cariou andWol, 2011), inadequate government action against piracy (Hastings,
2009; Chalk, 2008), geographic position, weak judicial systems and political instability (Murphy, 2007). For an
overview, definitions and historical context the reader is referred to Mejia et al. (2012).
2 Indirect costs of piracy range from threatening the participation of neighbouring states in maritime trade,
tourismand fishery (Mbekeani andNcube, 2011) to an increase in corruptionand thusweakeningof the legitimacy
of governments and even potentially environmental disasters as pirates attack oil tankers or ships carrying toxic
chemicals (Chalk, 2008).
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some of their goods by plane rather than by ship. The remaining average shipments per firm
however become larger and average producer prices fall, indicating that exporters absorb
parts of the costs. Despite these compensating activities, overall exports from China decline
on routes aected by piracy.
The paper relates to two strands of literature. The first strand concerns the determinants of
firms’ choice of transportation mode and has already attracted significant research attention.
At themacro level, Hummels (2007) discusses howdeclining transport costs such as the spread
of containerization have contributed to an increase in international trade. Correspondingly,
this paper shows that an increase in transportation costs on specific ocean routes due to pirate
activity reduces bilateral trade flows along the aected routes.
Harrigan (2010) develops a Ricardian model to investigate the interaction between trade,
transport cost and the choice of transport mode and tests its predictions using US import
data. Beyond the finding that goods with high unit values are more likely to be shipped by
air, the author demonstrates that countries more distant from the destination market have a
comparative advantage in lightweight goods. Related to that, Hummels and Schaur (2013)
model a firm’s choice between air and ocean transportation, showing thatmore time sensitive
goods are more likely to be shipped by air. Ge et al. (2014) use Chinese customs data to
investigate the choice of transport mode at the firm-level, finding that high productivity firms
are more likely to ship goods by air, indicating that they specialise in time sensitive high value
products.
Part of the cost of piracy comes from additional shipping time due to re-routing of vessels
to avoid areas with pirate activity. For example, a round voyage of a container ship from
Singapore to Rotterdam takes on average 33 days if travelling via the Suez Canal and 42 days
if travelling around the Cape of Good Hope (Bendall, 2010). Such an increase in shipping time
constitutes one explanation for the decision of exporting firms to switch from ocean to air
transport.
This paper also relates to the work of Kropf and Sauré (2014). The authors construct and
empirically test a model of the relationship between fixed costs per shipment and a firm’s
choice regarding the size and frequency of shipments. In line with their results, this paper
finds that a piracy induced increase in fixed costs per shipment reduces shipment frequency
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and increases shipment size.3 An alternative channel through which pirate activity may aect
trade and the choice of shipment mode is through uncertainty. Békés et al. (2017) show that
firms tend to send less frequent but larger shipments to more uncertain markets. Piracy
increases uncertainty by increasing the probability of losing a ship at sea. In line with Békés
et al. (2017), it is hence not surprising to see exporters responding to piracy by reducing the
number of shipments while increasing their size.
The second strand of literature this paper relates to concerns the eects of piracy on trade
in general and firms’ choice of transport mode in particular. A good overview is provided
by Endler et al. (2012), who also show that most studies are either descriptive or focus on a
particular region. For example, Bendall (2010) specifically calculates the costs of re-routing
ships from the Suez Canal to the Cape of Good Hope using a model of shipping costs. Using
OECD data onmaritime transport costs, Bensassi and Martínez-Zarzoso (2013) estimate the
eects of piracy on transport cost. The authors find that the hijacking of one additional ship
between Europe and Asia increases transport costs between the two continents by 1.2%.
However, the authors do not discuss the implications of such increases in costs on prices and
the choice of transportmode. This paper shows how piracy aects producer prices, the choice
of shipment mode as well as the size of shipments.
Fu et al. (2010) construct amodel of the container liner shippingmarket in order to investigate
the impact of piracy on trade volumes. The authors find that Somali pirates have reduced
traic between Europe and the Far East through the Suez Canal by about 30%. As only some
of this traic is rerouted via the Cape of Good Hope, the annual loss is estimated to be around
30 billion USD. Bensassi and Martínez-Zarzoso (2012) estimate a gravity model, finding that 10
additional vessels being hijacked reduce exports by 11%. Both studies focus on trade between
Europe and Asia. This paper extends the scope by considering the universe of Chinese exports
to all destination countries to empirically investigate the eects of piracy on trade. Moreover,
it separately investigates eects on ocean and air trade.
3 The term “shipment size” in this paper refers to the size of the transaction reported in the customs data. It is
not the same as the amount of goods carried by a ship. Costs for military escorts or higher wages for the crew
increase the cost of a ship’s journey. If these additional costs are divided across containers, the costs of shipping
an additional container increases from the perspective of the exporter, thus providing her with an incentive to
use its entire capacity.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents the data used, while
Section 4.3 discusses the empirical strategy. Section 4.4 presents the results, followed by
robustness checks in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Data
To investigate the impact of piracy on trade and the choice of transport mode, this paper
uses Chinese customs data, which provides information onmonthly export transactions at
the firm-product(8 digit)-destination-country level for the period 2000 to 2006. Crucially, for
every transaction it also reports the main transport mode employed. While value in USD and
quantity are reported directly, unit values are imputed by dividing value by quantity. Since
export values are reported free on board, unit values can be interpreted as producer prices.
Overall, the Chinese customs data dierentiates between six dierent modes of transport
of which we use “sea and river” and “air”. We abstain from using “rail” and “road” for two
reasons. First, transportation by land is restricted primarily to Asia. Second, it may also be
subject to armed robberies that may or may not correlate with pirate activity. For the final
twomodes “mail” and “other”, it is not clear how they are transported, which is why they are
excluded from the analysis.
Data on piracy is taken from the International Maritime Organisation which provides monthly
reports on piracy incidents (allegedly committed and attempted attacks) in 13 dierent geo-
graphical areas. Panel (a) of Figure 4.1 shows the total number of pirate incidents between
2000 and 2006 by region. With only one observed case in the China Sea and 497 in the Indian
Ocean, the figure indicates substantial cross sectional variation.
The three regions most aected by piracy in the period under investigation are the South
China Seawith an average of 118 incidents per year, the IndianOcean (71 incidents per annum)
and the Strait of Malacca (49 incidents per annum). Piracy along the Coast of Somalia (East
Africa, 29 incidents per year) is not among the top three aected regions, as pirate activity
there only increased dramatically in 2008 and 2009. We choose not to extend our analysis to
these years for two reasons. First, export data for the years 2007 to 2009 are available only
at the annual level. However, aggregating to the annual level would substantially reduce
variation over time. In addition, it is possible that the financial crisis aected dierent trade
routes dierently, which could bias our estimated treatment eect.
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The number of pirate incidents by year is reported in Panel (b) of Figure 4.1. It indicates a
declining trendwhich is however interruptedby sudden increases. Amoredetailedbreakdown
of pirate incidents by region and year is provided by Figure D.1 in the Appendix. It shows that
while piracy declined in some regions such as the South China Sea, it actually increased in
others such as East Africa. Since not all piracy incidents are reported (Berg et al., 2006; Murphy,
2007), all numbers constitute a lower bound for piracy activity.
Figure 4.1: The Number of Piracy Incidents by Region and Year
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Note: Panel (a) shows the total number of piracy incidents from 2000 - 2006 by region. Panel (b) shows the total
number of piracy incidents over all regions by year. Source: Data from International Maritime Organisation.
Matching the Chinese customs data with the piracy data is a challenge because the former
does only report the destination country, not the exact route taken. For example, goods can
be shipped from China to France either through the Suez Canal or by going around Africa
along the Cape of Good Hope. The choice of route depends on several factors, including
distance, weather conditions, duties, whether or not the ship calls at certain ports for loading
and unloading of additional freight and of course the risk of piracy. It is thus not evident which
route a ship takes.
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This paper applies a conservative approach, considering all possible ocean routes between
China and the continent to which the destination country belongs. The number of piracy
cases on the route between China and the destination continent is taken to be the sum of all
piracy incidents in all areas covered by the possible ocean routes. Information on the exact
matching between areas aected by piracy and destination continent is provided in Table D.1
in the Appendix. Even though this reduces the cross sectional variation in piracy incidents to
five continents, Figure 4.2 nevertheless shows that there remains significant variation both
across continents and over time. The average number of piracy incidents per month between
2000 and 2006 was 26 along all routes to Africa, 12 for America, 22 for Asia, 26 for Europe and
10 for Oceania.
Figure 4.2: The Number of Piracy Incidents over Time by Destination Continent
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Note: The graph shows the total number of reported piracy incidents per month, covering all possible routes
from China to each of the five destination continents. Source: Data from International Maritime Organisation.
There are two obvious drawbacks to this approach. First, it is possible that all or most piracy
incidents are observed at a route which is not the preferred route anyway. In this case, the
choice of shipment mode should be independent of the piracy incidents, leading to an under-
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estimation of the treatment eect. The results presented in this paper should thus be seen as
a lower bound of the eect and a first step towards estimating the impact of piracy on trade
and the choice of transport mode.
Second, it is impossible to observe a switch in shipping routes, which also constitutes a
plausible response to piracy. A switch from one route to another due to increased pirate
activity along the first one would not be picked up by the regressions, as the variation takes
place at a more disaggregated level than the one observed in the data. However, a switch
from one ocean route to another ocean route would aect neither air travel nor the overall
value of goods shipped by ocean. While the eect of piracy on the choice of ocean routes
is an interesting research question in itself, the fact that it cannot be observed in the data
should not lead to an underestimation of the treatment eect when evaluating the eect of
piracy on overall trade as well as the choice of transport mode. However, this is only true as
long as diversion to dierent routes does not increase demand for shipping services and thus
transport costs along that alternative route, thus aecting the amount of goods shipped.
4.3 Estimation Strategy
The eect of piracy on the choice of transport mode is estimated as follows:
Ycpft = β1Piracytc + β2ln pcpft + νcpf + νpft + εcpft, (4.1)
where Ycpft is a dummy (henceforth “ocean dummy”) that equals one if a shipment to country
c from firm f of good p at time t is carried out by ship and zero otherwise. In an alternative
specification, Ycpft is the natural logarithm of the size of the transaction. Since we are using
monthly data, a time-unit equals a particular month in a particular year. Piracytc is the
number of piracy incidents on the route to country c at time t, ln pcpft is the natural logarithm
of the unit value of the transaction, νcpf and νpft are destination country-product-firm and
product-firm-time fixed eects respectively and εcpft is an error term.
Using the natural logarithm of transaction size as dependent variable and controlling for
country-product-firm fixed eects ensures that the piracy coeicient β1 identifies how the
average quantity of product p shipped by firm f to country c changes with every additional
piracy incident along a route connecting China to destination country c. Using the ocean
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dummy as dependent variable, β1 informs about the eect of piracy on the choice of shipment
mode.
Country-product-firm fixed eects also control for all unobserved time invariant variables
that may correlate with both the dependent variable and the number of piracy incidents,
thus ruling out one possible source of omitted variable bias. In particular, some routes are
more likely to experience piracy than others. One reason for this could be geography - natural
harbours provide a good basis for piracy operations. Another is the popularity of the route as
those with a lot of traic might either attract piracy (greater likelihood of capturing a ship) or
deter it (ships in distress may quickly call for help). However, while popular routes with large
trade values may or may not cause increased piracy activity, this relationship is less likely to
hold at the firm-transaction-level. Average shipment size and value (per container) should not
aect piracy on the route. Nevertheless, any remaining correlation is controlled for by using
country-product-firm fixed eects.
Global economic conditions might constitute another source of omitted variable bias. In
particular, a strong global economymight be associated with an increase in shipping activity
as well as a decline in pirate activity under the assumption that the latter is correlated with
economic hardship. Similarly, seasonality might play a role as seasonal weather conditions
simultaneously aect shipping and piracy activity. Both factors can be controlled for by using
product-firm-time fixed eects, which also account for unobserved product-firm specific time
trends.
Since we are also interested in the eect of piracy on total trade, we regress total export
quantity at the product-country-time-level (thus aggregating over all firms) on the number of
piracy incidents according to the following equation:
lnYcpt = β1Piracy(t−3)c + νcp + νcy + νcm + νpt + εcpt, (4.2)
where lnYcpt is the natural logarithm of total quantity shipped of product p to country c at
time t. Since such an estimation may be subject to simultaneity as more popular trade routes
are more likely to attract piracy, the number of piracy incidents Piracytc is lagged by three
months. This might only pose a partial solution if trade per route is correlated over time. We
therefore also use country-product fixed eects to account for all time invariant factors as well
as country-year fixed eects. Seasonality is controlled for using country-month fixed eects
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and product-time fixed eects control for global as well as product specific time trends.4
Hence, the estimated coeicient β1 tells us how total exports of a particular product p to a
particular country c change at a point in time t if the number of piracy incidents has changed
three months ago.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Firm-level Regressions
The baseline results of the firm-level regressions are reported in Table 4.1. The first column
shows results from regressing the ocean dummy, which identifies whether a transaction has
been carried out by ship as opposed to air, on the number of piracy incidents as well as
controls. The coeicient of ln price is negative and significant at the 1% level, indicating that
a one percent increase in unit values is a associated with a reduction in the likelihood of the
transaction being carried out by sea by 4.5%. Qualitatively, this result is in line with the finding
of Harrigan (2010).
Table 4.1: The Eect of Piracy on the Choice of Transport Mode
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Ocean ln quantity ln quantity ln quantity ln price ln price ln price
Variable Dummy All Ocean Air All Ocean Air
Piracy cases -0.0002*** 0.0007*** 0.0014*** -0.0001 -0.0002* -0.0002* -0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004)
ln price -0.0453*** -0.6740*** -0.6851*** -0.5159***
(0.0008) (0.0041) (0.0039) (0.0079)
Observations 10,650,883 10,614,099 8,127,057 1,437,225 10,650,883 8,136,755 1,461,519
R2 0.5799 0.8025 0.8597 0.8592 0.9585 0.9673 0.9558
Clusters 978225 975291 820381 152990 978225 821182 155136
Note: OLS regressions with country-product-firm and product-firm-time fixed eects. Robust standard errors clustered by
country-product-firm in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
4 “Month” in this contextmeans January - December, whereas “time” is a year-month combination, e.g. January
2000.
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The negative piracy coeicient of -0.0002 is significant at the 1% level and indicates that one
additional pirate incident on a particular route reduces the probability that a given firm ships
a given product to a particular country by ship by 0.02%. This result provides evidence that
increased pirate activity induces firms to reduce the number of transactions carried out by
ship relative to those by plane.
Column2of Table 4.1 presents the eects of piracy onaverage shipment size across bothocean
and air shipments. The statistically significant coeicient of 0.0007 means that the average
quantity shipped increasesby0.07% for eachpirate incidentona route. This coeicient is twice
as large when only looking at goods shipped by sea (Column 3), while it turns insignificant
when only considering air shipments (Column 4). Together with results in Column 1, this
implies that piracy induces firms to reduce the number of shipments by sea relative to air and
to increase the size of the remaining shipments. As stated in Section 4.1, one explanation for
this observation is the fact that the additional costs of piracy accrue per journey and are thus
not ad-valorem. In order to minimise costs per ton shipped, ships have an increased incentive
to run at full capacity. If they charge more per container, firms have an increased incentive to
fill them, thus explaining increased average shipment size.
Column5of Table 4.1 shows regression results from regressing ln priceon thenumber of pirate
incidents. The coeicient of -0.0002 is significant at the 10% level and indicates that average
unit values per shipment fall in the presence of piracy on a given route. This observation may
also be explained through the costs associated with piracy. Depending on the elasticity of
demand, the increase in transport costs will only partially be passed through to consumers,
so that exporters reduce producer prices. As shown by Column (6), this eect is driven by
goods shipped by sea. There is no evidence for a change in unit values of goods shipped by air
(Column 7).
4.4.2 Product-level Regressions
Table 4.2 presents regression results at the product-level. The significantly negative coeicient
of -0.0009 reported in Column (1) means that one additional case of piracy along a particular
route is associated with a 0.1% fall in exports to all countries on that route. Looking at Column
(2), it can be seen that this aggregate trade eect is driven by a reduction in ocean trade. While
ocean trade declines by 0.1%, the respective coeicient for air trade (Column (3)) is, while
identical in magnitude, not significantly dierent from zero. Looking at Figure 4.2, that means
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that in an average month with 26 piracy cases along the route to Europe, trade is around 2.3%
lower than in the absence of piracy.
Table 4.2: The Eect of Piracy on Chinese Exports
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent ln quantity ln quantity ln quantity
Variable Aggregate Ocean Air
Piracy cases -0.0009** -0.0011*** -0.0011
(lagged) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0008)
Observations 4,896,465 3,770,565 1,019,446
R2 0.6346 0.8071 0.7852
Clusters 211881 194934 70184
Note: OLS regressions with piracy cases lagged by 3 months,
country-product, country-year, country-month and product-time
fixed eects. Robust standard errors clustered by country-product
in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
4.5 Robustness Checks
In our baseline regression, we use Chinese export data to investigate eects of piracy on firms’
choice of transport mode. In a robustness check, we run the same regressions using import
data. The results are summarized in Table 4.3 below. The significantly negative coeicient of
piracy in Column (1) reveals that Chinese importers also react to piracy by switching to air
transportation. The coeicient is twice as large as its equivalent in Table 4.1, suggesting that
importers may react more sensitively than exporters. The coeicient of ln price is similar to
the baseline.
However, Column (2) of Table 4.3 does not provide evidence for increased shipment size
following an increase in pirate activity. This is true for both, trade carried out by ocean
(Column (3)) and air (Column (4)). Finally, Column (5) indicates no eect of piracy on prices.
This result is, however, not directly comparable to the baseline because import values - and
thus imputed unit values - are reported at cost insurance freight. They can be interpreted
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as consumer prices and provide evidence that producers do not pass on the piracy induced
increase in transportation cost to consumers. The result is hence in line with falling producer
prices indicated by Column (5) of Table 4.1. Interestingly, the price coeicient for ocean
shipments (Column 6) is significantly negative while that for air shipments (Column 7) remains
insignificant. There is no evidence that piracy negatively aects import quantity at theproduct-
level (Table D.2 in the Appendix).
Table 4.3: The Eect of Piracy on the Choice of Transport Mode, Imports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Ocean ln quantity ln quantity ln quantity ln price ln price ln price
Variable Dummy All Ocean Air All Ocean Air
Piracy cases -0.0004*** -0.0009 -0.0015 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0009** -0.0006
(0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006)
ln price -0.0455*** -0.6441*** -0.6439*** -0.5265***
(0.0007) (0.0037) (0.0073) (0.0048)
Observations 7,155,017 6,854,297 2,959,643 2,385,407 7,155,017 3,020,738 2,565,631
R2 0.6206 0.8560 0.9010 0.8618 0.9210 0.9515 0.9190
Clusters 548448 529845 283530 205965 548448 288199 220062
Note: OLS regressions with country-product-firm and product-firm-time fixed eects. Robust standard errors clustered by
country-product-firm in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Product-firm-time fixed eects are used in the baseline to control - among other things - for
seasonal variation. However, when it comes to the choice of transport mode, weather condi-
tions can be very dierent across dierent routes at the same point in time. As an additional
robustness check, we hence perform the firm-level regression, controlling for country-month
fixed eects. The results are reported in Table D.3 in the Appendix. All coeicients remain
similar to the baseline results in both magnitude and significance. The only exception are the
estimated eects of piracy on prices presented in Columns (5) and (6) of Table D.3, which turn
insignificant.
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4.6 Conclusion
This paper combines Chinese customs data with detailed information on pirate activity to
investigate the eects of piracy on firms’ choice of transport mode as well as aggregate trade
flows. Aer briefly illustrating that piracy can bemodelled as an increase in fixed costs per
shipment, it was shown that, in line with the literature, an increase in piracy along a trade
route induces exporters to switch from ocean to air transport, while the remaining ocean
shipments become larger. This is accompanied by a fall in average producer prices, which can
be explained by the fact that a piracy induced increase in transport costs is not fully passed
on to consumers.
Aggregating over all firms exporting a particular product to a particular country, it was shown
that, despite the aforementioned reactions of exporters, overall trade declines along routes
aected by piracy. More specifically, 26 piracy incidents per month on a particular route
(the average number for Europe) reduce exports on average by 2.3%. Given the sources of
measurement error due to data availability discussed in Section 4.2, this estimate is likely to
constitute a lower bound of the true treatment eect.
Overall, the results thus show that piracy does have a small but significant dampening impact
on trade. Beyond obvious humanitarian reasons, this constitutes an additional motive for
governments to act. Moreover, the switch from ocean to air travel along routes aected by
piracy may have second order eects for other industries that have not yet been considered.
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Appendix D.1 Additional Figures and Tables
Figure D.1: The Number of Piracy Incidents over Time by Region
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Note: The graph reports the total number of piracy incidents from 2000 - 2006 by region. Source: Data from
International Maritime Organisation.
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Table D.1: Matching of Regions to Continents
Continent Region Continent Region Continent Region
Africa
East Africa
China Sea
South China Sea
Malacca Strait
Far East
Indian Ocean
West Africa
Europe
China Sea
South China Sea
Malacca Strait
Far East
Indian Ocean
Arabian Sea
Mediterranean Sea
West Africa
North Atlantic Ocean
North Sea
East Africa
Asia
China Sea
South China Sea
Malacca Strait
Far East
Indian Ocean
Arabian Sea
Persian Gulf
East Africa
Americas
China Sea
South China Sea
South America
Oceania
China Sea
South China Sea
Far East
Note: Authors’ own allocation
Table D.2: The Eect of Piracy on Chinese Imports
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent ln quantity ln quantity ln quantity
Variable Aggregate Ocean Air
Piracy cases 0.0004 0.0001 0.0014
(lagged) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Observations 2,814,960 1,599,758 1,104,302
R2 0.7210 0.8622 0.7807
Clusters 88113 67523 54258
Note: OLS regressions with piracy cases lagged by 3 months,
country-product, country-year, country-month and product-time
fixed eects. Robust standard errors clustered by country-product
in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table D.3: The Eect of Piracy on the Choice of Transport Mode, Seasonality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Ocean ln quantity ln quantity ln quantity ln price ln price ln price
Variable Dummy All Ocean Air All Ocean Air
Piracy cases -0.0002*** 0.0006** 0.0013*** -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004)
ln price -0.0453*** -0.6738*** -0.6849*** -0.5159***
(0.0008) (0.0041) (0.0039) (0.0079)
Observations 10,650,819 10,614,035 8,126,992 1,436,978 10,650,819 8,136,690 1,461,273
R2 0.5800 0.8026 0.8598 0.8594 0.9586 0.9673 0.9559
Clusters 978206 975272 820360 152924 978206 821161 155072
Note: OLS regressions with country-product-firm, product-firm-time and country-month fixed eects.
Robust standard errors clustered by country-product-firm in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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